


Heresy in Transition

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Ian
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Transforming Ideas of Heresy in Medieval
and Early Modern Europe

Edited by Ian Hunter, John Christian Laursen, and Cary J. Nederman



Catholic Christendom, 1300–1700

HERESY IN TRANSITION

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Transforming Ideas of Heresy in Medieval and Early
Modern Europe

Edited by

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Series Editor's Preface

The still-usual emphasis on medieval (or Catholic) and reformation (or Protestant) religious history has meant neglect of the middle ground, both chronological and ideological. As a result, continuities between the middle ages and early modern Europe have been overlooked in favor of emphasis on radical discontinuities. Further, especially in the later period, the identification of 'reformation' with various kinds of Protestantism means that the vitality and creativity of the established church, whether in its Roman or local manifestations, has been left out of account. In the last few years, an upsurge of interest in the history of traditional (or catholic) religion makes these inadequacies in received scholarship even more glaring and in need of systematic correction. The series will attempt this by covering all varieties of religious behavior, broadly interpreted, not just (or even especially) traditional institutional and doctrinal church history. It will to the maximum degree possible be interdisciplinary, comparative and global, as well as non-confessional. The goal is to understand religion, primarily of the 'Catholic' variety, as a broadly human phenomenon, rather than as a privileged mode of access to superhuman realms, even implicitly.

The period covered, 1300-1700, embraces the moment which saw an almost complete transformation of the place of religion in the life of Europeans, whether considered as a system of beliefs, as an institution, or as a set of social and cultural practices. In 1300, vast numbers of Europeans, from the pope down, fully expected Jesus's return and the beginning of His reign on earth. By 1700, very few Europeans, of whatever level of education, would have subscribed to such chiliastic beliefs. Pierre Bayle's notorious sarcasms about signs and portents are not idiosyncratic. Likewise, in 1300 the vast majority of Europeans probably regarded the pope as their spiritual head; the institution he headed was probably the most tightly

integrated and effective bureaucracy in Europe. Most Europeans were at least nominally Christian, and the pope had at least nominal knowledge of that fact. The papacy, as an institution, played a central role in high politics, and the clergy in general formed an integral part of most governments, whether central or local. By 1700, Europe was divided into a myriad of different religious allegiances, and even those areas officially subordinate to the pope were both more nominally Catholic in belief (despite colossal efforts at imposing uniformity) and also in allegiance than they had been four hundred years earlier. The pope had become only one political factor, and not one of the first rank. The clergy, for its part, had virtually disappeared from secular governments as well as losing much of its local authority. The stage was set for the Enlightenment.

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Introduction

Ian Hunter, John Christian Laursen and Cary J.
Nederman

Systems of religion that require the faithful to adhere to a strict standard of belief and/or worship generally produce a concomitant idea of heresy, understood as an error in matters directly related to the truths of one's confession.¹ The terminology of heresy originated in the Judeo-Christian tradition, deriving from the Greek word *hairesis*, which means both 'deliberate choice' and 'sect.' The word is employed by Josephus to describe several sects widespread in Judea, and is applied to St. Paul in Acts 24:5 and Acts 28:22 by Roman authorities.

It is possible to conceive of heresy according to either a broad or a narrow understanding. In the broadest understanding, different religions are heretical to each other. In a narrower sense, it is only disagreements among those who profess the same religion that can lead to heresy, while different religions concern infidels. This broadness or narrowness is reproduced inside any single religion, as well. Thus, broadly conceived, heresy can be found in any religion that attempts to define or codify its doctrines as an orthodoxy, excluding certain people who refuse profession of a core set of teachings yet claim to adhere to the faith. The formulation and construction of orthodoxy thus entails the logical possibility of heresy and a concern about its appearance and dissemination. Christianity in its early phases was heresiological in this broad manner. Beginning after c. 150 AD, Christian apologists, taking direction from St. Paul's attacks upon religious diversity among the alleged followers of Jesus, condemned the heretical tendencies of numerous Christian sects. As it developed from St. Justin and Irenaeus in the second century through Tertullian and Hippolytus of Rome in the third century to the crowning

achievement of Epiphanius in the fourth century, a large literature of anti-heretical classification and criticism became a hallmark of Christian polemic, accompanied by the construction of unitary Christian doctrine.

The concept of heresy was transformed within the Christian tradition, however, in accordance with a second and narrower understanding, insofar as heretical 'error' came to be seen to require forms of correction and punishment, both temporal and spiritual. To the extent that heresy was singled out by Christians as an especially dangerous sort of spiritual outlook, different in nature and kind from apostasy and similar forms of infidelity, it demanded persecution and extirpation of a greater intensity than other modes of unbelief. What rendered heresy special? Quite simply, the fact that those who were heretics had been admitted, through baptism and sacrament, into the unified soul the communion — of the Christian church. As a consequence, heterodoxy was particularly horrific because those who adopted it maintained not only that they were Christians, but that their version of Christianity was truer and more pure than the orthodox one. Heresy was therefore a disease of the soul that was extremely contagious if not quickly treated; the prevention of its spread to the remainder of the believing community justified even the use of physical violence against those who persisted in upholding it. And Christianity, with the universalistic pretensions of its 'catholic' church, found temporal resources to enforce its spiritual vision in a way that other religions were unable or unprepared to pursue.

The first several centuries of Christian history, scholars have noted, witnessed heretical movements in far larger numbers than any other religion of that or other times. Such quantitative data, while illustrative, do not fully capture the character of the historical evolution of the place of heresy within Christianity. In the period following the integration of the Christian church into the official apparatus of the Roman Empire, the perseverance of longstanding heterodox views, as well as the appearance and diffusion of new deviant stances, suggests the ineffectiveness with which the specific content of Christianity, as opposed to its general form, had been disseminated to late classical society at large. The Bishop of Hippo (and eventual saint) Augustine expressed evident frustration with the myriad heresies that he

combated, a testament to the widespread and deep roots of Christian diversity. It may be, as some scholars have suggested, that the scope of the beliefs that counted as heresy grew along with the confidence of a Christian church supported by the political mandate of the Empire. But it also seems to be the case that the implacable imposition of orthodoxy encouraged the spontaneous emergence of innovative expressions of heretical sentiment.

Ultimately, St. Augustine concluded that patient fraternal correction of heretics — his original prescribed remedy for heresy — required supplement in the form of bodily compulsion and even execution. Persecution became an approved treatment of the contagion, yet the ability of ecclesiastical officials to impose coercive penalties certainly declined with the erosion of a centralized imperial regime.² Until the eleventh century, evidence for the presence of heresy among European Christians is so sketchy as to render impossible any sustained conclusions. Even the widely held view that new Christian heresies began to crop up with alarming frequency after about 1100 has been effectively countered. The undisputed fact that the church and secular authorities during the High Middle Ages began to uncover and exterminate heresy has instead been said to reflect an upswing in theological zeal on the part of consolidating political and ecclesiastical institutions, yielding the 'persecuting society' famously posited by R. I. Moore.³ The weight of attempts to repress heresies and heretics may be said to stand in direct relation to the rigor of efforts to define orthodoxy and establish uniformity.

The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which proscribed a range of heresies as well as other forms of religious and moral non-conformity, represents in many ways the apogee of the persecutorial impulse during the Latin Middle Ages. The Council propounded a series of decrees that amounted to a comprehensive standard for inclusion in and exclusion from the community of Christian believers. Those who asserted membership, whether by reason of baptism or by partaking of the sacraments, yet who refused to submit to their clerical superiors in matters of creed and conduct, were subject to excommunication and to the temporal penalties (imprisonment, confiscation, and corporal and capital punishment) that

followed therefrom. The canon law that had formed the backbone of institutional ecclesiastical development in the twelfth century stipulated a fixed legal procedure, *inquisitio*, to address reputed crimes of notorious or flagrant heresy.⁴

Ironically, the stimulus for the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council was yet another round of demands for clerical renewal, arising from recurring sentiment on the part of the laity (and also some high-minded churchmen) that the clergy had become corrupt and was misleading (if not fleeing) the flock whose souls they were assigned to guard. The persistence of heresy in Christian Europe may thus be intimately linked with reforming sentiment that remained wholly orthodox and reflected an acceptable measure of religious zeal. Both the popular heresies that the church struggled to suppress (such as Catharism) and the more elite heresies (centered in the schools) whose advocates courted censure by ecclesiastical authorities (such as the Spiritual wing of the Franciscan order) tended to direct their outrage toward clerical corruption (doctrinal as well earthly) and to call for the reinvigoration of moral and spiritual purity.

Yet the impression that authorities in medieval Christian society were uniformly persecuting in the treatment of heretics is misleading. Widespread anti-clericalism fostered sympathy toward and protection of heretics by secular officials who did not themselves subscribe to the heresy, as was the case with the Cathars in thirteenth-century Orvieto.⁵ Powerful European rulers regularly sheltered accused heretics amongst the intelligentsia and employed them as counselors and polemicists in their causes against popes and the ecclesiastical hierarchy generally. Scholastic authors were also shielded by the institutions of the university from subjection to inquisitional procedures and the punishments that might follow. In sum, resistance to the strict imposition of orthodoxy remained a feature of Latin Christianity throughout the Middle Ages.⁶

In the wake of the Reformation, with the shattering of confessional and institutional unity, heresy increasingly acquired an unfocused quality as an all-purpose term of religious derision. Christians of differing affiliations employed the language of heresy to fling accusations at each other Catholics against Protestants as well as Protestants against one another and against Catholics — so that eventually the epithet

'heretical' came to denote nearly any form of apostasy or infidelity. In effect, the meaning of heresy in Western society was in the process of changing from the narrowly technical one that referred to obdurate dissent from orthodox authority into an all-purpose charge levied against anyone who expressed a belief or opinion different from one's own.

Yet in the midst of the historical processes that occasioned the transformation from medieval to early modern approaches to heresy, plenty of opportunities remained for transitional moments that defy precise classification into one or the other side of the historical divide. In 1635, the most famous Saxon jurist of the seventeenth century, Benedict Carpzov, offered a confident characterization of heresy: 'I call heresy an obstinate error in the articles of faith'.⁷ Of course, Carpzov's confidence was misplaced. In attempting to refashion the weapon of heresy prosecution for use by a Protestant confessional state in the middle of the Thirty Years War, he was already on borrowed time. This was due to expire in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia, whose enforced toleration of the three main religions signalled the end of heresy as a juridical reality. Yet, Carpzov was drawing on the key canonistic definition of heresy, and Saxon Anabaptists were still being executed for heresy in the seventeenth century, even if Carpzov himself recommended restricting punishments to excommunication and deportation.⁸

Carpzov may thus be regarded as a transitional figure. In carrying forward the central canon law definition of heresy — which conceived heresy as criminal deviation from unimpeachably true doctrine he was wielding a theological-juridical weapon which had been forged by the Catholic church to combat the great heretical movements of the middle ages. By the end of the century, however, Christian Thomasius could treat heresy as a purely historical phenomenon — albeit a still dangerous one indicative of the means by which theologians and churches had mercilessly enforced their creeds by claiming a monopoly on true faith.⁹ Moreover, he could treat Carpzov's confessional jurisprudence as symptomatic of this malign history.¹⁰ The world that Carpzov was losing was one where it was possible for a single church to set the limits of orthodox belief (no matter how contested this process proved to be); and where the church's alliance with state and empire made it

possible to persecute the heretics who transgressed these limits (no matter how unstable this alliance proved to be). The world that Thomasius was entering was one in which the advent of an irreducible plurality of sects made all talk of orthodoxy and heresy merely sectarian, and where the alliance between church and state had either been dissolved or was maintained as an open marriage, permitting the state to entertain other churches on the side.

So profound was this change in religious and political culture, and so deeply has it informed our narratives of modernity and our sense of self, that it challenges the scholarly imagination to recover medieval understandings of heresy and then to chart their transformation during the early modern period. Nonetheless, that is what the essays collected in this volume set out to do. In doing so, they imitate their object, straddling the transition between medieval and early modern constructions of heresy. Half of the chapters investigate the manner in which the church and its attendant civil authorities defined and proscribed heresy. The other half focus on the means by which early modern writers sought to supersede such definition and proscription, paying particular attention to the 'histories of heresy' which removed heresy from the domain of truth and falsity and turned it into an explicable historical phenomenon.

One of the striking things to emerge from the investigation of medieval heresy is the intensity of the reaction it evoked from the orthodox, and the routine violence of their response. Under circumstances in which religious belief and practice penetrated deep into society, and in which the civil and religious community were scarcely distinguishable, religious deviance was often perceived as an immediate threat to the community's sacramental relation to God, to be met with violent expulsion. Paul Hayward thus observes that while English and Norman chroniclers paid little attention to heresy prior to the twelfth century, the arrival of Cathar missionaries was treated as an unprecedented threat requiring a harsh response to re-establish the faith community. Unprecedented, perhaps, but certainly not unprepared for. As Hayward notes, these chroniclers had earlier retold exemplary anecdotes regarding the fate of heretics — most notably the story of the heresiarch Arius's self-evisceration

while emptying his bowels, indicative of the visceral repulsion and violence accompanying the defence of ecclesial orthodoxy and hierarchy.

Rooting heresy in the body did not mean that its uprooting was always so violent. In her discussion of the thirteenth-century followers of the Parisian master, Amalric, Sabina Flanagan notes that providing heresy with a bodily basis sometimes allowed it to be medicalized as a species of madness, thereby mitigating the crime and avoiding its punishments. Even ascribing madness to diabolical possession could have the same mitigating effect, unless the Devil's presence in the body was itself treated as a sign of heresy, which would dictate an altogether more violent mode of expulsion.

Regardless of the visceral depths to which the medieval fear of heresy penetrated the social and individual body, heresies themselves were delineated and fought over by the church's intellectual elite, the theologians of the universities, cathedral schools, and monasteries. Responding to the view of twelfth-century theology as heralding the emergence of a 'persecuting society', Constant Mews focuses on the diversity and complexity of twelfth-century conceptions of heresy. Mews provides insights into both the extraordinary sophistication and sensitivity of the triggers for heresy allegations — the minefield of deadly subtleties surrounding the duality of Christ's natures and the trinity of the Godhead — and into their role as weapons for defending or attacking particular configurations of the believing community.

Something similar emerges from Takashi Shogimen's account of the struggle over juridical and theological constructions of heresy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Clerical authorities sought to endow heresy with an overtly institutional thrust. Shogimen shows that Ockham's sophisticated theological retort to this effort — via his treatment of heresy in terms of the misconstrual of authoritative texts — resulted in a far more individualized application of the definition of heresy as an obstinate error in the articles of faith.

Of course, not all medieval scholars wrote as intellectual shock-troops of the militant church. Cary Nederman's discussion of Marsiglio of Padua and his reception by Nicole Oresme reveals how articulating grounds for the separation of civil and

religious authority might attract the charge of heresy in the attempt. The fact that Marsiglio's ideas remained current in the immediate following generations suggests his status as a transitional figure. In turn, Oresme's appropriation of Marsiglio's famously heretical doctrines, when carefully disguised, could render them palatable to an audience that considered itself fully orthodox.

The illusion that matters somehow radically change as we approach the threshold of early modernity is explored by Thomas Fudge's discussion of Aeneas Sylvius's history of the Hussite heretics. Aeneas Silvius provides a particularly vivid illustration of the way in which sophisticated Christian humanists could harness their intellects to the stigmatizing and demonizing of heretics, treating them as a polluting threat to be eliminated from a society understood as a unified mystical body. Even in the more temperate climate of sixteenth-century Canterbury, those charged with the dual task of rooting out the Lollard heresy and reforming the clergy were erudite clerical humanists, trained in Italy or at Oxbridge. They represented 'the educated elite of the English ecclesiastical machine', as Craig D'Alton puts it in his fine-grained account of these events.

On the other hand, early modern writers whose prime concern was the legitimacy of the territorial state and its sovereign might adopt an opposite tack concerning the threat of heresy. One of these was Thomas Hobbes who, as Conal Condren points out, drew on Marsiglian ideas in his works on the history of the church and heresy. With Hobbes, some of the central themes of the early modern historicisation of heresy step to center stage: in particular the ambivalence of Constantine as the unifier of church and state, and the role of Greek philosophy in converting faith into enforceable doctrine, thereby giving rise to heresy-mongering as a chief form of priestcraft. Perez Zagorin has recently claimed that Hobbes was 'one of the first thinkers' to attempt to deal with the origins of the idea of heresy, and with that we may understand him as one of the first to historicize heresy.¹¹ If that is true, it reinforces once again the conventional wisdom that Hobbes was a watershed thinker. But not all historicizations of heresy could afford to relativize heresy and (by implication) religious truth in the Hobbesian manner. Condren thus observes that Archbishop John Sharp's defence of

Anglican latitudinarianism meant that he would maintain the concept of heresy, but in a benign form, as a goad to the historical search for truth.

Thomas Ahnert and John Christian Laursen discuss the diversity of the new histories of heresy. Focusing on ecclesial and heresy histories written by Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius, Gottfried Arnold, and the Pietist theologian Joachim Lange, Ahnert demonstrates a spectrum of positions taken up with regard to the doctrinalizing of faith. These ranged from the orthodox, through 'enthusiast' spiritualism, to the middle-ground of the Pietists. Laursen's focus is elsewhere, on the strategies adopted to obtain the 'impartiality' claimed by many of the new historians of heresy. Gottfried Arnold's famous history thus aspires to impartiality by claiming to occupy no particular confessional position, yet in doing so relies on a doctrinaire spiritualist theology. Johann Lorenz Mosheim, however, adopts a different strategy, seeking impartiality by self-consciously occupying a temperate middle-ground between the confessional extremes.

Arnold receives a more sympathetic reception in Ian Hunter's chapter, where his spiritualist theology is treated as the (anti-metaphysical) condition of adopting a historical and relativistic view of heresy and religious truth. Hunter's main interest, though, is in the manner in which this view was able to feed into the treatment of heresy in Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* (constitutional church law), specifically in the work of Christian Thomasius whose decriminalization of heresy incorporated Arnold's historicized and relativistic view of the erstwhile crime.

Gisela Schlüter's chapter explores the Italian and German translations of a widely-read French history of heresy first published in 1762-64, and the fortunes of that French work in its later reprintings. She demonstrates that in Italy it served a role in the Catholic Enlightenment, as the translator added polemics against the Jesuits. In Germany, it joined the ranks of 'popular encyclopedias', providing a Catholic answer to Protestant histories of heresy and criticizing compromises with the radical Enlightenment. In France the work was reissued in 1847 with major revisions which added significantly to the catalog of heresies, a clear response to reform movements within French Catholicism. These translations and later editions

demonstrate that the historiography of heresy was always closely integrated into national political controversy.

Finally, in Sandra Pott's discussion of the histories of heresy, we pass through the crucial transition of early modernity and into the modern period where heresy has ceased to be a danger and is being transformed into an object of cultural memory. By focusing on the theme of pre-Reformation 'witnesses of truth' — through which heresy historians had transformed medieval heretics into proto-Protestants — Pott captures the process whereby the historicisation of heresy is transformed into literary topos and cultural common sense.

In addition to discussing the roles of theology, law and politics, the chapters in this book explore the role of nationalism and linguistic identity in constructions of heresy. They draw attention to analogies and alternative concepts such as treason and madness, and to the role of passions and emotions in identifying heresies and sponsoring reactions to them. They contrast the attraction and repulsion, the fascination and disgust, with which heresy was received. They bring out the role of class, status, and professional orientation in different responses to heresy. And, of course, they show when and where historicization emerged as one of the chief factors in the modern understanding of heresy.

The interpretation of changes in the idea of heresy is, in turn, itself profoundly historical. Among Enlightenment thinkers, the heretics and heresies of the past became valorized as part of a heroic struggle to realize religious toleration and humanistic values. John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* (1859) held up heterodox movements of the Middle Ages as bearers of the truths whose suppression slowed the progress of humanity. Some recent students of heretical ideas barely conceal their admiration for the independence of mind expressed in the dissenting outlooks they study. Such apparent anachronisms retain the earlier sense of horror with which heresy was viewed by the orthodox, but they revalue heretical doctrines as expressions of personal or communal autonomy and refusals to submit to arbitrary power. Such is the scholarly state of the history of heresy today.

¹ For a useful overview, see John B. Henderson, *The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish, and Early Christian Patterns* (Albany, 1998).

² See R. I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent* (London, 1977).

³ R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* (Oxford, 1987).

⁴ Elizabeth Vodola, *Excommunication in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1986).

⁵ Carol Lansing, *Power and Purity: Cathar Heresy in Medieval Italy* (Oxford, 1998).

⁶ Cary J. Nederman, *Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Religious Toleration, c. 1100-c.1550* (University Park, Penn., 2000).

⁷ Benedict Carpzov, *Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium*, (Frankfurt, 1635), fol. 280, § 4.

⁸ Winfried Trusen, 'Rechtliche Grundlagen des Häresiebegriffs and des Ketzerverfahrens', in S. S. Menchi, ed., *Ketzerverfolgung im 16. and frühen 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 1220.

⁹ Christian Thomasius, 'Ob Ketzerei ein straffbares Verbrechen sei? / An haeresis sit crimen' (1697), in *Auserlesene deutsche Schriften, Erster Teil* (Halle, 1705), pp. 210-307.

¹⁰ Thomasius, 'Ketzerei', p. 214.

¹¹ Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, 2003), p. 18.

Chapter 1

Before the Coming of Popular Heresy: The Rhetoric of Heresy in English Historiography, c. 700-1154

Paul Antony Hayward

Introduction

It is the intention of this chapter to survey the ways in which heresy figures in historical works produced in a country which appears to have remained largely free of doctrinal conflict from the time when its peoples were first converted to Christianity until the fourteenth century. It will shed light on the functions that the rhetoric of heresy has played in medieval historiography prior to the coming of organised popular heresy. The country in question is England, and the texts that will be examined comprise historical works by Bede, Ælfric of Eynsham, John of Worcester, Henry of Huntingdon and William of Malmesbury. For the purpose of comparison attention will also be given to the certain works composed on the Continent — that is, to the works of Gregory of Tours, of Orderic Vitalis and to various *vitae* and *miracula* composed at the monastery of Bec.

1. Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*

Three doctrinal heresies figure in Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*: Arianism, Pelagianism and Quartodecimanism. The rise of the 'Arian madness' (*vaesania Arrii*) in the fourth century and its corruption of the world to the point where it infected even as remote an island as Britain is briefly covered in book one.¹ Rather more attention is given to the rise of Pelagianism and to the efforts of the orthodox to refute this heresy, especially

among the Britons: Bede refers to the alleged British origins of Pelagius himself and to the efforts of Augustine to refute the teachings of his apologist, Julianus of Campania;² moreover, he devotes some five chapters to the two anti-Pelagian missions of Germanus, bishop of Auxerre (d. 446), to Britain.³ The latter chapters are taken almost verbatim from the late fifth-century *Life of Germanus* by Constantius of Lyons.⁴ The Quartodeciman heresy — that is, the heresy of celebrating Easter from the fourteenth day of the moon in the Hebrew month of Nisan on whatever day of the week on which it fell, even when it did not fall on a Sunday — figures in Bede's treatment of the divergences between the Irish and English Churches over the Easter question. Here he quotes at length Pope John IV's letter accusing the Irish of Pelagianism and of the Quartodeciman heresy.⁵ This letter implied that there were some Quartodeciman heretics in Ireland, but Bede's commentary suggests that this deviation was atypical. The practice was, he comments, only a recent aberration and the entire race was not implicated in it. He returns to this point several times, explicitly exculpating Aidan, the monks of Iona and later the bishops who consecrated Chad. However mistaken their methods of calculating the date of Easter, 'they did not always observe it on the fourteenth day of the moon, as some believe, but they celebrated it always on Sunday, just not in the proper week'.⁶

Such scrupulousness in the use of evidence implies a deep concern for historical accuracy, and there is certainly much about Bede's treatment of the theme which suggests a scholarly adherence to his model, Eusebius of Caesarea's *Historia Ecclesiastica*.⁷ In his preface Eusebius had listed heresy among his major themes: second (or third, depending how they are counted) among the chief matters to be covered were 'the names and dates of those who through a passion for innovation have wandered as far as possible from the truth, proclaiming themselves the founts of Knowledge falsely so called while mercilessly, like savage wolves, making havoc of Christ's flock'.⁸ For Eusebius heresy was a fundamental topic for the historian of the Church, in part because outbreaks of heresy had been obstacles to the fulfilment of God's plan for the advance of the true faith, but chiefly because heresies — the long-since refuted as well as the recent — were still tearing at the unity of the

Church. They had to be identified and condemned in the strongest terms lest the faithful should succumb to them.⁹ Given that popular heresy was not a pressing issue in his milieu, Bede's interest in the issue is perhaps to be explained by his adherence to the generic format established by Eusebius, and there are indeed moments where his approach to heresy seems to echo Eusebius with almost mechanical precision. According to Eusebius the trait which has always distinguished heresy from orthodoxy has been novelty: the true Church, 'always remaining the same and unchanged', has been faced with a seemingly endless succession of challenges as 'one after another new heresies [have been] invented, the earlier ones constantly passing away and disappearing, in different ways at different times, into forms of every shape and character'.¹⁰ Thus, Bede regards heresy as an expression of a flippant desire for novelty: every 'foul heresy' poured into fourth-century Britain, he explains, because 'the [British] Isles always delight in hearing something new and hold firmly to no belief'.¹¹

There is, however, a polemical edge to Bede's scholarship. As Walter Goffart has argued, the care evident in his account of the alleged Quartodecimanism of the Irish was driven by an urge to correct Stephen the Priest's vision of the recent past — a vision in which Archbishop Wilfrid had singlehandedly renewed the English Church's Roman orthodoxy and saved it from confusion.' In particular, it was Stephen who had 'falsely supposed' that Aidan and the Irish bishops who had consecrated Chad were Quartodecimans.¹³ Bede knew that here Stephen had gone too far, and this slip provided him with an opportunity to expose the Wilfridians' lack of respect for the many who besides themselves had made worthy contributions to the Christianisation of the English.

This is not the only polemical dimension in Bede's treatment of the issue of heresy. Just as Eusebius was concerned with conflicts over doctrine because these defined the boundaries of the true Church,¹⁴ so Bede deploys the rhetoric of heresy to establish a gratuitous contrast between the English Church and its most immediate competitor, the British Church. The orthodoxy of the English is celebrated above all in Bede's account of the Synod of Hatfield. This synod was part of the efforts of Pope Agatho (678-81) to halt to spread of the

Monothelite heresy, which was then endemic in the Byzantine Empire. A survey of the beliefs of the various western Churches was one of his preliminary steps, and it was in obedience to this papal directive that Archbishop Theodore summoned the bishops, abbots and abbesses of England to attend a synod which was held in 679. Each was questioned as to whether they adhered to the faith as defined by the first five ecumenical councils — that is, by the council of Nicaea in 325, of Constantinople in 381, of Ephesus in 431, of Chalcedon in 451, and of Constantinople in 553. The synod duly found that none of them were heretics. Bede quotes at length from the records of the synod and notes with some pride that its findings were well-received when they were reported in Rome: 'The testimony of the English to the Catholic faith was carried to Rome and most gladly received by the pope and by all those who heard it or read it'.¹⁵ 'To Bede's evident gratification', as Henry Chadwick puts it, 'the decisions of the Council of Hatfield proved how meticulously orthodox the English Churches were'.¹⁶

It is true that Bede concedes that the British 'had no desire at all' to succumb to Pelagianism,¹⁷ but there is no doubting the sharp contrast he draws between the British weakness for doctrinal error and the steadfast orthodoxy of the English from their conversion. In his final sections of the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, for example, Bede draws out a threefold comparison between the Irish who have lately been converted, through the agency of the English, to the correct form of Easter observance, the Britons who, 'incorrigible and hobbling along in their ways' (*inueterati et claudicantes a semitis suis*), persist in their errors, and the English who are now — that is, around 731 when he was writing — 'believers instructed in every aspect of the Catholic faith'.¹⁸ The heresies of the British were, for Bede, one of the many faults that caused their displacement by the English;¹⁹ but it is a testimony to his ingenuity that this discourse of ethnic self-justification (which can be seen as the obligatory jingoism of the society in which he operated)²⁰ is aligned with the cause of ecclesiastical reform.²¹ For a crucial point in Bede's account of the anti-Pelagian missions of Germanus is that the British succumbed to this heresy because they lacked the ability 'to refute by argument the subtleties of [this] evil doctrine'. It was a 'beneficent decision' that led them to seek the help of the 'Gallic

bishops'.²² Thanks to the two *bishops*, Germanus and his companion Severus, 'the faith remained untainted in those parts for a very long time'.²³ Bede's lesson for his English readers, in short, is that their continuing freedom from heresy (and with it their possession of their lands in Britain) depends on the full and proper exercise of episcopal authority by competent bishops.²⁴

It is instructive at this point to compare Bede's use of the rhetoric of heresy with that found in the works of Gregory of Tours. Like Bede, Gregory invokes the menace of a heresy that had long ceased to be a living issue in his milieu – that is, in the Loire Valley of the 570s and 580s. The spectre of Arianism figures prominently in his *Historiarum libri decem*, even though, as Walter Goffart puts it, it would have been hard for 'normal Catholics of Gregory's generation to look around and regard Arianism as an active menace'.²⁵ Like Bede, he also invokes the menace of heresy in the service of episcopal authority. Indeed, it is tempting to argue that Bede derived his interest in the topic from reading Gregory as well as Eusebius. But whereas Bede utilises the rhetoric of heresy to demonstrate the need for an effective episcopate, Gregory turns it into a weapon of episcopal authority per se. Thus, in a telling passage he likens the fate of a man who had dared to diminish the power of a bishop of Clermont Ferrand to administer the properties of his church with that of Arius as reported by Rufinus in his Latin translation of Eusebius.²⁶ Like Arius, this man had also died while sitting on the toilet. There is no question, Gregory concludes, but that he 'was guilty of a crime no less than that of Arius, who likewise emptied his entrails into a latrine through his rear, because it cannot be accepted without heresy that in the Church one may disobey God's bishop, who has been entrusted with the task of pasturing the sheep, and that power may be usurped there by a man who has been entrusted with nothing by either God or man'.²⁷ Though both historians are concerned with enhancing episcopal authority, they differ over means and ends. Whereas Gregory would strengthen the episcopate by making opposition to episcopal authority itself a heresy, in Bede it is the ever-present danger of doctrinal heresy that requires the establishment of a stronger episcopate of a particular kind. Whereas Gregory is eager to extend the concept of heresy so

that it can cover any offence against episcopal authority, Bede keeps it within the doctrinal sphere.

2. Ælfric of Eynsham

Ælfric was an author chiefly of homilies in the vernacular and cannot, therefore, be described as an ecclesiastical historian in the strict sense,²⁸ but he nevertheless provides a useful case study for the present essay as his works illustrate the continuing use — in the decades either side of the millennium when historical writing was largely in abeyance in England — of the rhetoric of heresy to consolidate episcopal authority. Ælfric drew upon a vision of the historical role of heresy in the Church similar to that of Eusebius and Bede — one in which the episcopate and the great ecumenical councils had been central to the definition and defence of orthodoxy, but in his concern to hold his audience's attention his approach is far less circuitous. Like Gregory of Tours, he invokes the vivid image of divine vengeance that Rufinus had provided with his story about how Arius was eviscerated through his anus as he was attempting to vindicate his position at the Council of Nicaea.

His earliest use of the story is probably that found in his homily *De fide catholica*, which is part of his first series of Catholic Homilies, that compiled between 990 and 995. Here the variants that Ælfric introduces into the story emphasise God's vindication of his bishop's authority. It is a bishop who invokes God's just vengeance as he keeps vigil on the eve of the synod: 'Thou Almighty God, judge right judgement between me [Bishop Alexander] and Arius'.²⁹ The story is also deployed in the so-called pastoral letters — the brief manuals for parish priests and secular clergy which Ælfric compiled on behalf of Wulfsize III, bishop of Sherbourne (993-1002) and Wulfstan I, archbishop of York (1002-23). Consider, for example, Ælfric's first pastoral letter for Wulfsize III which was written soon after 992 and before 998:

²⁹ Then he [the Emperor Constantine] assembled a synod in the city of Nicaea, three hundred and eighteen bishops from all nations, for the strengthening of the faith. There were many such famous bishops at that synod that they *could work miracles*, and did so. They excommunicated there

the mass-priest Arius because he would not believe that the Son of the living God was just as mighty as his glorious Father is. Then they all condemned the devil's man; but he would not yield until all his bowels entirely fell out when he went to the privy.³⁰

In the same letter there also appears a long account of the role of the first four ecumenical synods in the definition of orthodoxy:

There were four synods for [establishing] the true faith against the heretics who spoke foolishly about the Holy Trinity and the Saviour's humanity. The first was in Nicaea, as we have said before; and the second was afterwards in Constantinople, a hundred and fifty bishops, holy men of God; the third was in Ephesus, consisting of two hundred bishops; and the fourth was in Chalcedon, consisting of many hundred bishops. And they were all unanimous among themselves about the ordinance which had been appointed at Nicaea, and they amended whatever of it was broken. Those four synods are to be observed, just as the four gospels, in Christ's Church. Many synods were held afterwards, but these four are nevertheless the foremost, because they extinguished the heretical doctrines (*dwollican lara*) which the heretics invented heretically (*dwollice*) against God, and they also appointed the ecclesiastical services.³¹

There is in these two passages a strong emphasis on the role of episcopal and synodal authority in the defence of orthodoxy — an emphasis vividly supported by the scatology of Arius's demise. In the later letters, those which he wrote for Wulfstan, the same point is made with greater coherence. In these letters the story of Arius's evisceration appears as the final part of a long digression on the history of the early Church which covers the missionary work of the apostles, the origins of monasticism, the great persecution, and the story of the first four ecumenical councils.³² It emerges from these pastoral letters that Ælfric was less concerned with the nature of doctrinal error than with the legitimacy of the ecclesiastical structures that had evolved to protect the Church from error. In short, Ælfric uses the rhetoric of heresy to reiterate the centrality of episcopal authority after the manner of Gregory but for Bede-like purposes.

3. The Post-Conquest Period

The rhetoric of heresy is conspicuous by its near complete absence from the historical writing produced between 1066 and

the Angevin takeover in 1154. This period saw a dramatic revival in the writing of history in England, with the production of no fewer than three historical works comparable in scale and scope to Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*,³³ but the rhetoric of heresy scarcely figures in them. If we turn, for example, to Henry of Huntingdon what we find on the subject is a few notes about Arianism, Pelagianism and Quartodecimanism, and somewhat lengthier coverage of 679 Synod of Hatfield, all reproduced from Bede. The annal for 679, moreover, is the last in which Henry mentions heresy in his *Historia Anglorum*.³⁴ John of Worcester, likewise, carries over a few of Bede's comments about the alleged heresies of the British and Irish,³⁵ and a good deal more material from the early sections of his major source, the World Chronicle of Marianus Scotus.³⁶ But the last point at which heresy figures in his Chronicle is in his brief note under the year 680 on the Synod of Hatfield. Indeed, so spare is John's treatment of this synod that without knowing John's source (that is, Bede), one would be scarcely be aware that the monothelite heresy was the issue that prompted this synod.³⁷ William of Malmesbury, likewise, scarcely ever uses the word heresy, even in his saints' lives, though modern translators have sometimes introduced it where matters of doctrinal error are at issue.³⁸ However, as will emerge below, he devotes considerable space to the controversy generated by the Eucharistic theology of Berengar of Tours.³⁹

This absence is all the more remarkable because these historians were all writing, if not pure ecclesiastical history, hybrid forms that owed much to this genre. Huntingdon openly declares in his prologue that Bede's work provided him with the fundamental starting point for his own researches indeed, so much of the first four books are derived from Bede that the rest of his work can be seen as a continuation of his *Historia Ecclesiastica*.⁴⁰ Malmesbury, likewise, openly declares that one of his aims in writing the *Gesta regum* was to mend the chain of history which was broken when no-one bothered to continue Bede's work.⁴¹ As for John of Worcester, the extent to which his chronicle is an ecclesiastical history has been much disguised by the way in which it has been printed. In the manuscripts it begins with the incarnation of Christ, but because almost all of its material down to the mid-fifth century is derived from the

world chronicle of Marianus Scotus the tendency has been to leave it out. Benjamin Thorpe's edition begins in 450, the point at which John begins to intrude English material: he omitted, moreover, almost all of the subsequent material that John derived from Marianus, much of which relates to the history of the Latin Church in general.⁴² The new Oxford Medieval Texts edition will only go some way towards repairing this weakness,⁴³ and at present many readers of John have a misleading impression of the relative balance between the secular and the ecclesiastical in this work. Considered as a whole, the *Chronica chronicarum* is very much an ecclesiastical history. Since all of these historians were following (even if only to a limited extent) in the Eusebian tradition we might reasonably expect them, then, to invoke the rhetoric of heresy rather more often than they do.

It is likely, of course, that this absence is for the want of incidents in which English ecclesiastical authorities had actually named and condemned heretics. For although beliefs contrary to Catholic doctrine may well have made considerably more progress in England in the period before the 1160s than is now apparent, it is authority that makes such beliefs heresy. Heretics are created when individuals or communities are corrected by the Church yet refuse to accept that correction: 'heresy', as Robert Grosseteste is said to have defined it, 'is a tenet chosen on human impulse, contrary to Holy Scripture, openly declared, and *obstinately defended*'.⁴⁴ In England, however, no such confrontations would seem to have taken place until 1166, when the members of a Cathar mission from Germany were tried and condemned at Clarendon.⁴⁵ That this trial was unprecedented for England is suggested by the way which Roger, bishop of Worcester (1163-79), wrote to Gilbert Foliot in 1165 seeking advice about what to do with these 'weavers'. So novel was the event that he was at a loss as to how to deal with it,⁴⁶ and the missionaries spent some time in prison before they were brought to trial. This episode generated, moreover, numerous reports in the chronicles covering the period, most notably in that by William of Newburgh.⁴⁷ It can be argued, therefore, that the historians of the post-Conquest period would have reported more heresy episodes had they taken place; that they did not was because there were no such events to report.

But this cannot be the complete explanation. It is important to remember that earlier historians such as Bede and Gregory of Tours had written about heresy even though they had flourished in contexts where actual confrontations between heretics and bishops were all but unknown. There were, moreover, a couple of episodes of intellectual heresy in this period that ought, arguably, to have been given some attention because, even if they did not take place in England, English prelates were involved in them.

One of these is the Berengar episode.⁴⁸ One of its major protagonists, Lanfranc of Pavia, went on to become archbishop of Canterbury from 1072 to 1089, yet it is only historians based in Normandy, such as Orderic Vitalis, who celebrate his contribution to the defeat of Berengar. A monk of mixed Anglo-Norman descent writing at the Abbey of Saint-Evroult in Normandy, Orderic assigns to Lanfranc the leading role in the events that led eventually to the final condemnation of Berengar at the Lateran Synod of 1079. He describes how the Italian prelate worsted Berengar with his 'spiritual eloquence' in debates held at Rome, Vercelli and Tours, 'forcing him to pronounce anathema on all heresy and to profess the true faith in writing'. When Berengar later revived his false ideas about the Eucharist, Lanfranc responded again, this time with 'a treatise in a lucid and elegant style, heavy with quotations from Scripture and the Fathers, strictly logical in its deductions from the premisses, abounding in proofs of the true meaning of the Eucharist, distinguished in eloquence, but containing nothing superfluous'.⁴⁹ Orderic's treatment of this episode is echoed in several hagiographical texts from the Norman abbey of Bec, over which Lanfranc had presided as a prior and school master from around 1045 to 1060: that is, in the *Vita Lanfranci* thought to have been written by Milo Crispin around 1135,⁵⁰ and in a collection of the Miracles of St Nicholas thought to have been compiled around 1140 at Bec's priory of Conflans near Paris.⁵¹ In contrast, the episode is ignored by all the English historians except William of Malmesbury. This is even true of the Canterbury historian Eadmer, whose *Historia novorum* includes a long eulogy celebrating Lanfranc's achievements.⁵²

Another episode of intellectual heresy which ought arguably to have been reported since it again involved an archbishop of

Canterbury is the exchange between Anselm and another pioneer of dialectical theology, Roscelin of Compiègne. It is true that Roscelin had avoided condemnation for heresy by declaring his orthodoxy at the Council of Soissons (held between 1090 and May 1092), but he had resumed teaching his views about the Trinity soon afterwards, possibly during a visit to England. Anselm responded by issuing a new version of his *Epistola de incarnatione uerbi* in which he clearly implied that his opponent was a heretic, though he did not identify him by name.⁵³ Eadmer, alone of the English historians in this period,⁵⁴ celebrates the composition of this work, but he does so without explaining the context in which it was written.⁵⁵

4. Some Hypotheses

It is possible that part of the explanation for the thin treatment of these episodes is that the issues involved were simply too difficult for our historians. By the twelfth century the Benedictines had begun to lag behind the great cathedral schools in the intellectual training which they offered to their monks,⁵⁶ but in general the kind of reportage given to heresy in medieval chronicles does not require a deep understanding of the intellectual issues, and, in any case, this point cannot apply to a writer as capable and as well read as William of Malmesbury. Stronger explanations for the absence of the rhetoric of heresy from post-Conquest historiography are perhaps to be found in a profound change in the relationship between the English episcopate and the English historical community, which was largely comprised of Benedictine monks.

One element in this change was the withdrawal of the Benedictines from the pastoral sphere. In the conversion period, very few *monasteria* had been pure 'monasteries' in the high medieval sense; rather, they were hybrid institutions which combined many of the functions that would later be divided between the collegiate church and the monastery.⁵⁷ These 'minsters' were heavily involved in pastoral work: all had a complement of priests and deacons who were involved in the administration of baptism, marriage, the provision of various services, especially the mass and the burial of the dead. In some

but not all cases, these priests and deacons also lived according to a monastic rule alongside people who might be more properly described as monks. It was through these institutions, moreover, that bishops directed pastoral work in their dioceses. In this period monastic and secular churches were so profoundly intertwined with one another that it was only natural that in the great minsters like the double monastery of Monkwearmouth-Jarrow there would be scholars like Bede who would take a strong interest in issues relating to pastoral work. This tradition of close involvement by the monastic order in the 'secular' Church remained strong throughout the pre-Conquest period, even through the ideological justifications that accompanied the 'monastic' reforms of the late tenth century required the differentiation of authentic monasteries from houses of secular canons.⁵⁸

Though England's monastic cathedral chapters survived attempts to bring about their replacement with colleges of secular canons,⁵⁹ the Norman Conquest greatly accelerated the trend towards a separation of monastic and pastoral spheres.⁶⁰ In part this was achieved by the great proliferation of parish churches in the century after 1066, but a more crucial element for present purposes was the emergence of separate episcopal households at the monastic cathedrals. Whereas the later Anglo-Saxon bishop had almost invariably come from a monastic background and was expected to live among the monks attached to his cathedral, the post-Conquest bishop was typically a secular cleric whose route to episcopal office had been through service at the royal court.⁶¹ The prince-bishops of the Norman era lived apart from their monks, and relied on the clerks of their households for help in the administration of their dioceses. Thus, even at the monastic cathedrals, monks were increasingly isolated from the work of bishops. This deepening divide is reflected in the attitudes of England's monastic historians towards their bishops. In their works, bishops figure less often as allies in the work of the Church than as enemies of monastic communities in their struggles to protect their rights and properties.⁶² It is not surprising, therefore, that the rhetoric of heresy, which is a discourse that had generally redounded to the benefit of episcopal authority, should be largely absent from their work.

As if to prove the point, one of the few English historical texts of this period which deploys the rhetoric of heresy without restraint is one which was produced in an episcopal context. The work in question is a collection of the miracles of St Erkenwald which was compiled around 1140 by Arcoid, a canon of St Paul's Cathedral, London, and a nephew of its bishop, Gilbert the Universal (1128-34).⁶³ It includes at the conclusion of one of its miracle stories a long diatribe against Vigilantius of Calagurris, an early fifth-century cleric who had been condemned by Jerome for questioning the practice of venerating the bodily remains of the saints: 'So blush with shame, Vigilantius, worst of heretics...'⁶⁴ This outburst, which is far too long to quote here, is most unusual for an English miracle collection of this period. To be sure, stories directed against those who expressed doubt about the validity of the cult of saints are quite common in post-Conquest miracle collections,⁶⁵ but only rarely is such scepticism stigmatized as heresy. The editor of the collection has plausibly suggested that this passage was 'less an attack on the long-dead pamphleteer... than on the many and various revivers and developers of his ideas who were active in Arcoid's own time'.⁶⁶ Early twelfth-century heretics such as Henry of Lausanne and Peter of Bruys are known to have been sceptical about the material aspects of the cult of saints,⁶⁷ and it is tempting to suggest that their ideas had reached London. Indeed, if heresy were in England, the most likely place to find them is a mercantile centre such as this city. London certainly enjoyed strong trading links with the Low Countries and the Rhineland — that is, with the major growth areas for heretical movements during the first half of the twelfth century.⁶⁸ A better explanation may be, however, that Arcoid is using the rhetoric of heresy to attack the everyday materialism of the local population. Observers based in the city — such as Peter of Cornwall, prior of Holy Trinity, Aldgate (1197-1221) — certainly report that indifference to the basic tenets of the Christian faith was widespread in their world.⁶⁹ But whatever the actual explanation for its composition, it is telling that the author of this diatribe was a cathedral canon rather than a Benedictine hagiographer.

However, the general movement of the Benedictines out of the pastoral sphere cannot explain the absence of similar

rhetoric from the works of historians such as Eadmer and Henry of Huntingdon. Eadmer was, after all, Archbishop Anselm's secretary, whilst Henry was the archdeacon of Huntingdon. Thus, it may be suggested that the most important factor in this absence in the work of English historians between 1066 and 1154 is the Conquest itself, since it brought about the appointment of Normans to all the major episcopal and abbatial offices, whilst the majority of the historians working in England during this period (and here we can include Henry of Huntingdon) were men of lesser rank who identified with the English and their suffering.⁷⁰ Indeed, the effect of the Norman takeover on these historians' use of the rhetoric of heresy can be seen in William of Malmesbury's treatment of Lanfranc's role in the defeat of Berengar of Tours, for his approach could not be more different from that of Orderic and the monks of Bec.

To put it more fully, William's view of Lanfranc was shaped by the part which the Italian prelate had played in the Norman colonisation of the English Church.⁷¹ It was at synods held under his authority during the 1070s and 1080s that one English abbot or bishop after another had been deposed. However, William was prevented from openly criticising Lanfranc by the very real dangers involved in showing disrespect for the Norman regime.⁷² It is true that he was writing in the 1120s, some three generations after the Battle of Hastings, but those who had benefited from the dispossession of the English were still anxious to defend its legitimacy and the reputations of their ancestors. Thus, William is compelled to treat figures such as Lanfranc as great men, but he subtly subverts his praise by mixing it with innuendo, as in the following passage:

Nor was Odo far wrong [in his suspicion that Lanfranc had played a role in his imprisonment], for once when William was complaining to Lanfranc of his brother's treachery, the archbishop's reply was: 'Arrest him and lock him up!' 'What!', said the king, 'a clergyman?' The archbishop laughed, balancing, as Persius says, 'charge against charge in neat antithesis'. 'No', he retorted, 'you will not be arresting the bishop of Bayeux, you will be taking into custody the earl of Kent'.⁷³

This passage needs to be read in conjunction with William's many cynical comments about the power of rhetoric, about the ability of the eloquent to manipulate those around them.⁷⁴

William's insinuation was that Lanfranc was, like other rhetoricians, a clever and sometimes quite sinister man who provided words to justify the policies of the moment no matter how dubious their morality. Indeed, he makes Lanfranc's complicity in the regime all but explicit in a long passage which, in a wiser moment, he cut out of later editions of his *Gesta pontificum*.⁷⁵

William's account of the Berengar episode is written in a similar vein. Here he twice damns Lanfranc with faint praise. He damns him a first time by contrasting his contribution with that of another Norman prelate, Guitmund of Aversa (d. 1094): Berengar 'was answered in books by Archbishop Lanfranc and, *with particular force*, by Guitmund... *the most eloquent man of our time*'.⁷⁶ Though Guitmund's treatise was generally regarded as being better than Lanfranc's,⁷⁷ William might, like Orderic, have ignored this. The implication is that Lanfranc's contribution was second-rate. Moreover, having reduced the archbishop's role to a single sentence, William damns Lanfranc a second time by going on to explore Berengar's merits at great length. Indeed, he seems almost to want to exculpate him. Though he begins by saying that Berengar was a 'heresiarch' and with a summary account of how his teachings were condemned by Popes Leo IX and Gregory VII, he goes on to emphasise his change of heart: 'In fact, though Berengar disgraced himself in the warmth of early manhood by defending some heresies, he repented as he grew more austere, to such effect that he is unhesitatingly held by some to be a saint, recommended by countless good qualities, humility and almsgiving in particular'.⁷⁸ After more comments to similar effect, he then quotes at length the obituary composed in Berengar's honour by Hildebert of Le Mans,⁷⁹ and in the comments that follow the poem he emphasises his humility at the moment of his death — his remorse that his teachings had once led men astray. William's treatment of this episode reflects a deep unwillingness to credit Lanfranc with the honour and authority that was to be derived from having helped to vindicate catholic orthodoxy. It seems likely that jealousy arising from this source is one reason why the Eucharistic controversy was ignored by the other major English historians of this period.

In short, the near total absence of the rhetoric of heresy from

the new wave of historical writing that emerged in the first half of the twelfth century is significant. Heresy was a central topic of ecclesiastical history, and its omission from works in this tradition needs to be explained. In the present case the key factors seem to have been less a lack of interest in the issue or an inability to understand the new doctrinal heresies of the period than the great array of political and institutional changes which divorced the historians at work in England from those who would have benefitted from the deployment of the rhetoric of heresy. For the most part the latter were the great Norman prelates of the day, but the majority of the historians at work in England in the century after the Conquest spoke for those who resented the authority of these men.

¹ Bede, *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, i.8, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969), pp. 34-37, cited hereafter as 'Bede, *HE*'. In this essay, *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina, Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis*, Subsidia Hagiographica 6, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1898-9), is cited with H. Fros (ed.), *Novum Supplementum*, Subsidia Hagiographica 70 (Brussels, 1986), as '*BHL*'. The Oxford Medieval Texts is cited as 'OMT', Studies in Church History as 'SCH', and the Rolls Series as 'RS'.

² Bede, *HE*, i.10.

³ Bede, *HE*, i.17-21.

⁴ *Vita S. Germani Autissiodorensis* (*BHL* 3453), §§ 12-18, 25-27 ed. Wilhelm Levison, *Monumenta Germaniae Historiae: Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum*, vol. 7 (Hannover, 1920), pp. 247-83, at 259-65, 269-71. Cf. J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People: A Historical Commentary*, OMT (Oxford, 1988), pp. 26-29; Charles Plummer, *Venerabilis Baedae opera historica* (2 vols, Oxford, 1896), vol. 2, pp. 31-35.

⁵ Bede, *HE*, ii.19. On this letter, its context and the Paschal controversy more generally, see Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, 'New Heresy for Old': Pelagianism in Ireland and the Papal Letter of 640', *Speculum*, 60 (1985): 505-16; Thomas M. O. Charles-Edwards, *Early Christian Ireland* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 391-415.

⁶ Bede, *HE*, iii.4. Cf. *ibid.*, iii.17, 28.

⁷ On Bede's debt to Eusebius, see L. W. Barnard, 'Bede and Eusebius as Church Historians', in Gerald Bonner (ed.), *Famulus Christi: Essays in Commemoration of the Thirteenth Centenary of the Birth of the Venerable Bede* (London, 1976), pp. 106-24; Robert A. Markus, *Bede and the Tradition of Ecclesiastical Historiography*, Jarrow Lecture 1975 (Jarrow, 1975). On the evolving tradition of ecclesiastical history, see Markus, 'Church History and the Early Church Historians', in Derek Baker (ed.), *The Materials Sources and Methods of Ecclesiastical History*, SCH 11 (Oxford, 1975), pp. 1-17.

⁸ Eusebius, *The History of the Church*, trans. G. A. Williamson (Harmondsworth, 1965), I, alluding to 1 Timothy 6:20 and Acts 20: 29.

⁹ See further Robert M. Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 84-96; Markus, 'Church History', pp. 5-7.

¹⁰ Eusebius, *History of the Church*, p. 110.

¹¹ Bede, *HE*, i.8, after Acts 17: 21.

¹² Walter Goffart, *The Narrators of Barbarian History (A.D. 550-800): Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, Bede, and Paul the Deacon* (Princeton, 1988), pp. 306-20 and esp. 328: 'The program Bede set himself for outdoing his predecessors was not so much to retrace the English conversion for the instruction of posterity as to supersede the rival accounts of the same period.' Cf. Markus, *Bede and Ecclesiastical Historiography*, p. 7.

¹³ *Vita S. Wilfridi* (*BHL* 8889), §§ 12, 14-15, ed. B. Colgrave, *The Life of Bishop Wilfrid by Eddius Stephanus* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 24-25, 30-33. Cf. Goffart, *Narrators of Barbarian History*, p. 310.

¹⁴ Markus, 'Church History', pp. 6-7.

¹⁵ Bede, *HE*, iv.18. See, likewise, the account of Wilfrid's testimony to the faith of the English at the Lateran synod of 680 (*ibid.*, vol. 19).

¹⁶ Henry Chadwick, 'Theodore, the English Church and the Monothelete Controversy', in Michael Lapidge (ed.), *Archbishop Theodore: Commemorative*

Studies on His Life and Influence, Cambridge Studies in Anglo-Saxon England 11 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 88-95, at 93. See also Michael Lapidge, 'The Career of Archbishop Theodore', *ibid.*, esp. pp. 22-25.

¹⁷ Bede, *HE*, iv.17. See note 22 below.

¹⁸ Bede, *HE*, v.22.

¹⁹ Bede, *HE*, i.22: 'As events plainly showed, this [conquest] was ordained by the will of God so that evil might fall upon these [British] miscreants'. As Robert A. Markus argues in 'Pelagianism: Britain and the Continent', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 37 (1986): 191-204, the Pelagianism of the British is most likely to have been a retrospective construction imposed on a Church that was effectively 'pre-Pelagian' by Continental theologians. The heresy's true origins lie in the Origenist controversy and the place of its formulation was Rome. See also Elizabeth A. Clark, *The Origenist Controversy* (Princeton, 1992).

²⁰ It is clear from Bede's criticism of King Egfrith's (d. 685) failed invasion of Ireland that Bede thought that conquest could only succeed when it coincided with God's decision to direct divine vengeance against its victims (*HE*, iv.26).

²¹ For Bede's concern with pastoral care and the role of bishop in its provision, see his *Epistola Baedae ad Egbertum antistitem*, ed. Plummer, *Baedae opera historica*, vol. 1, pp. 405-23 (esp. §§ 5-10).

²² Bede, *HE*, i.17: 'Verum Brittanni, cum neque suscipere dogma peruersum gratiam Christi blasphemando ullatenus uellent, neque uersutiam nefariae persuasionis refutare uerbis certando sufficerent, inueniunt salubre consilium, ut a Gallicanis antistibus auxilium belli spiritualis inquirant'. This is Bede's own gloss. Cf. Constantius, *Vita Germani*, § 12.

²³ Bede, *HE*, i.21, following Constantius, *Vita Germani*, § 27 (p. 271). Note, likewise, Bede's account, *HE*, i.20, of a bloodless victory over the Saxons and Picts which the British won through the leadership of the *pontifices* Germanus and of Lupus. Cf. Constantius, *Vita Germani*, § 18 (p. 265).

²⁴ Cf. Wallace-Hadrill, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History*, p. 26. Bede's own efforts to equip England's teachers with the knowledge required to detect doctrinal error can be seen in his *In epistulas VII catholicas*, ed. David Hurst, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, vol. 121 (Turnhout, 1983), which includes warnings against and explanations of the errors of the great heretics. See Benedicta Ward, *The Venerable Bede* (London, 1990), esp. p. 57; Scott de Gregorio, 'Nostrorum socordiam temporum: The Reforming Impulse of Bede's Later Exegesis', *Early Medieval Europe*, 11 (2002): 107-22.

²⁵ Goffart, *Narrators of Barbarian History*, p. 213, n. 440.

²⁶ Rufinus of Aquileia, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, x.14., ed. Eduard Schwartz and Theodore Mommsen, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller* vol. 9, pts. 1-2 (Leipzig, 1903-9), pt. 2, p. 979). The story probably derives from the lost continuation of Eusebius by Gelasius of Caesarea, and was known to Bede. See *Expositio actuum apostolorum*, ed. M. L. W. Laistner, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* vol. 121 (Turnhout, 1983), pp. 12-13.

²⁷ *Libri historiarum X*, ii.23, ed. Bruno Krusch and Wilhelm Levison, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum*, vol. 1.1 (2nd ed., Hannover, 1937-51), p. 68. See further Martin Heinzlmann, 'Heresy in Books I and II of Gregory of Tours' *Historiae*', in Alexander Callander Murray (ed.), *After Rome's Fall: Narrators and Sources of Early Medieval History: Essays*

Presented to Walter Goffart (Toronto, 1998), pp. 67-82.

²⁸ On Ælfric and his career, see Milton McC. Gatch, *Preaching and Theology in Anglo-Saxon England: Ælfric and Wulfstan* (Toronto, 1977); Peter Clemoes, Ælfric', in Eric G. Stanley (ed.), *Continuations and Beginnings* (London, 1966), pp. 176-209; Stanley, 'The Chronology of Ælfric's Works', in Stanley (ed.), *The Anglo-Saxons: Studies in Some Aspects of their History and Culture presented to Bruce Dickins* (London, 1959), pp. 212-47.

²⁹ *De fide Catholica*, ed. Peter Clemoes, *Catholic Homilies: The First Series, Text*, Early English Text Society, Supplementary Series 17 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 335-244, at 343. M. R. Godden, *Ælfric's Catholic Homilies: Introduction, Commentary and Glossary*, Early English Text Society, Supplementary Series 18 (Oxford, 2000), p. 160, notes that this sermon handles its source materials with great freedom, 'without showing a sustained debt to any particular source'.

³⁰ 'First Pastoral Letter for Wulfsig III', §§ 6211, ed. and trans. D. Whitelock, M. Brett, and C. N. L. Brooke, *Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church*, vol. I, A.D. 871-1204, 2 pts. (Oxford, 1981), pp. 196-226.

³¹ *Ibid.*, §§ 93-100, (pp. 215-16).

³² See, for example, 'First Old English Pastoral Letter for Wulfstan I, Archbishop of York (1002-23)', §§ 54-58, printed in Whitelock, Brett and Brooke, *Councils and Synods*, pp. 260-302.

³³ The three works are: (1) John of Worcester, *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, ed. and trs. R. R. Darlington, Patrick McGurk and Jennifer Bray, 3 vols., OMT (Oxford, 1995-), which was begun before 1118 and expanded in a complex series of stages ending between 1141 and 1143; (2) Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum (History of the English People)*, ed. Diana E. Greenway, OMT (Oxford, 1996), which was begun around 1129 and revised several times down before being abandoned in 1154; and (3) William of Malmesbury's paired histories, *Gesta Regum Anglorum*, ed. and trs. Roger A. B. Mynors, Rodney M. Thomson and Michael Winterbottom, 2 vols., OMT (Oxford, 1998-9), and *Gesta Pontificum Anglorum*, ed. N. E. S. A. Hamilton, RS 52 (London, 1870), the first drafts of which were largely complete by the beginning of 1126. On this revival in historical writing, see esp. Martin Brett, 'John of Worcester and his Contemporaries', in R. H. C. Davis and J. M. Wallace Hadrill (eds.), *The Writing of History in the Middle Ages; Essays presented to Richard William Southern* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 101-26.

³⁴ Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum*, i.48; ii.6; iii.32; iv.1

³⁵ For example, John of Worcester, *Chronica chronicarum*, s.a. 628.

³⁶ For example, John of Worcester, *Chronica chronicarum*, s.a. 450 (the Council of Ephesus and the Eutychian heresy), 460 (the Acephalian heresy), 485 (the Vandal persecution of the Catholic Church in Africa), 525 (the end of the Vandal Persecution and the end of the Acephalian heresy), 533 (the mission of Pope Agapitus to Constantinople), 579 (Gregory the Great confutes the Eutychians), 588 (the three chapters controversy), and so on.

³⁷ John of Worcester, *Chronica chronicarum*, s.a. 680 (recte 679).

³⁸ See, for example, William of Malmesbury, *Vita S. Dunstani (BHL 2348)*, pref., ed. and trans. Michael Winterbottom and Rodney M. Thomson, *Saints' Lives*, OMT (Oxford, 2002), pp. 166-303, at 166-67, where *Egregie et pulchre dictum si esset catholicum!* is rendered as 'That would be a very fine saying, if it

were not heretical'; and *ibid.*, i.21 (pp. 212-13), where *male credere*, 'to believe wrongly', is rendered as 'to be heretical'. A rare passage where William does deploy the concept of heresy occurs in his discussion of the British among the fragments of his lost *Vita S. Patricii*, in *ibid.*, pp. 316-43, at 324.

³⁹ William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum*, iii.284-85.

⁴⁰ See further Greenway's Introduction to *Historia Anglorum*, pp. lxxxvi-lxxxix.

⁴¹ William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum*, I, prol. 3.

⁴² *Florentii Wigorniensis Monachi Chronicon ex Chronicis*, English Historical Society Publications 13, 2 vols. (London, 1848-9).

⁴³ Vols. I and 3 report all the Marianus material from 450 onwards; vol. I, which has still to appear, will include extracts from the annals for A.D. 1 to 450.

⁴⁴ Thus, Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H. R. Luard, RS 57, 7 vols. (London, 1872-83), vol. 5, p. 401: 'Hæresis est sententia humano sensu electa, Scripturæ Sacræ contraria, palam edocta, *pertinaciter defensiva*' (emphasis added). On the context in which Grosseteste is supposed to have articulated this definition, see Richard W. Southern, *Robert Grosseteste. The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 1986), p. 292.

⁴⁵ For the judgement of the Assize, see Whitelock, Brett and Brooke, *Councils and Synods*, pp. 925-26.

⁴⁶ Zachary N. Brooke, Adrian Morey and Christopher N. L. Brooke (eds), *The Letters and Charters of Gilbert Foliot, abbot of Gloucester (1139-48), bishop of Hereford (1148-63), and London (1163-87)* (Cambridge, 1967), nos. 157-8; Adrian Morey and Christopher N. L. Brooke, *Gilbert Foliot and his Letters*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought 11 (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 241-43.

⁴⁷ *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, ii. 13, ed. R. Howlett, *Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, RS 82 (4 vols, London, 1884-89), vol. I, pp. 131-4). For a thorough discussion of this incident and the records it generated, see Peter Biller, 'William of Newburgh and the Cathar Mission to England', in Diana Wood (ed.), *Life and Thought in the Northern Church c.1100 – c.1700: Essays in honour of Claire Cross*, SCH: Subsidia 12 (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 11-30.

⁴⁸ On the episode, see now H. E. J. Cowdrey, *Lanfranc: Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 592-74; Margaret Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 63-97; Richard W. Southern, 'Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours', in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Partin and Richard W. Southern (eds.) *Studies in Medieval History presented to F. M. Powicke* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 272-48; Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 273-315, and the other works cited here.

⁴⁹ Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. and trs. Marjorie Chibnall, OMT (6 vols, Oxford, 1968-280), vol. 4, pp. 251-23. It should be noted that this is the only passage where Orderic shows a sustained interest in heresy, although he uses the term a number of times, mostly to refer to the sin of simony or to that of rebellion against the authority of pope (e.g. *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 238; vol 3, pp. 58, 64, 72; vol. 4, pp. 10, 26). But note also the curious and as yet unexplained reference to a tithe-paying knight of William Pantulf called *Rodbertus hereticus* (*ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 156-7). How did this surname arise? On Orderic's concept of heresy and his sense of its role in ecclesiastical history, see Marjorie Chibnall, 'A

Twelfth-Century View of the Historical Church: Orderic Vitalis', in Robert Swanson (ed.), *The Church Retrospective*, SCH 33 (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 115-34 (esp. 125); Chibnall, *The World of Orderic Vitalis* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 160-266.

⁵⁰ *Vita magni gloriosi Lanfranci Cantuariensis archiepiscopi* (BHL 4719), § 3, ed. Margaret Gibson in Giulio d'Onofrio (ed.), *Lanfranco di Pavia e l'Europa del secolo XI nel IX centenario della morte (1089-1989)*, Italia sacra: studi e documenti di storia ecclesiastica 51 (Rome, 1993), pp. 667-715, at 669-73.

⁵¹ *Miracula Sancti Nicholai* (BHL 6208), printed in *Catalogus codicum hagiographorum latinorum antiquiorum saeculo XVI qui asservantur in bibliotheca nationali Parisiensi*, Subsidia Hagiographica 2 (3 vols, Brussels, 1889-93), vol. 2, pp. 405-32. This work draws heavily on Gilbert Crispin's *Vita Herluini* and the *Vita Lanfranci* whilst adding further detail. See Gibson, *Lanfranc*, p. 199.

⁵² *Historia novorum in Anglia*, ed. Martin Rule, RS 81 (London, 1884), pp. 10-23.

⁵³ Franciscus S. Schmitt (ed.), *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia* (6 vols, Edinburgh, 1946-61), vol. 2, pp. 1-17 (esp. 4). For the context, see Constant J. Mews, 'St Anselm and Roscelin of Compiègne: Some New Texts and Their Implications: II. A Vocalist Essay on the Trinity and Intellectual Debate c. 1080-1120', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 65 (1998): 39-90 (esp. 41-45, and the other works cited there).

⁵⁴ The full implications of this episode may not, however, have been clear to William of Malmesbury, since he knew the milder, first, edition of *De incarnatione uerbi*, which he copied into London, Lambeth Palace, MS 224. See Rodney M. Thomson, *William of Malmesbury* (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 87-289.

⁵⁵ *Vita S. Anselmi, archiepiscopi Cantuariensis* (BHL 526a), ii.10, ed. W. Southern, *The Life of St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury*, OMT (2nd edn, London, 1972), pp. 1-145, at 72-73: 'egregium et pro illius temporis statu pernecessarium opus *De Incarnatione Verbi* composuit'.

⁵⁶ Cf. Robert Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Manchester, 1999), p. 120.

⁵⁷ See esp. Henry R. Loyn, *The English Church, 940-1154* (London, 2000), pp. 28-29; John Blair, 'Local Churches in Domesday Book and Before', in James C. Holt (ed.), *Domesday Studies* (Woodbridge, 1987), 265-78; John Blair (ed.), *Minsters and Parish Churches: The Local Church in Transition, 950-1200* (Oxford, 1988); and the debate between Eric Cambridge, David Rollason, John Blair and David Palliser in *Early Medieval Europe*, 4 (1995): 87-104 and 193-212.

⁵⁸ See Eadmer, *Historia novorum*, pp. 18-22; Loyn, *The English Church*, pp. 87-97.

⁵⁹ See Cowdrey, *Lanfranc*, pp. 149-50, 160-63.

⁶⁰ A curious sidelight on this process is provided by William of Malmesbury's *Vita S. Wulfstani* (BHL 8756), i.8.2, ed. Winterbottom and Thomson, *Saints' Lives*, pp. 8-155, at 36, where the English saint is found, in the period when he was still prior of Worcester, having to vindicate himself for preaching in public after he is criticised for doing so by a foreigner, a 'German' monk called Winrich. Significantly, his criticisms reflect the reforming attitudes which were becoming current in the post-Conquest period when William was at work: 'A monk's role is silence in the cloister, not assaulting the ears of the people with sermons as melodramatic as the gestures that accompanied them'.

⁶¹ Compare the processes of appointment and administration discussed by Stephanie Mooers Christelow, 'Chancellors and Curial Bishops: Ecclesiastical Power in Anglo-Norman England', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 22 (2000): 49-69, and Everett U. Crosby, *Bishop and Chapter in Twelfth-Century England: A Study of the 'Mena Episcopalis'*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 4th ser. 23 (Cambridge, 1994), with those described by the still fundamental R. R. Darlington, 'Ecclesiastical Reform in the Late Old English Period', *English Historical Review*, 51 (1936): 386-428.

⁶² Note, for example, the striking comparison between seventh- and twelfth-century bishops drawn by the author of the twelfth-century *Vita sanctissimi et gloriosissimi regis Deirorum Oswini* (BHL 6382): 'Nec erant tunc temporis pontifices ut nunc, uel diuitiarum affluentia insolentes, uel uestium preciosarum pomposo fastu, etiam diuitibus secularibus preeminentes, sed pauperes spiritu' (Oxford, Corpus Christi College, MS 134, fol. 12r). On the composition of this work, see my 'Sanctity and Lordship in Twelfth-Century England: Saint Albans, Durham, and the Cult of Saint Oswine, King and Martyr', *Viator*, 30 (1999): 105-44.

⁶³ *Miracula S. Erkenwaldi* (BHL 2601), ed. E. Gordon Whatley, *The Saint of London: The Life and Miracles of St Erkenwald* (Binghampton, 1989), pp. 100-65. For the dating of the work, see *ibid.*, pp. 36-40.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, § 4, pp. 126-29.

⁶⁵ For example, Goscelin of Canterbury, *Miracula S. Ivonis* (BHL 4622), ed. W. D. Macray, *Chronicon Abbatiae Ramesiensis*, RS 83 (London, 1886), pp. lxxi-lxxii.

⁶⁶ Whatley, *Saint of London*, p. 55.

⁶⁷ Marcia L. Colish, 'Peter of Bruys, Henry of Lausanne, and the Facade of St-Gilles', *Traditio*, 28 (1972): 451-59.

⁶⁸ See Biller, 'Newburgh and the Cathar Mission', 23-25; Biller, 'The Northern Cathars and Higher Learning', in Peter Biller and R. B. Dobson (eds.), *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life. Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff* SCH: Subsidia 11 (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 25-53.

⁶⁹ *Libra revelationum*, in London, Lambeth Palace, MS 51, fol. 2r. On Peter and his work, see C. S. Nicholls et al. (eds.), *The Dictionary of National Biography: Missing Persons* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 519220.

⁷⁰ Cf. Elizabeth M. C. Van Houts, *Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, 900-1200* (Basingstoke, 1999), esp. pp. 138-9.

⁷¹ The points made in this paragraph are developed further in my, 'William of Malmesbury on the Saints of the Anglo-Saxon (and Norman) Churches' (forthcoming).

⁷² Cf. *Gesta regum*, iv, prefatio.

⁷³ *Gesta regum*, iv.306. See, similarly, *ibid.*, iii.267.

⁷⁴ E.g. *Gesta Regum*, v.406: 'General considerations can be adapted to either side of an argument according to the skill of the advocate'. Likewise, *ibid.*, iii.238.7-8.

⁷⁵ The passage has recently been rediscovered: see M. Winterbottom, 'A New Passage of William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Pontificum*', *Journal of Medieval Latin*, 11 (2001): 50-59. I am grateful to Rod Thomson for alerting me to this discovery.

⁷⁶ *Gesta regum*, iii.284, alluding to Guitmund of Aversa, *De corporis et*

sanguinis Christi veritate, ed. Luciano Orabona, *La Verna dell'Eucharista* (Naples, 1995). Guitmund is also known from Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ii, 270-79, as someone who had refused an offer from William the Conqueror of a bishopric in England on the basis that it would be sinful to accept the 'spoils of plunder'. Doubt is sometimes expressed about this story as Guitmund later accepted the bishopric of Aversa, but by 1088 this town had been in Norman hands for over fifty years and he was appointed to the office by Pope Urban II (*ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 280-81). The words that Orderic puts in Guitmund's mouth are certainly fictitious, but the story may still derive from an actual event. It would be nice if it could be shown that this event was known to William and his audience, since it would lend richness to the comparison he makes; but even if the event was not as famous as Orderic suggests, there is no denying the element of faint praise in William's account.

⁷⁷ Cf. Peter the Venerable, *Contra Petrobusianos hereticos*, § 153, ed. J. Fearn, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis*, vol. 10 (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 87-88.

⁷⁸ William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum*, iii.284.

⁷⁹ *Carmina minora*, ed. A. Brian Scott, *Bibliotheca Teubneriana* (Leipzig, 1969), no. 18, pp. 7-9.

Chapter 2

Heresy, Madness and Possession in the High Middle Ages

Sabina Flanagan

The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 holds a special place in the history of heresy.¹ With an attendance of more than 400 bishops and 800 abbots from diverse geographical areas, it could with some justification claim to be the first council to be fully representative of Latin Christendom. It pronounced definitively on various matters of doctrine (in particular Trinitarian theology), which had been under discussion for the past century, and incorporated such new formulations into what was virtually a new creed (canon 1). It also summed up and codified procedural and legalistic developments intended to deal with such heresies as could now be identified in the light of this more precise declaration of the faith. While the formalisation of the Inquisition (admittedly a rather imprecise concept, though I take it to be characterised by the appointment of special officials to seek out heresy rather than the more ad hoc episcopal investigations hitherto employed) was not to be perfected for at least another decade, by 1215 all the elements were pretty much in place. The one exception was perhaps the routine use of torture in heresy investigations which was not itself codified until 1252 with Pope Innocent IV's bull *Ad extirpanda*. It would seem, then, that both the means for identifying heresy, and the methods for dealing with it, including the extension of the perquisites of the crusade to the pursuit of heresy within the borders of Latin christendom (canon 3), had been settled by this landmark gathering.

However, the degree of certainty delivered by this document on the matter of heretics and heresy is not as secure as might appear at first reading. True, the methods for combating heresy

outlined in the partnership between Church and secular authorities, and the procedural rules to be followed for the investigation of heresy were clear enough. Moreover, the statement of faith on which this all depended was forthrightly expressed. But the implications of the particular pronouncements against the teachings of individuals contained in canon 2 are far from clear. Indeed, they suggest that at the time the concept of heresy, or rather who could be termed a heretic, was mired in ambiguity.

The first of the individuals mentioned in canon 2 was Joachim of Fiore whose name is well known and whose influence was to be important and long lasting.² For the history of heresy this influence was largely due to the fact that his theology of history was taken up and developed, perhaps distorted, by the Spiritual Franciscans and the Fraticelli who became suspect in the course of time.³ But that was further down the line; the Council here is particularly concerned to refute Joachim's criticisms of the Trinitarian doctrine of Peter Lombard, which he had attacked in a libellus' now unfortunately lost.⁴ Joachim, however, was never himself considered a heretic, perhaps because of his timely written submission to the Holy See before his death in 1202.

Tacked onto the end of this canon, almost as an afterthought, is the reference to the second individual — Amalric (or Aumery) of Bène (Bena). This Amalric was the source of a short-lived and now largely forgotten heresy, which seems to have included elements of 'neoplatonic pantheism, gnosticism, antisacerdotalism, antinomianism, mysticism and Joachite-derived prophecy.'⁵ So far, so unremarkable, but the point which struck me as worth a second look was the Council's description of Amalric's teachings as 'not so much heretical as mad' — 'non tam haeretica quam insana'.

Why is this pronouncement so important? I must admit that others do not seem to have found it very remarkable. Gary Dickson, who produced the definitive article on the Amalricians, merely notes, 'The equation of heresy with insanity was ... something of a medieval topos.'⁶ His comment was echoed by Fiona Robb in her paper on the Council's definition of Trinitarian orthodoxy.⁷ And indeed it is true that heresy and insanity are often mentioned together. A search of the Corpus

Christianorum produces many examples of such short, rhetorical, collocations as: 'the insane doctrines of the Manicheans,' 'the madness of heretics'; or simply 'mad and heretical'.⁸ In such examples the nature of the supposed connection between the two concepts is left unstated. The more extended examples that mention heresy and madness together, generally cited in this connection, are not much more illuminating.⁹

It might be mentioned here that the same kind of unreflective connection between heresy and madness is made in the very canon of Lateran IV under discussion where it is reported that Joachim claimed Peter Lombard's teaching on the Trinity was 'mad and heretical.' However, returning to that part of canon 2 which specifically deals with Amalric, we find that it does not suggest the equivalence (or close connection) of madness and heresy, but rather posits a disjunction or contrast between them: it says that Amalric's writings are to be considered 'not so much heretical as mad' or to put it another way 'mad, rather than heretical.'

Since heresy is surely a more serious charge in the eyes of the Church than madness, can the characterisation of Amalric's writings as 'mad, rather than heretical' be read as a less severe judgment upon them? I believe this is so, and the case is strengthened by the fact that the council also comments on the genesis of Amalric's error, suggesting that this mad belief was caused by the interference of the Devil with his reasoning ability. 'The father of lies so blinded his mind' is the clause that precedes the imputation of madness. Is this, then, intended as some sort of rehabilitation of Amalric himself? I say rehabilitation, since although Amalric, like Joachim of Fiore, had already died by this time and had been buried within the Church, unlike Joachim, Amalric had subsequently been pronounced a heretic and posthumously excommunicated.¹⁰

Now it might be argued that this is reading too much into a few words. But the Council did not have to say anything about madness, or the Devil, for that matter. It is an interesting fact that the Devil does not get much of a run in the rest of the decrees of Lateran IV, though he is mentioned briefly in the declaration of Faith where it is stated that 'The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became

evil by their own doing.' This is obviously intended to counter the dualistic beliefs of such groups as the Cathars.¹¹ Nor does he play a large role in such representative texts of the day such as Gratian's *Decretum* or Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. What we tend to find here are formulaic phrases like 'at the prompting of the devil', or 'at the devil's suggestion' to describe the reason for someone's criminous actions. In such cases the person was expected to use his will to resist such temptation, but as I shall explain in due course, in other cases such as full-blown possession, this was not considered an option.

So the framers of canon 2 could have left it at 'we condemn and damn the most perverse teaching of the impious Amalric' without mentioning the Devil, or heresy at all. But they chose not to. Since all the canons of the declaration of 1215 were debated and then passed by vote or acclamation, here, if anywhere, we might expect the words to have been carefully chosen and their implications fully anticipated and understood.¹²

But before we go on to investigate the relationship between madness and heresy that such a statement implies, something more should be said about Amalric and his teachings. Evidence for the nature of Amalric's beliefs and the career of his followers comes from a mixture of sources — some narrative (such as chronicles, including one from Scotland, many emanating, interestingly enough, from Cistercian circles) and others which can be characterised as official records, such as the decrees of the Lateran Council, already mentioned, and of the Council of Paris held in 1210. There is also a fragment of the judicial process against the fourteen suspects and a polemical work written against the Amalricians, contained in a manuscript from Troyes.¹³ It should be noted that they all tell us more about the Amalricians than the purported founder of the sect.

We do know, however, that Amalric was a Master of the University of Paris, and at one time tutor to the future Louis VIII (1223-26). He is said to have taught logic for many years before turning to theology. He then fell foul of his colleagues at Paris and was charged with teaching among other things, that 'everyone was obliged to believe that he was member of Christ's body.' Such a statement is in itself unobjectionable, occurring as it does in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. However Amalric

seems to have interpreted it in a literal, rather than allegorical sense. He appealed to the Pope (that is, Innocent III) in person, but the condemnation of his teaching was upheld and he was sent back to Paris, where he admitted his error. The comment of one of the chroniclers that he 'admitted it with his mouth rather than his heart' is surely a rationalisation based on the subsequent history of the case.¹⁴ He died shortly thereafter (probably about 1206) and was buried with full rites of the Church.

However, it seems that he had been a charismatic teacher and there were some among his pupils who took his views further and as priests (or in minor orders) had started to proselytise among their flocks in the dioceses of the province of Sens. With the aid of a spy who infiltrated their circle, these followers of Amalric were exposed as heretical. Fourteen members were tried in Paris and ten of them refused to abjure a series of propositions including, apparently, the claim that 'God is everywhere, in the same way in a rational thing as in an irrational, in a perceptible thing as in an imperceptible'.¹⁵ These ten were found guilty by the Council of Paris in 1210, stripped of their orders, and subsequently burned. The others who seem to have confessed were sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Now since the Amalricians had been found to be heretical, the council (working backwards from these facts and with less than a strict adherence to logic) declared Amalric himself to have been a heretic and ordered his body to be exhumed from the churchyard in which he had been buried and for good measure excommunicated him in all churches of the province.¹⁶

But the Lateran Council declared that Amalric was 'not so much heretical as mad.' This puzzling statement about Amalric raises several questions. First, was madness some sort of excuse for heresy? Second, what was the connection between the devil, madness and heresy and, third, if madness was indeed an extenuating factor for someone accused of heresy, why would the Council want to excuse Amalric? In order to explore these questions we have to understand how madness was viewed in the Middle Ages, or rather, how it was viewed at the turn of the thirteenth century, since, as Barbara Newman shows in a recent article, that the understanding of madness, especially as identified with possession, was subject to change over time, a particular watershed being reached in the mid-thirteenth

century.¹⁷

First of all, madness, like other forms of illness in the Middle Ages had a twofold aetiology with a complicated pattern of interaction. On the one hand, there was the medical model, which we might think of as the 'natural model', though that is not in any way intended to privilege it over the alternative which generally depended upon some form of humoral theory as outlined by Galen. According to this account varying proportions of the four bodily humours (which were in turn linked to the four elements comprising humankind and the larger world,) interacted and caused varying states of sickness and health. The matter was complicated by the theory of the temperaments whereby each person had their own basic combination of humours which contributed to the type of personality they had (these are the well-known 'complexions' as in sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic and melancholy). This last complexion (the melancholic), to make matters even more difficult could itself be implicated in madness. Then again, the choleric nature could result in sudden rages or 'furor'.¹⁸

So much for the natural model (or models). There was also the supernatural model in which madness was somehow induced by the action of the devil (or demons) in various ways, sometimes apparently from within and sometimes from outside, possibly by intermediaries such as flies, bees, darts etc. Where the devil is more directly involved, madness is identified with 'possession' or as it tends to be in Latin 'obsession' the idea being here on the 'siege' the devil lays on the person. It should be noted here that neither model was particular to what has been called (with some misgivings) either 'elite' or 'popular' culture.

In order to get an idea of these different models at work we need go no further than Caesarius of Heisterbach's Dialogue *on Miracles*.¹⁹ This vast collection of monastic lore from the 1220s is cast in the form of a dialogue between a master and a novice and serves as an introduction not only to Cistercian culture of the time but, because of the wide net cast by the examples it uses, is also applicable to lay understandings. It seems particularly appropriate to use Caesarius because he is, in fact, one of the narrative sources for the cult/trial of the Amalricians. Indeed, the long and circumstantial account of the affair is included in his chapter on demons.²⁰

Caesarius provides more examples of those driven mad by the actions of devils and by actual possession where the devil is somehow seen as entering into and taking over the body of the victim — than what we have called the naturalistic model. This is not really surprising since his stated aim in book 5 of the *Dialogues* is to provide evidence for the proposition 'that there are demons, there are many and that they are evil.' So it is interesting to find him also providing an example of the natural model when he refers in passing to a man who repudiated his wife due to 'some unknown disease of the brain.'²¹

The relation in Caesarius's mind between the two models is not at all clear and in this he seems to reflect the general consensus. As in other cases of medieval illness, the natural explanation was often tried first and the supernatural resorted to if that failed. Indeed, this uncertainty is reflected in another of the decrees of Lateran IV, (canon 22) which commands physicians to call in a priest at an early stage when treating a patient because the bodily illness might be (note the tentative approach here) the result of a spiritual failing. The fact that the spiritual explanation was popularly thought of as a last resort is indicated by the council's recognition that a priest should be called at an early stage of the proceedings to spare the patient undue anxiety.

So what was the relationship between the devil and madness (and heresy)? Strangely, not much work seems to have been done on this topic. J. B. Russell, for example, in his book on the Devil in the Middle Ages,²² does not treat the matter at all. Other books have approached the question from the madness side of the equation, but prove even less applicable to our subject.²³ Even Newman, in the article mentioned above, since she is concerned to show how possession seems to have been accommodated as a tool of orthodoxy, has little to say about its relationship to heresy. What emerges from these studies is the lack of a fixed body of lore on the subject. Rather, there was, at least at the time that interests me, the turn of the thirteenth century, a great variety of opinion, and a good deal of crossing back and forth between different models, as the following illustrations show.

My first example is the case of Sigewise, a young noblewoman from Cologne, whose story is told in the Vita

Hildegardis, the late twelfth-century Life of the Abbess of Bingen, famous, among other things for her writings, which spanned the spectrum from theology to poetry and natural history.²⁴ This case also has the advantage of being historically documented (i.e. not just made up by the hagiographer) and famous in its time, as we see from the letters Hildegard received on the subject from people who were not directly involved.²⁵ We first hear of Sigewise in a letter sent to Hildegard by the monks of Brauweiler, who write: 'A certain noble woman, obsessed by an evil spirit these many years, was brought to us by her friends, to gain the help of the blessed Nicholas our patron, to free her of the devil which beset her. The cunning and wickedness of this sly and wanton enemy led almost a thousand people into error and doubt, which we fear was greatly detrimental to Holy Church. Now we all laboured for three months, together with the liberation of this woman in all sorts of ways, but — we cannot say it without grief since our sins weighed upon us we achieved nothing. Thus all our hope is in you, after God. Now one day when the devil was conjured, at last it revealed to us that this obsessed woman should be liberated by the virtue of your contemplation and the mightiness of your divine revelation...' ²⁶

In Abbot Godolphus' letter and in the *Vita* the case is presented as a narrative of possession (or rather obsession) where Hildegard (and indeed only Hildegard in person) is finally able to effect a cure after two failed exorcisms. The first of these was undertaken by the monks of Brauweiler and the second, also at Brauweiler, was performed according to a unique mimetic script involving 7 priests, costumes, and beating the subject with rods which Hildegard had sent them. Despite the fact that the monks describe the case in their initial approach to Hildegard as one of possession there was obviously something more to it.²⁷ Although it is not clear what the symptoms of Sigewise's madness were, according to the monks, they were such that they had led almost a thousand astray.²⁸ Now this is the kind of language used for the popular preaching (or secret proselytising) of heretical sects.²⁹ It might be noted that Hildegard was herself engaged in the campaign against the Cathars at about the same time. We have a letter to the clergy of Cologne, which is dated c. 1163 warning them to be more

vigilant.³⁰ The Sigewise episode is dated to 1169 and it is noted that Hildegard liberated her in the eighth year of her illness. Since we can locate the time of this episode to the early 1160s and the place to the vicinity of Cologne, it is probable that the error into which Sigewise is said to have been leading the people was some form of Catharism. Hildegard, for her part, seems to confirm this when she says that some who were led astray (and the implication here is that they had been led astray by Sigewise) were led back when, under Hildegard's care at Rupertsberg, and while her full recovery was being prayed for, Sigewise (or the Devil through her) preached penance, acceptance of the sacraments and *against* the errors of the Cathars. Newman, in the article mentioned earlier, suggests that Sigewise may have been an 'ex-Cathar or fellow traveller,' but is more concerned to claim her as being the 'first demoniac preacher,' in the sense that the Devil preaches the word of God.³¹ But surely this is to elide the seven years when she had 'been leading others astray' and to privilege the brief period, from the feast of the Purification of the Virgin (Candlemas) till Maundy Thursday, when under Hildegard's strict guidance, the Devil was allowed to aid, rather than hinder God's cause.

The reason why Sigewise was treated as mad or possessed and in need of a spiritual cure rather than ecclesiastical censure and denunciation as a heretic is not clear. Perhaps it had something to do with her position as a noblewoman, or her presumably influential friends who are mentioned as having conducted her around the shrines for some time seeking a cure before ending up at Brauweiler. However it does show that the boundaries between such cases (i.e. possession/madness/heresy) were more often in the eye of the beholder than a matter of objective fact. It is also of interest to note that once it was decided that the matter was a case of possession no blame was attached to her. A similar conclusion is also reached by Caesarius of Heisterbach in connection with those possessed by the Devil in Book 5, chs 32 and 47 of his *Dialogue*, where he explains how the Devil might also beset the good, and that the 'discerning of spirits is not given to all' (cf. also Innocent III's letter on this with examples of Job etc.). Indeed, it should be noted that the comment of the monks of Brauweiler on their failure to perform a lasting exorcism casts no blame on the

woman herself but suggests that it was due to their own sins that they could not be more effective.

This raises some larger questions on the mechanics of possession and the role of the Devil in such cases of 'madness'. Hildegard addresses this question (as usual declaring that she has looked to God for illumination and is relaying his words on the subject) in connection with the Sigewise case and comes to some interesting conclusions.³² Once again there seem to be a couple of different and not altogether reconcilable models at work. On the one hand, she points out that the Devil cannot enter a person 'in his own form' since that would prove catastrophic for the victim. Some kind of explosion seems to be envisaged where she says, 'the person's members would be dissolved more quickly than a straw in the wind.' We might compare this with Caesarius of Heisterbach's slightly different account who says that the Devil cannot occupy a person's soul, but may get into empty places in a person's body, such as the 'bowels.'³³ That Hildegard also subscribed in some way to this model is suggested by some of the more graphic aspects of Sigewise's exorcism. But in her formal explanation of the mechanics of possession Hildegard uses the same sort of language as the Council which talks of the Devil 'blinding' Amalric's mind: when she writes that in such cases the Devil 'covers and overshadows them with the shadow and smoke of his blackness.'³⁴ She also describes in a striking phrase how the possessed are not responsible for their own words or actions since it is the Devil who 'cries out through the person as through a window and moves that person's members although he may not be within them.' and that this takes place while the mind is 'as if asleep.'³⁵ Part of the problem can be seen to go back to accounts of possession and exorcism in the Bible, where the language does indeed suggest some kind of physical entry of the Devil into people.³⁶ Medieval theories of possession had to negotiate this as we see with a comparison of Hildegard and Caesarius.

When we return to the case of Almaric, and find the same sort of language employed, where the Devil is made the active party, it sounds like a mitigating circumstance: '*cuius mentem sic pater mendacii excecavit, ut eius doctrina non tam heretica consenda sit quam insane.*' So the statement accords with what

seems to be the contemporary understanding of the role of the Devil in madness, but can we get any closer to what the Council, or indeed Innocent himself might have thought on the matter? Can he be said to operate with the two models? And what about his notion of the connection between madness and heresy?

We do have some evidence on this count because, among the large numbers of letters he sent during his pontificate are several regarding local heresies (some identified as such and some by implication) and how to deal with them.³⁷ One of these, which is relevant to our investigation, is the case of the brothers and sisters of Castanaso, in the diocese of Bologna, 'concerning, whom,' he writes, in a letter of 1205, 'some sinister things had been suggested to us by certain persons opposed to their way of life.'³⁸ Who were these people and what sort of sinister suggestions might they have spread concerning them? Here we have a collection of (lay) men and women, apparently gathered together to lead what appears to be a common apostolic life under the authority of one Brother Albert, who lapse into 'profanity' and 'blasphemy' along with other disturbing physical and psychological symptoms. A comparison of contemporary groups suggests that this is a typical scenario for the raising of a charge of heresy. And it is likely that this is what the bishop of Bologna had instigated, and from which the Pope is asking him to desist. Whereas in the case of Sigewise, there seems to have been a general consensus that she was possessed, the bishop under whose jurisdiction the Castanasian community fell appears not to have accepted this and to have been 'harassing' them—presumably as heretics.

Ironically, those affected believed that they had been possessed, but Innocent, having sent a team of investigators to the place and also having received a deputation from the community themselves, disputes this perception. This is on the grounds that the Devil would not be permitted to inhabit or otherwise harass the bodies of people who were truly penitent, as these people seemed to be. He bases this insight firmly on biblical texts which he cites in the letter. He suggests indeed that the more naturalistic model is to be applied, and that they are suffering from some sort of mania induced by the strictness of their way of life. However when they thus became mad, as he explains, 'they took the madness for diabolical vexations.' This

argument suggests that he was prepared to accept both the diabolical and the physical models for madness and indeed that he thought it was possible to distinguish between them. So here possible heresy is explained as madness on the natural, rather than the supernatural/diabolical model. It might be noted here that some of the other symptoms the community members described has led John Moore, in his recent study of Innocent III³⁹ to suggest another naturalistic explanation: namely that they were suffering the effects of ergotism.

Now if it had simply been a case of possession, it would surely have been inappropriate for the bishop to have been molesting them since it seems they were quite prepared to carry out any number of penances. So presumably he thought there was something else going on, which given the circumstances, is best considered as heresy. The fact that the Pope tells the bishop to stop harassing them surely suggests that Innocent III believed madness was at the time a possible defence against such accusations of heresy.

But how does the question of the identification of heresy relate to outside circumstances such as the perceived social consequences of the heretical belief? It has been argued, and seems obvious enough, that heresy is only really perceived as a problem when it affects more than just the individual bearer of the (decreed) error and that the most dangerous heresies were seen to be those which undermined most directly the authority of the institutional Church. Of course, it could be argued that by definition any heretical belief undermined the authority of the Church since it opposed it. Indeed this is graphically shown by the form of the Paris decree of 1210 which, when outlining the errors of the Arnalricians takes the form, 'Auctoritas sancta': and the proposition, followed by 'Hi e contra...'.⁴⁰ But heresies which denied the need for sacraments that could only be performed by a duly ordained priesthood, penance, purgatory, paying of tithes etc. had more obvious dangers. However, at least up to this period there seems to have been room for individual judgment on what (or perhaps who) constituted a danger to the Church and since the judgment was made by different people in different positions and with different agendas there was room for doubt and a certain degree of ambiguity which was not the case when a specially dedicated service was developed whose

sole mission was to root out heresy.

To return to the two cases already examined, it seems that Sigewise was not deemed a threat despite the fact that she was active at a time and place (Cologne in the early 1160s) when Catharism was a problem (though not for the first time, since Eberwin of Steinfeld, as early as the 1140s had written to Bernard of Clairvaux to ask him for some ammunition against a group of Cathar heretics in Cologne).⁴¹ This was despite the fact that she was very possibly engaged in some sort of proselytising (i.e. she/the devil through her led many thousand astray). The explanation here is possibly that the diocesan clergy were not themselves very vigilant against the appearance of such heresies. This is certainly what Hildegard suggests when she wrote to them at about the same time to be on the lookout for heretics in Cologne.⁴² The question then arises as to why she did not treat Sigewise as a heretic rather than as one possessed by the Devil. Possibly it was because Sigewise had submitted to (or been delivered into) the therapeutic scenario of shrine-visiting and exorcism rather than the quasi-legalistic one of diocesan inquiry. On the other hand, in the case of the brothers and sisters of Castenaso, the bishop of Bologna seems to have recognised them as a threat and to have acted accordingly, but not the Pope, who accepted their madness but argued against their self-diagnosis of possession and replaced it with a more mundane and naturalistic cause. The reason for this is not clear either, perhaps the pope knew more about the bishop of Bologna than I do, and did not trust his judgment. It can hardly be said that Innocent III was in general 'soft on heresy.'

How then, should we consider the case of Amalric? Does the declaration of Lateran IV constitute some sort of rehabilitation of the man who had been condemned as a heretic in 1210? Can we see this as a kind of rewriting of the history of heresy in miniature? It should be remembered that Amalric was only declared a heretic and excommunicated some years after he had died apparently within the Church. The excommunication of a dead person was unusual enough to require some debate at the time. It is perhaps significant, as Thijssen points out, that one of the principal movers in the action against the Amalricians, Robert de Courson, had recently addressed this question in his Penitential and decided (as against Gratian) that it was justified

as a preventative against the spread of heresy.⁴³ Obviously, the Bishop of Sens had thought the threat of the Amalricians so dangerous around 1210 that their supposed leader had to be posthumously condemned. But what sort of threat was this? On the one hand it seems to fit in with the kinds of popular heresy, like Catharism, that appeared to be getting out of hand. Indeed, the description of the Amalrician heresy in the chronicles contains all the stock accusations such as misleading the unlearned (especially, for some reason, widows) sexual licence, rejection of the sacraments and so on. (Though it should be noted that it was in one sense diametrically opposed to Catharism in that it saw God in everything rather than the Devil.) However, another important factor was the perceived threat to the prestige of the University of Paris as arbiter in theological matters. However, by the time the Lateran Council met in 1215 the Amalrician heresy/sect seems to have been entirely destroyed, by the burning of the ten in Paris in 1210 and the subsequent capture and execution of the last Amalrician, master Godin, in about 1212.⁴⁴ Thus the rather dubious logic of condemning Amalric for the actions and beliefs of his followers after his death may have occurred to some of those present at the council, if not to the Pope himself.

We cannot know if it was, indeed, the Pope who was responsible for the change, but his many letters, including that concerning the community of Castenaso, show the trained mind of a jurist able and willing to make such logical distinctions. And if some sort of mitigation were required, what more fitting than that the mind of the supposed heresiarch had (through no fault of his own) been blinded by the Devil. This allows the beliefs to be condemned, but removes some, or perhaps all, of the blame from their carrier. If you have followed my speculations this far, and agree that at this time madness was a possible defence against accusations of heresy, we might ask whether it continued to be so. It would take more time than I have at my disposal to follow the career of madness through the bloody history of heresy beyond the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth century. However, something of its status may be indicated by its appearance in the *Directorium inquisitionum* of the Aragonese inquisitor Nicholas Eymerich in the late fourteenth century.⁴⁵ Here feigned madness is listed as one of

the 'ten ways in which heretics seek to hide their errors' when he writes 'The ninth way of evading a question is by feigning stupidity or madness. For example, if they are questioned concerning the faith, fearing lest they be caught out in their errors through the efforts of the inquisitor, they act as if they were mad and out of their minds ... I have had much experience with such people who at times constantly act out of their minds, but at other times have lucid intervals.⁴⁶ So it seems that there must have been some underlying residuum of the notion that madness was a mitigating factor, but it is also clear from the manual that no method of distinguishing between real and feigned madness is suggested, and indeed the presumption is that the person suspected of heresy is not really mad at all.

Can this sorry state of affairs be sheeted back to Lateran IV and Innocent III? I hope not, and would argue that it has more to do with the formalisation of the inquisition, and its inevitable bureaucratisation, together with the growing feeling that despite all this the problem of heresy was slipping out of control. It would indeed be ironic if the Pope who had himself employed or at least allowed for this humane possibility (that is, madness as mitigation of heresy), by putting the prosecution of heresy on a more formal, tightly controlled and professional footing, was also the cause of its demise.

¹ For the text see Antonio Garcia y Garcia, *Constitutiones Concilii Quarti Lateranensis una cum Commentariis glossatorum* (Città del Vaticano, 1981).

² See for example Marjorie Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages*, (Oxford, 1969).

³ See Malcolm Lambert, *Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation*, 3rd edn (Oxford, 2002), pp. 208-37.

⁴ See Fiona Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition of Trinitarian Orthodoxy,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 48 (1997): 20-43.

⁵ Gary Dickson, 'The Burning of the Amalricians,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 40 (1989): 347-69, 358.

⁶ Dickson, 'Burning', p. 352.

⁷ Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition of Trinitarian Orthodoxy,' p. 27.

⁸ Among the numerous twelfth-century examples found, Rupert of Deutz stands out for his frequent linking of the terms. The connection is also assumed by William of Ockham (see [Chapter 4](#) in this volume).

⁹ One such eleventh-century example has been discussed by Brian Stock in *The Implications of Literacy* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 101-106. But in the case of Leutard and the bees (as reported by Radolph Glaber in his *Historiae* 2.11.22) it is hard to disentangle the various strands of the tale from each other, and there is also some confusion about what the people thought, what the bishop thought, and what Glaber thought about what they thought. As such it proves to be only a very muddled guide to the relationship between heresy, the devil and madness. The case of Eon de l'Etoile who appeared before the Council of Rheims in 1148 has also been taken as suggestive of madness, is also less than clear and appears to depend largely on the fact that his punishment was incarceration in chains. See Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the legal aspects of the case see J. M. M. H. Thijssen, 'Master Amalric and the Amalricians: Inquisitorial Procedure and the Suppression of Heresy at the University of Paris,' *Speculum* 71 (1996): 43-65.

¹¹ The literature on the Cathars is large and growing. See, for example, Malcolm Lambert, *The Cathars* (Oxford, 1998).

¹² See Raymonde Foreville, 'Procédure et débats dans les conciles médiévaux du Latran (1123-1215),' *Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia* 19 (1965): 21-37 and Garcia y Garcia, *Constitutiones*, p. 11.

¹³ For full details see Thijssen, 'Master Amalric', pp. 43-46.

¹⁴ *Gesta Philippi II Augusti*, in *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste I*, Henri F. Delaborde (ed.), (Paris, 1882), pp. 230-233, 231.

¹⁵ From a fragment of the process discovered by Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, fragment du procès des amauriciens,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 18 (1950-51): 325-36. Cited Thijssen, 'Master Amalric', p. 57.

¹⁶ Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (4 vols, Paris, 1889-91), vol. I, pp. 70-71.

¹⁷ Barbara Newman, 'Possessed by the Spirit: Devout Women, Demoniacs, and the Apostolic Life in the Thirteenth Century,' *Speculum* 73 (1998): 733-770.

¹⁸ For more on this see my 'Hildegard and the Humors: Medieval Theories of

Illness and Personality,' in Andrew D. Weiner and Leonard V. Kaplan (eds), *Madness, Melancholy, and the Limits of the Self* (Madison, 1996), pp. 14-23.

¹⁹ *Caesarii Heisterbachensis monachi Dialogus miraculorum*, Joseph Strange (ed.), (Cologne, 1852, repr. 1966).

²⁰ At pp. 304-7. Translated by Walter L. Wakefield and Austin P. Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* (New York, 1969), p. 260.

²¹ This is the version in *The Dialogus on Miracles* trans. by H. von E. Scott and C. C. Swinton Bland (2 vols, London, 1929). The Latin reads 'cui cum materia rapta esset in cerebrum'.

²² Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Lucifer, the Devil in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 1984).

²³ As for example, Penelope Doob, *Nebuchadnezzar's Children: Conventions of Madness in Middle English Literature* (New Haven, 1974).

²⁴ For Hildegard see my *Hildegard of Bingen: A Visionary Life* (London, 1998). For the Sigewise episode see Monika Klaes, (ed.) *Vita Hildegardis*. In *Corpus Christianorum continuatio medievalis* (Turnhout, 1993), vol. 126, pp. 55-65.

²⁵ See for example the letter from Hildegard's nephew, Arnold of Trier, Ep. 27, 27r in Lieven Van Acker, (ed.) *Hildegardensis Bingensis Epistolarium: Prima Pars*. CCCM, vol 91 (Turnhout, 1991) and Ep. 158-158r in CCCM 91A.

²⁶ Klaes, *Vita*, p. 59. [my translation]

²⁷ Klaes, *Vita*, p. 61.

²⁸ The Latin here reads oddly as 'Sed uersutia et nequitia callidissimi et nequissimi hostis tot hominum fere milia duxit in errorem et dubium, quod ecclesie sancte maximum timemus detrimentum' where 'tot' seems to be in apposition to 'fere milia hominum' pace Baird and Ehrman who translate it as 'But the insidious evil of this most shrewd and wicked enemy has brought so many thousands into error and doubt that we greatly fear harm to Holy Church', in *The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen* (New York, 1994), vol. 1, p. 147. Moreover, the form of the verb ('duxit') suggests a reference to the specific case of Sigewise, rather than a more general statement about the Devil's long-term influence.

²⁹ See for example Hildegard's letter to the clergy of Cologne, in Van Acker, *Hildegardensis Bingensis Epistolarium*, Ep. 15r; and Bernard of Clairvaux's Letter 239 to Pope Innocent III in *The letters of St Bernard of Clairvaux*, trans. Bruno Scott James (Phoenix Mill, 1998), pp. 317-20.

³⁰ Van Acker, *Hildegardensis Bingensis Epistolarium*, Ep. 15r.

³¹ Newman, *Possessed*, p. 755.

³² Klaes, *Vita*, pp. 56-7.

³³ *Dialogues*, Book V, ch. 15.

³⁴ Klaes, *Vita*, p. 56.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ See, for example, Luke: 8.

³⁷ Othmar Hageneder et al. (eds), *Die Register Papst Innocenz III* (Graz, 1964-).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, (Pontifikatsjahr, 1205/1206) Letter 158 (157), vol. 8, pp. 278-81.

³⁹ John C. Moore, *Innocent III* (Leiden, 2003), p. 151.

⁴⁰ Denifle, *Chartularium*, p. 71.

⁴¹ See Wakefield and Evans, *Heresies*, pp. 126-132.

⁴² See note 31 above.

⁴³ Thijssen, 'Master Amalric', pp. 50-52, and Appendix, pp. 61-65.

⁴⁴ Dickson, 'Burning', p. 350.

⁴⁵ Nicholas Eymerich, *Directorium inquisitorum F. Nicolai Eymerici Ordinis Praedicatorum, cum commentariis Francisci Pegnae sacrae theologiae ac iuris utriusque doctoris* (Venice, 1595).

⁴⁶ Quoted James B. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society: Power, Discipline, and Resistance in Languedoc* (Ithaca, 1997), pp. 93-96.

Chapter 3

Accusations of Heresy and Error in the Twelfth-Century Schools: The Witness of Gerhoh of Reichersberg and Otto of Freising

Constant J. Mews

Introduction

The twelfth century, sometimes celebrated as an age of intellectual renaissance, is often identified as the time when an increasingly authoritarian Church starts to exercise its muscle against the threat of heresy. Certainly, this is the image put forward by R. I. Moore in recent studies which focus on the repression of dissent within the period.¹ Perhaps the most well-known ecclesiastical prosecutor of heresy is Bernard of Clairvaux, who accused both Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers of flouting orthodoxy.² His rhetorical descriptions of heretics as wolves, 'driven by pride and hypocrisy, who devour the vine (Cant. 2:15)' have been of immense influence in shaping the way heresy was perceived, both in the medieval and modern periods.³

Yet how reliable is the rhetoric of Bernard of Clairvaux as a guide to the boundaries between orthodoxy and heresy in the twelfth century? The image of Bernard of Clairvaux as hammer of heretics, given great authority in counter-Reformation Europe, owes much to the efforts of his loyal disciple and biographer, Geoffrey Auxerre, who describes how his hero championed orthodoxy against a series of threats, Peter Abelard at Sens, Gilbert of Poitiers at Reims, and the anti-clerical followers of Henry of Lausanne in Toulouse.⁴ Geoffrey also helped shape our image of Bernard by compiling the official

register of Bernard's correspondence, in which he included Bernard's letters relating to Peter Abelard and Arnold of Brescia, as well as the edict of Pope Innocent II, issued on 16 July 1141, condemning Abelard to perpetual silence and excommunicating all his followers.⁵ Geoffrey did not include any reference to the subsequent reconciliation between Bernard and Abelard, or the lifting of the sentence of excommunication, obtained by Peter the Venerable.⁶ Geoffrey thus ensured that readers of Bernard's correspondence would think that his hero had obtained a definitive papal judgment against Abelard and his followers. He did not include correspondence relating to Gilbert of Poitiers, perhaps because Bernard never succeeded in having this remarkable intellectual condemned.

Bernard considered that Abelard did not so much invent a new heresy, as reassert old heresies, whether of Arius, Pelagius, or Nestorius, all of which had been condemned by the Fathers of the Church.⁷ Bernard's influence was such that when the collected works of Abelard and Heloise were printed for the first time in 1616, François d'Amboise was obliged to reissue them in the same year with a *praefatio apologetica*, coupled with a *Censura doctorum Parisiensium*, issued by the Theology Faculty of the Sorbonne, identifying potentially dangerous passages.⁸ Later in the seventeenth century, Abelard and Heloise attracted attention not as heretics or thinkers, but as lovers, trapped by the repressive forces of medieval Christendom.⁹ The dramatic quality of their writing, coupled with the polemic of St. Bernard, helped create a dangerously simplistic mythology of the twelfth century as a time of deep-seated conflict between an age of faith and an age of reason.

While Gilbert of Poitiers has attracted much less critical attention than Peter Abelard, his writings were in fact more widely copied in the twelfth century.¹⁰ His dense and philosophically demanding commentaries on the theological tractates of Boethius survive in monastic houses all over Europe, but were particularly well studied in monasteries within Bavaria and Austria. My particular interest in this paper is to consider the implications of twelfth-century debate about the influence of the ideas of Gilbert, far more widely diffused within a monastic milieu than the writings of Bernard might lead us to think. In particular, I wish to explore the writings of Otto of Freising, an

admirer of Gilbert of Poitiers, and of Gerhoh of Reichersberg, in some ways more vocal than Bernard in condemning the influence of scholastically trained teachers within the Church. The differences between Otto of Freising and Gerhoh bring into sharp relief the lack of consensus in the twelfth century about the definition of orthodoxy and the way in which heresy could be understood. Otto, who studied in France in the late 1120s before becoming a Cistercian monk at Morimond in 1132 and then bishop of Freising from 1138 until his death in 1158, shared with Gerhoh a commitment to the cause of ecclesiastical reform.¹¹ They differed radically, however, in their philosophical and theological outlook.

Gerhoh of Reichersberg (1092/93-1169)

Unlike Hugh of St. Victor and Otto of Freising, Gerhoh (1092/93-1169) never travelled to France to further his education.¹² Instead, Gerhoh modelled himself on Rupert of Deutz (c.1075/80-1129), a prolific Benedictine abbot who distrusted the scholastic masters at Laon and Paris.¹³ In 1120, Gerhoh became an Augustinian canon at Rottenbuch, on the southern edges of the diocese of Freising, in Bavaria. His first major writing on the cause of clerical reform in his first major treatise, *Opusculum de aedificio Dei* (1128), dedicated to Bishop Cuno of Regensburg.¹⁴ In 1132, following an unsuccessful struggle with Bishop Henry of Freising, Gerhoh moved to Reichersberg in the diocese of Passau, from where he saw himself as supporting Conrad, the reforming archbishop of Salzburg (1121-47) and Pope Innocent II (1130-43).¹⁵ Gerhoh became a good friend of Godfrey of Admont (1137-65), and developed a close relationship with the highly educated female community at Admont.¹⁶

Gerhoh's fear of heresy was inextricably linked to his hostility to the cause of Pope Anacletus II, elected by a majority of Roman cardinals, with the support of the city of Rome. Not only had Anacletus II been educated in France, but his brother, Jordan, was a prominent civic leader in Rome involved in a movement to re-establish the Senate.¹⁷ Gerhoh was a passionate supporter of Pope Innocent II, a rival candidate chosen by a

smaller faction of Cardinals, led by chancellor Haimeric and supported in France by Bernard of Clairvaux.¹⁸ Unlike Bernard, however, Gerhoh was unrestrained in publicly condemning what he saw as the two biggest heresies of his day, simony and nicolaitism.¹⁹ In his *Liber de simoniaciis* (1135), Gerhoh accused clerics of imitating both Simon Magus, who used money to buy ecclesiastical office, (Acts 8:9) and Nicolaus, a deacon condemned for moral turpitude (Acts 6:5; Rev 2:6, 15).

After the death of Anacletus II in 1138, Innocent II reasserted his vision of a reformed Church, free of secular influence, at the II Lateran Council, held in April 1139. Innocent declared all clergy ordained by Anacletus to be schismatic and heretical, a position so harsh that even Bernard of Clairvaux urged that a more moderate position should prevail (to Gerhoh's dismay).²⁰ Also at the Council, Innocent II had Arnold of Brescia, an Augustinian canon closely identified with criticism of the Pope and bishops wielding temporal power, expelled from Italy. Arnold subsequently went to Paris, where he attached himself to Peter Abelard. Sometime during Lent 1140, William of St-Thierry warned Bernard of Clairvaux about the dangerous influence of Abelard's theological writings, which had reached even into Roman curia. Such fears were not without reason. Master Guy of Castello, subsequently elected as Pope Celestine II on the death of Innocent on 24 September 1143, owned an important copy of Abelard's *Theologia christiana* and *Sic et Non*. William and Bernard raised the spectre of renewal of schism within the Church if Abelard's influence went unchecked. Fear of internal conflict within Rome was at its height during these years. Celestine II lasted only five months as Pope, being poisoned by 'one of his own' according to a Bolognese chronicle.²¹ During these months, however, Arnold slipped back into Italy and reconnected with the nascent Roman commune. Pope Lucius II reverted to a policy of open warfare on the commune, and after only eleven months was fatally wounded leading an assault on the Capitol. The cardinals then elected a Cistercian abbot, Bernardo Pignatelli, a former monk of Clairvaux. Refusing to recognize the Roman commune, Eugenius III was forced to flee the city, establishing his court at Viterbo. He used the fear of heresy and of external assault on Christendom to convey a sense of mission to the Church. In

January 1146, Eugenius travelled to Vezelay, from where he proclaimed a new Crusade against enemies of Christendom. This was the climate in which Eugenius was asked to judge accusations of heresy being made against Gilbert of Poitiers, initially at Paris in April 1147, and then again at Reims in March 1148.

Gerhoh of Reichersberg saw his role as warning Pope Innocent II and his successors about the threat presented to doctrinal purity by a range of innovative theological opinions that he feared were gaining ground in the Church. Writing to Pope Innocent II in 1141, he recalls that he first came across heretical teaching about Christ in 1126 during a visit to the papal court in Rome, when he heard a certain master Liutolph argue that Christ was by nature the son of Man, but had been adopted as Son of God.²² While such terminology was not seen as heretical by disciples of Anselm of Laon (of whom Liutolph was one), Gerhoh feared that it could undermine Christ's divine status. He also reports that on a separate visit (probably in 1132, when Anacletus II was in control of Rome), Gerhoh fell into argument with a canon of the Lateran called Adam, a disciple of Abelard, who held that statements about Christ's divinity, such as that Christ was a dwelling place for God, were essentially figurative expressions.²³ In the winter of 1141, he sent to Otto of Freising a treatise, now lost, *De glorificatione Filii hominis*, directed against disciples of Peter Abelard, whom he claims were 'as numerous as locusts'.²⁴ Gerhoh evidently knew that Otto, who had only come to Freising from France in 1138, was sympathetic to new ways of thinking being propounded in the Schools. Otto reportedly wrote back to Gerhoh, defending the teaching of Gilbert, who had moved from Chartres to Paris in around 1137, but would not become appointed as bishop of Poitiers until 1142.²⁵ This did not assuage Gerhoh, for whom all attempts to differentiate philosophically the humanity and divinity in Christ were tantamount to heresy. Gerhoh continued to maintain a politely reverential, although perhaps also implicitly suspicious attitude towards Otto, to whom he submitted to Otto the first part of his vast Commentary on the Psalms.²⁶ This did not stop Gerhoh from questioning arguments put by wayward disciples of Gilbert.

Gerhoh's fear of heresy was often prompted by visits to

Rome. In February/March 1146, shortly after Eugenius had been forced to take refuge in France, he wrote his *Giber de duabus haeresibus*, in which he warns the Pope about two major heresies he sees as threatening the Church. One was doctrinal. He was particularly concerned to refute a disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers who had claimed the authority of Hilary of Poitiers to support the distinction between the humanity and divinity of Christ. Gerhoh lambasted this as defective patristic scholarship, quoting many texts to prove his point that as both Man and God, Christ was fully equal to God the Father. He targets not Gilbert or Abelard in particular, but 'dogmatising French masters'.²⁷ The other heresy that disturbed him was the claim of clerics ordained by schismatic authority (in other words Anacletus II) to celebrate sacraments. In Gerhoh's view, they could not ritually recreate the body of Christ, if they were not fully members of the Church.

Gerhoh returned to these two major concerns after the death of Pope Eugenius III in 1156, and the accession of a new pope, Hadrian IV (one of whose first actions was to have Arnold of Brescia executed for heresy). In a treatise warning about 'the novelties of his day', he reminded the new Pope, Hadrian IV, on the see of Peter, of his long-standing claims to earlier Popes about threats confronting the Church.²⁸ He appeals to Hadrian IV to enforce the strict rules laid down at the II Lateran Council, 'against the madness of clerics luxuriating in a worldly and worse than lay manner, transforming divine grace into their own luxuries, while they perversely enjoy ecclesiastical privileges'.²⁹ He sees the citizens of Rome as having prostituted themselves to a spirit of avarice and forcing Popes to flee the city. Worldly minded clerics have crept into influence with the Church as a result of personal ambition: 'Of such a kind are cathedral clerics and their fellow-travellers (*conducticii*), throughout Germany and Gaul'.³⁰ He is troubled that these clerics are not content with a single prebend, but are accumulating benefices for financial gain. While Gerhoh recognizes the truth of St Paul's statement that it is necessary that there should be heresies (1 Cor. 11.19), he laments that he himself has been damned as a heretic by those that he accuses of heretical doctrine himself, namely that schismatics could legitimately celebrate sacraments.

Rather than dwell on simony and nicolaitism, he warns more attention about purveyors of novelty, 'the dialecticians or rather heretics of our time', above all 'the many disciples of Peter Adbaiolard, as numerous as locusts, who claim that Christ is not God, except in a figurative sense and that Christ is simply the dwelling place for divinity'.³¹ Gerhoh flatly rejects an accusation made by a disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers that he had fallen into idolatry in speaking about the flesh of Christ as divine. He scours the writing of the Fathers to prove that the flesh of Christ is nothing other than God himself. To say that Christ is anything less than fully divine, he sees as gross heresy. This was master Peter of Vienna, who seems to have moved from Paris to the Hofkapelle in Vienna, perhaps through the influence of Otto of Freising, sometime before 1153/54, when he engaged in a heated exchange of letters with Gerhoh, not all of which have survived.³² Master Peter followed the teaching of Gilbert of Poitiers that the form by which something exists, namely divinity, is quite separate from that which it informs, namely the human person of Jesus. Critics of Gilbert of Poitiers considered that this metaphysical distinction was blasphemous when applied to God, as it implied that God was something different from his divinity, or that Christ as a man was different from the divinity by which Christ was informed. Gerhoh's devotional image of Christ was like a Romanesque image of the Son of God as an all powerful judge, as divine in character as the Church which he founded. Peter of Vienna, by contrast, considered that Gerhoh was effectively denying the full humanity of Christ. For any student of Gilbert of Poitiers, Christ's divinity was that of perfect form, not to be confused with the human person assumed by the Word of God. Gilbert and Peter of Vienna saw their Christology as in continuity with orthodox tradition, but applied a crucial metaphysical distinction to preserve the dynamic tension between humanity and divinity in Christ.

In his letter to Pope Hadrian, Gerhoh is proud to demonstrate that he is as proficient in scholastic theological dispute as his adversary, even though he has none of the philosophical underpinning which makes Gilbert's theology such an impressive intellectual edifice. Gerhoh considers disciples of Gilbert to be the new semi-Sabellians, in the way they separate

the persons of the Trinity from divinity itself.³³ Gerhoh finds support in the anti-heretical writings of the Fathers of the Church for what he sees as simply a resurgence of the ancient heresies of both Arius and Sabellius. Another variant of the Christological heresy that he blames on Gilbert is the notion that Christ is not the natural, but the adoptive Son of God. This he sees as an insult to Christ's divinity.³⁴ Gerhoh has access to Gilbert's commentary on Boethius, and urges Gilbert's pupils to follow their teacher's instruction in respecting the difference between theology and other disciplines. Gerhoh has no understanding, however, of the metaphysical distinction between quality and substance that underpins the Christology of Gilbert and Peter, and accuses such arguments of denying the divinity of Christ.

Only in the second part of his treatise does Gerhoh indicate the polemical subtext that drives his argument, the vexed relationship between the monastic order, identified with Benjamin, and the clergy, who claim to represent Rachel, but abuse that honour. Their iniquity is now rife throughout Germany and Gaul. Their crimes are not just theological. They are participating in physical wars on the Church, again a reference to the growing conflict between clerics loyal to the German emperor and to the Pope.³⁵ He has particular venom for the upstart people of Rome, so different from the Christian. He recalls an occasion when he was once in Rome, and came into contact with an *Arnoldinus*, an educated follower of Arnold of Brescia. In Gerhoh's vision of the world, all heretics were fundamentally the same, dangerous threats to the established order.³⁶

The treatise presents a litany of abuses in the Church, which he sees as demanding strong measures from a new Pope. His ideal is that the clergy should return to apostolic simplicity. His theological concern about clerics not acknowledging the full divinity of Christ, is only part of a broader preoccupation that the Church, the body of Christ, is being sacrificed to secular control. Gerhoh presents himself as like Bernard of Clairvaux, who had died only a few years earlier in 1153, a voice of orthodoxy protesting against the influence of scholastic argument within the Church. With no awareness of the major differences between Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, he accuses

them both of undermining belief in the divinity of Christ, and thus of weakening the Church, the body of Christ.³⁷ His tirade is that of an old man, who recalls how he had fulminated in the past against clergy ordained by Anacletus and had preached against the followers of Abelard who once infected the Church as much as followers of Gilbert have now risen to positions of influence.

Otto of Freising (c. 1111-1158)

Otto of Freising, who studied in France sometime between the mid-1120s and 1132, when he became a Cistercian monk at Morimond, was far more sympathetic to Gilbert of Poitiers than Gerhoh. His understanding of Gilbert's thought is so nuanced that it seems quite possible that he was a student of Gilbert at Chartres, where Gilbert was taught from the early 1120s until 1137, rather than in Paris.³⁸ Otto knows about the fame of the two brothers, Bernard and Thierry of Chartres, but never mentions Hugh of St Victor, emerging as the dominant teacher in Paris at the time that Gilbert was studying in France. He knows only second-hand reports of the teaching of Peter Abelard, and expresses distaste for the way that he challenged the authority of his teachers with none of the respect for his elders demonstrated by Gilbert. In 1132, he and his companions entered the monastery of Morimond, founded from Cîteaux in 1115 at the same time as Clairvaux, but with a very different character. Whereas Bernard had gathered many French speaking monks to Clairvaux, not least through his close friendship with William of Champeaux, Morimond had a much stronger German character to its community, provoking some serious tensions within the nascent Cistercian order in 1124, when its abbot Arnold decided to resign in order to establish a new foundation, with a group of younger monks, in Palestine.³⁹ Unlike Bernard of Clairvaux, Otto saw no incompatibility between a reformed monasticism and commitment to the study of Plato and Aristotle.⁴⁰ Through his studies, Otto was far more aware than Bernard of the shift in theological perspective being promoted by both Gilbert of Poitiers and Thierry of Chartres, founded on renewed attention to the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius. His

biographer, Rahewin, tells us that he was the first to bring into Germany texts of Aristotle like the *Sophistical Refutations*, little known in the early 1120s, when Abelard composed his *Logica Ingredientibus*, but which only started to become known in Paris in the 1130s.⁴¹ Whereas Bernard of Clairvaux drew inspiration from a fresh reading of Augustine, to support his reflections on the experience of divine love within the soul, Otto of Freising was closer in spirit to the more abstract and elitist philosophical reflection encouraged at Chartres through meditating on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius. While he acknowledged Bernard's undoubted rhetorical mastery as a preacher on the Bible, Otto never sympathized with the dismissal of 'head' learning, and always attached great value to the study of the ancients.

In his *Chronicle of the Two Cities* Otto accords a more significant role than Augustine to continuities between classical and Christian culture, while still looking forward to the *eschaton*, when a transient world finally succumbs to the city of God. Although dependent on Eusebius and Orosius for his knowledge of the heresies that have afflicted the Church, he is much less fearful about contemporary heresy than Bernard of Clairvaux. He praises Boethius as the great intellectual who refuted the errors of Sabellius, Arius, Nestorius and Eutyches, through reason rather than through enforcing religious authority.⁴² He emphasizes the continuity of civilization from the time of the Trojans, to the rulers of the Roman Empire, and now to the Holy Roman Empire, the governance of which had now fallen on members of his own family. Otto closes the preface to his *Chronicle* with a letter to his friend, Rainald of Dassel, chancellor of the kingdom and archbishop of Cologne (and celebrated patron of some very secular minded clerical poets), in which he lays out the place of history within a grand vision of philosophy, under the all seeing eye of God.⁴³ Otto's greatest challenge is to present the political crisis of his own age. Rather than invoke heresy as the cause of the papal schism or demonising Anacletus II, he blames much of the conflict within the Holy Roman Empire on political factors, above all what he sees as the insolence of many Italian cities. Unlike Rupert of Deutz and Gerhoh of Reichersberg, his historical vision is structured not around the efforts of the Church to free itself from secular authority, but around the search of an

imperfect society to live according to the will of God. With acute political insight, he blames the citizens of Rome for putting trust in Jordan, brother of Anacletus.⁴⁴ Arnold of Brescia was dangerous, not so much as a preacher of heresy, but as someone who encouraged civil disobedience. Otto blamed the intransigence of the Roman population Rome for forcing the Pope to leave the Lateran for Trastevere.⁴⁵

In the *Gesta Friderici I*, written in the two years before his death (22 September 1158), Otto recapitulates the history of the last fifty years, with particular attention to the tumultuous last decade of his life. In a brilliant philosophical excursus, Otto draws on central ideas of Gilbert of Poitiers to expound his understanding of the relationship between abstract form, above all divinity, and the concrete particulars of historical existence. He explains that divinity is true form, and can never be identified with specific concrete objects, each of which exists through forms, but different from God, who is true form.⁴⁶ This prologue provides a fitting introduction to his subsequent protracted defence of Gilbert of Poitiers, whose orthodoxy had been questioned in Paris in the presence of Eugenius III in April 1147, and again at Reims, where Bernard of Clairvaux accused Gilbert of heresy. Otto acknowledges that Peter Abelard 'was very capable in the subtlety of arguments that were not just necessary for philosophy, but useful for provoking the minds of men to laughter,' but criticizes his 'incautious' application of the *sententia vocum* to theology.⁴⁷ Whereas Bernard accused Abelard of imitating Arius and Nestorius in diminishing God the Son against God the Father, Otto claims that Abelard was guilty of the Sabellian error of not sufficiently respecting the identity of the three persons as three separate things, a definition that St Anselm had called heretical when formulated by Roscelin of Compiègne.⁴⁸ There is no foundation to his claim that Abelard compared the relationship between the three persons to that between a statement, a premise and a conclusion.⁴⁹ Otto never mentions Abelard's foundation of the abbey of the Paraclete, and only knows about the council of Sens in 1141 from the brief report provided the Pope by the archbishop of Reims (very likely written by Bernard or a secretary) and the condemnation issued by Pope Innocent II. Otto did not have access to the less well circulated but more detailed account of the proceedings,

offered by the archbishop of Sens, which explains that Bernard had preached to the assembled bishops before Abelard had been given a chance to put his case. Otto is aware however that Abelard composed an *Apologia*, and acknowledges that he finished his life as a humble monk of Cluny.

By contrast, Otto gives a much more nuanced account of the philosophical principles that underpin the theology of Gilbert of Poitiers, whose genius was that he applied with great care (*haut premeditate*) a key philosophical notion, the distinction between a substance (*id quod est*) and a quality (*id quo est*), to theology. The divine person Christians call God the Father is informed by divinity, but is not identical to divinity in that a substance can never be identified with its form. Otto explains (not very clearly) that Gilbert followed the teaching in logic, that when someone says 'Socrates is', he does not actually refer to any *thing*.⁵⁰ Writing perhaps only a year after Bernard's death, he comments with great acuity on his gullibility. He was 'zealous out of fervour for the Christian faith as much as rather naïve, as a result of his normal kindness, so that he had a horror of masters who trusted too much in worldly wisdom, and was particularly attentive if any one said anything foreign to Christian faith'.⁵¹ The charges of heresy against Gilbert, initially made by two disgruntled archdeacons of Poitiers, became elevated into a major issue of principle through the polemic of writers like Gerhoh of Reichersberg.⁵²

John of Salisbury, who was himself present at the council of Reims, reports that there was widespread suspicion among the cardinals of the curia that Suger of Saint-Denis (in charge of the kingdom of France while Louis was on Crusade) was wanting to use accusations against Gilbert as a way of forcing the papacy to accept the abbot's views under threat of schism.⁵³ John also tells us that Gilbert was opposed not just by Bernard of Clairvaux, but by two secular masters, Robert of Melun and Peter Lombard, both of whom were emerging as leading theologians in Paris in the 1140s, after Gilbert had left Paris to become bishop of Poitiers.⁵⁴ Both Robert of Melun and Peter Lombard represented a tradition of theology, quite different from Gilbert of Poitiers. Rather than developing their ideas in commentary on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius, they echoed the practice of Hugh of St. Victor in composing systematic sentence collections. In their

different ways, Robert and Peter Lombard distanced themselves from using the *id quodlibet* distinction to analyse problems of theology and Christology. Unlike Bernard of Clairvaux, they formulated their criticisms of Gilbert in the terminology of academic discourse, rather than through general condemnation of scholastic theology in general.

Conclusion

Whereas Abelard had not been successful at the council of Sens in 1141 in persuading the assembled bishops of the injustice of the accusations made against his teaching, Gilbert of Poitiers was much more able to assert his learning against critics not familiar with the terminology of the schools. Abelard may have had a few defenders among educated monks and clerics, but there were few bishops or abbots in positions of authority willing to stand in his defence. Gilbert, by contrast, generated some significant support from writers like John of Salisbury and Otto of Freising. Gerhoh of Reichersberg belonged to a different generation, fearful of the influence of new ways of thinking on the discussion of theology. He was afraid that any attempt to emphasize the humanity of Christ was a concession to those who challenged the divine authority of the Church as an institution. The accusations against Gilbert provided an opportunity for some leaders, in particular Suger of Saint-Denis, to assert monastic authority against that of a prominent teacher, albeit one with much wider support than Peter Abelard. In 1147, Suger was anxious at the time to reform the abbey of Sainte-Geneviève, initially by installing monks of Saint-Denis in the abbey. As it turned out, Eugenius III rejected this plan of Suger and instructed that Sainte-Geneviève be taken over by canons of Saint-Victor. This allowed for a much smoother transfer of authority, given that the canons of Saint-Victor were much more familiar with the intellectual traditions of the schools than the monks of Saint-Denis.

Perhaps the teacher who was ultimately far more important in countering the influence of Gilbert of Poitiers was Peter Lombard, who initially studied under Hugh at the abbey of St. Victor but had become a canon of the cathedral of Notre-Dame

by 1145. Influenced both by the clear doctrinal guidelines provided by Hugh of St. Victor and the style of precise, critical argumentation favoured by Abelard, Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* provided a systematic overview of theology ultimately more accessible than the Commentaries of Gilbert on the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius. Aware of the teachings of both Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, Peter Lombard sought to construct a theology and Christology that was both rational and founded on the authority of the Fathers. In his discussion of Christ's nature, he had to steer his way between various positions then current in Paris, all of which turned on the issue of whether God can be said to have become something (*aliquid*), when God the Son became incarnate. One was the view held, among others by Hugh of St. Victor (itself deriving from the teaching of Anselm of Laon) that Christ was *homo assumptus*, a man assumed by God. The second was the view, developed by Gilbert of Poitiers, that Christ has an explicable unity, but subsists by virtue of the two natures, human and divine, by which Christ exists. The third view, rejects the notion that Christ is essentially a man, but holds that Christ is less than the Father in so far as he is a man, or according to his disposition (*habitus*), united to himself.⁵⁵ Lombard's own discussion of Christ's identity, both human and divine, both benefits from Gilbert's discussion, while steering away from its potential limitations. On such a delicate issue Lombard could not avoid provoking controversy. In 1163/64, just three years after Lombard's death, Gerhoh accused him of favouring the *habitus* theory, and of drawing on Peter Abelard for these ideas.⁵⁶

The death of Hadrian IV in 1159, and the eighteen-year papal schism that followed, heightened fear of heresy within the Church. At a council at Tours in 1163, Pope Alexander III (1159-81), a former professor of law from Bologna, now in exile in France, was forced to condemn the thesis that Christ was not something, but avoided any specific condemnation of Peter Lombard. Until his death in 1169, Gerhoh continued to agitate popes and bishops to condemn what he saw as dangerous tendencies to deny the full divinity of Christ with as much vigour as he sought to defend the Church from secular interference, leading to an intellectual revolution within the teaching of theology in Paris. In 1177-79, an English cleric,

John of Cornwall, emulated Gerhoh in writing to Pope Alexander III about the pernicious influence of Peter Lombard, whom he accused of deriving his ideas from Peter Abelard and of denying that Christ became an *aliquid*, in other words of denying the divine status of Christ as a man.⁵⁷ The issue came up again at the III Lateran Council in 1179. Not long after, Walter of St. Victor condemned equally Lombard, Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, as all founts of heresy, resuscitating ancient errors in his *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae*.⁵⁸ While there were many other theologians who preferred more rational ways of presenting their arguments, it was only by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 that the orthodoxy of Peter Lombard was fully vindicated.

Writing in the late 1150s, Otto of Freising could not know about the new directions and controversies that theologians would face. He was hostile, however, to blanket criticism such as engaged in by Gerhoh of Reichersberg. Otto's historical writings were not forgotten, particularly in Bavaria and Austria. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, as intellectuals tired of the dominant influence of Peter Lombard on the teaching of theology, there was a significant revival of interest in Otto's historical writing, most notably in the work of another great German historian, Johannes Thurmeier (Aventinus) of Regensburg.⁵⁹ But because Otto was not a Parisian scholastic, he was never in a position to encourage the critical study of Gilbert as a thinker. By the early seventeenth century, the doctors of the Sorbonne forgot about the great intellectual diversity of Latin Christendom in the twelfth century, preferring to focus on Bernard of Clairvaux as a reliable guide to Christian faith. In many ways, the twelfth century Church was much less tightly controlled than either Bernard of Clairvaux, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, or those faceless Parisian theologians of the early seventeenth century ever wanted to imagine.

¹ R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250* (Oxford, 1987) and *The First European Revolution, c. 970-1215* (Oxford, 2000); see also his *The Origins of European dissent* (London, 1977), and his still very useful anthology of primary sources, *The Birth of Popular Heresy* (New York, 1976).

² See for example Constant J. Mews, 'The Council of Sens (1141): Bernard, Abelard and the Fear of Social Upheaval,' *Speculum* 77 (2002): 342-82, and Nikolaus Häring, 'The Case of Gilbert de la Porree Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154),' in *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1951): 1-40.

³ Of particular influence has been Bernard's sermon on heresy, *Sermo* 66, *Sancti Bernardi Opera [SBO]* (8 vols, Rome, 1957-77), vol. 1, pp. 178-97.

⁴ Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Vita Prima S. Bernardi*, vol. 3, pp. 5-6, PL 185: 310B2314C; see Adriaan H. Bredero, *Bernard of Clairvaux. Between Cult and History* (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 90-140, esp. 91-118.

⁵ See Jean Leclercq, *SBO*, vol. 7, pp. ix-xvi.

⁶ Giles Constable (ed.), *The Letters of Peter the Venerable* (2 vols, Cambridge, Mass., 1967), vol. 1, pp. 258-59.

⁷ Bernard, *Ep.* 192, *SBO*, vol. 8, p. 44.

⁸ The *praefatio apologetica* of D'Amboise and the *Censura* version of the 1616 edition, were reprinted in PL 178, pp. 71-104 and 109-112.

⁹ For an overview of seventeenth-century interest, see Mews, *The Lost Loye Letters of Heloise and Abelard. Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth2Century France* (New York, 1999), pp. 43-6.

¹⁰ See Nikolaus Häring (ed.), *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto, 1966); John Marenbon, 'Gilbert of Poitiers,' in Peter Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 328-52; H. C. van Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée*, *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* (Leuven, 1966); and Lange Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-80* (Leiden, 1982). See also Theresa Gross-Diaz, *The Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers: from lectio diving to the lecture room* (Leiden, 1996).

¹¹ G. Waitz and B. von Simson (eds), *Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris*, 1.48-61, *MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum* (Hannover-Leipzig, 1912; repr. 1978), pp. 67288. *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (New York, 1953). This was a continuation of A. Hofmeister (ed.), *Ottonis Episcopi Frisingensis Chronica sive Historia de duabus civitatibus*, *MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum* (Hannover-Leipzig, 1912; repr. 1984); *The Two Cities, A Chronicle of Universal History to the Year 1146 A.D.*, trans. Charles Mierow (1928; New York, 1966).

¹² The seminal study of Gerhoh (also spelled as Gerhoch) is Peter Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg. Eine Biographie mit einem Anhang über die Quellen, ihre Handschriftliche Überlieferung und ihre Chronologie* (Wiesbaden, 1960). Gerhoh's letters and writings are cited as R and Op. in Classen's invaluable inventory.

¹³ On Rupert, see John H. van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz* (Berkeley, 1983).

¹⁴ *De aedificio Dei*, PL 194: 1187-1336 (Op 1, p. 406).

¹⁵ Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg*, pp. 58-78.

¹⁶ See Gerhoh, *Ep.* 5, 26-28, PL 193: 495D, 607C-618D.

¹⁷ On Jordan, brother of Anacletus 11, see Otto of Freising, *Chronica* 7.31, ed. Hofmeister, pp. 358-60.

¹⁸ Mary Stroll, *The Jewish Pope: Ideology and Politics in the Papal Schism of 1130* (Leiden, 1987).

¹⁹ PL 194, 1335-72; see Peter Classen, 'Der Häresie-Begriff bei Gerhoch von Reichersberg und in seinem Umkreis,' in W. Lourdaux and D. Verhelst (eds), *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages (11th-13th c.): proceedings of the international conference Louvain, May 13-16, 1973* (Leuven, 1976), pp. 27-41. Reprinted in Josef Fleckenstein (ed.), Peter Classen, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Sigmaringen, 1983), pp. 461-73.

²⁰ Classen, *Gerhoch*, pp. 78-89. Gerhoch recalls this debate in a letter to Bernard.

²¹ Albano Sorbelli (ed.), *Corpus chronicorum Bononiensium*, Raccolti degli Storici Italiani 18, 4 pts. (Città di Castello, 1910-39), vol. 2, p. 22.

²² Gerhoh, *Ep.* 21, PL 193: 576CD.

²³ Gerhoh, Letter 21, PL 193: 576D-77A and in an earlier letter to Innocent quoted within *Ep.* 21, PL 193: 584D-585A; see David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 23-26; Classen, *Gerhoch*, pp. 410-12.

²⁴ *Ep.* 21, PL 193: 585A; Classen, *Gerhoch*, R 20, p. 336; Op. 6, pp. 410-12. Classen assembles good arguments for identifying the lost *De glorificatione Filii hominis* with the treatise noted in the Reichersberg Annals for 1169, MGH SS 77: 492: 'Opusculum contra discipulos Petri Abaelardi ad episcopum Frisingensem Ottonem fratrem Chunradi regis, et ad ipsos Frisingenses diversa opuscula et scripta.'

²⁵ Classen, *Gerhoch*, R 22, p. 337, recalled in a later letter of Gerhoch to Otto, from second half of 1156, *Ep.* 23, PL 193: 591A.

²⁶ *Ep.* 21, PL 194, 495CD.

²⁷ *De duabus haeresibus*, LP 194: 1167D.

²⁸ Nikolaus Häring (ed.), Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Liber de novitatibus huius temporis*, Letter to Pope Hadrian about the Novelty of the Day (Toronto, 1974).

²⁹ *Giber de novitatibus huius temporis*, Prol 2, p. 23.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.5, p. 27.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 4.11, 30, pp. 32, 37.

³² On this master Peter, see Classen, *Gerhoch*, pp. 162-73 and Fritz Peter Knapp, *Biographisches-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexicon* 7 (1994): 384-85. Nikolaus Häring argues that he is the author of an important sentence-work from the School of Gilbert of Poitiers, *Die Zwettler Summe: Einleitung und Text*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 15 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1977), pp. 228. See also Nikolaus Häring, 'The Liber de differentia naturae et personae by Hugh Etherian and the letters addressed to him by Peter of Vienna and Hugh of Honau,' *Mediaeval Studies* 24 (1962): 1-34 and, 'Two Austrian tractatus against the doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers,' *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 40 (1965): 127-67.

³³ *Liber de novitatibus huius temporis*, 13.1-3, p. 58.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.4-6, p. 73.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.1-2, p. 91.

³⁶ Ibid., 33.2, p. 95.

³⁷ Ibid., 42.2 p. 106.

³⁸ The exact whereabouts of Gilbert's teaching is not certain. The claims of Richard W. Southern that there is no evidence for the 'school of Chartres', and that all these teachers were in fact located in Paris, *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 61-85, are convincingly countered by the evidence provided by Nikolaus Häring in 'Epitaphs and Necrologies on Bishop Gilbert II of Poitiers', in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 36 (1969), 57-87, esp. 72-73, and in his 'Chartres and Paris revisited', in R. O'Donnell (ed.), *Essays in Honour of A.C. Pegis* (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268-329, esp. 273-4. Häring cites evidence that Gilbert studied at Chartres and Laon before 1117, but then came back to Chartres, where he was a canon, succeeding Bernard of Chartres as its chancellor in 1126, a position he still held in 1134 and 1136, but had resigned this position by 1137, when he must have moved to Paris. It is thus quite possible that Otto studied under Gilbert at Chartres.

³⁹ Michael Casey effectively uses the controversy between Clairvaux and Morimond to demolish the hypothesis proposed by Constance Berman, *The Cistercian Evolution: The invention of a Religious Order in Twelfth-Century Europe* (Philadelphia, 2000), that the Cistercian *ordo* did not yet exist, 'Bernard and the Crisis at Morimond: Did the Order Exist in 1124?' *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 38 (2003): 119-75.

⁴⁰ Cornelia Kirchner-Feyerabend, *Otto von Freising als Diözesan- und Reichshischof* (Frankfurt, 1990).

⁴¹ Rahewin, *Gesta Friderici* 4.14, ed. Waitz-von Simson, p. 250.

⁴² Ibid., 5.1, pp. 230-31.

⁴³ *Chronica* Pref, ed. Hofmeister, pp 3-5.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 7.29-31, pp. 355-60.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 7.34, p. 367.

⁴⁶ *Gesta Friderici* 1.5, pp. 16222.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1.48261, pp. 66288.

⁴⁸ The manuscript of Roscelin's letter to Abelard, which also contains two short texts also by Roscelin, occurs in a manuscript of Benediktbeuern, in the diocese of Freising, which also contains many other philosophical and historical texts known to Otto of Freising. See Mews, 'The Trinitarian Doctrine of Roscelin of Compiègne and its Influence', in A. D. Libera (ed.), *Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet* (Paris, 1997), pp. 347-64.

⁴⁹ *Gesta Friderici* 1, p. 69.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1.54, p. 76: 'erat quippe quorundam in logica sententia, cum quid diceret Socrate esse, nichil diceret.'

⁵¹ Ibid., 1.48, p. 68.

⁵² Ibid., 1.48, p. 68; Marjory Chibnall (ed.), John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis* 8 (Oxford, 1986), p. 16; Nikolaus M. Häring, 'Bischof Gilbert II. von Poitiers (1142-1154) and seine Erzdiakone,' *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 21 (1965): 150-72.

⁵³ John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis*, p. 20.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 8, p. 16.

⁵⁵ I. Brady (ed.), Peter Lombard, *Sententie in IV Libris distincte* (2 vols,

Grottaferrata, 1971, 1981), vol. 3, pp. 6-7, 49-66. See the detailed analysis of Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century. A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180*, Leiden, 1982), pp. 243-79. While Lauge argues that the Lombard is sympathetic to the third *habitus* theory, Marcia Colish argues against this, *Peter Lombard* (Leiden, 1994), pp. 398-427.

⁵⁶ Gerhoh, *De Gloria et honore Filii hominis* 7.3, PL 194: 1097B (written in 1163).

⁵⁷ 'The *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertiam* of John of Cornwall,' ed. Nikolaus Häring, *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1951): 253-300.

⁵⁸ P. Glorieux (ed.), Walter of St. Victor, *Contra quatuor Labyrinthos Francie*, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 19 (1953): 187-335.

⁵⁹ On Otto's wider influence, see Brigitte Schürmann, *Die Rezeption der Werke Ottos von Freising im 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1986).

Chapter 4

William of Ockham and Conceptions of Heresy, c.1250-c.1350

Takashi Shogimen

In the modern liberal world, it is a truism that individuals need to be guarded against society. As J. S. Mill's notion of the 'tyranny of the majority' clearly illustrates, society is presumed to be so much stronger than individuals. Medieval men and women lived in an inverted world: they thought that society needed to be defended against criminal individuals. This vulnerability of medieval society was an ecclesiastical issue that was addressed by Pope Innocent III. In order to combat the rising number of ecclesiastical crimes, the Pope adopted an innovative approach in the field of criminal law: he revised the law of proof. The Pope curtailed the rigorous application of the presumption of innocence, and replaced accusatorial procedure, hitherto prevalently practised, with inquisition. Inquisitorial procedure made prosecution of crimes, including popular heresy and fornication among clergy, easier, and enhanced efficiency in convicting criminals.¹ Thus thirteenth-century Christendom witnessed the formation of an inquisitorial culture. 'A persecuting society' was given a juridical expression. Canonists such as Hostiensis and William Durand the Elder made significant contributions to this by elaborating on the legal theory of inquisition. Ecclesiastics and lawyers in the High Middle Ages were thus dedicated to the defence of Christian society from the contagious depravity of allegedly heretical individuals.

The medieval academic community was not immune from this persecuting culture. The theological search for the truth was influenced by the proliferation of inquisitorial practice, resulting in a series of academic censures. The condemnation of 1277,

which has been described as a 'watershed' in medieval intellectual history, symbolized a serious blow to academic freedom. By the end of the thirteenth century, juridical channels for academic censure were well established, the freedom of theological enquiry was gradually restricted, and a number of theologians including Peter John Olivi and John of Pouilli were subjected to this inquisitive machinery, often ending in the official condemnation of their alleged heresy.²

Such societal concern with heresy was, at least in part, fuelled by what is known as the Poverty Controversy. The turn of thirteenth and fourteenth centuries witnessed a simmering dispute over mendicant poverty, and this constitutes the major intellectual context of the academic censures. The friars, inspired by the new vision of evangelical poverty expounded by St Francis and St Dominic, quickly conquered the University of Paris by driving away secular masters and compelling them to question the orthodoxy of the mendicant doctrine of poverty. The debate operated on the multiple levels: biblical exegesis, speculative theology, ecclesiology and ecclesiastical politics. Academic censures were a derivative of the dispute: Peter Olivi was subject to censure by a group of Parisian theologians concerning his doctrinal teaching of *usus pauper* – the rigorous practice of poverty by restricting the use of goods. Similarly, John of Pouilli was brought to a theological court due to his alleged ecclesiological error on mendicant privilege. The controversy culminated in the early fourteenth century when Pope John XXII officially condemned Franciscan poverty, generating a bitter war of words between the papacy and Franciscan dissidents.³ Thus an important consequence of this long dispute was that it compelled theologians to employ the language of heresy.

This paper is intended to illustrate some of the main features of the scholastic discourses on heresy in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and, against this backdrop, to reappraise William of Ockham (1285-1347)'s astonishingly unique contribution to the conceptualization of heresy. Heresy was not only a contemporary public issue; for Ockham, it was also a personal problem. The Franciscan theologian might have spent his entire life in innovative research and teaching at Oxford, if it were not for the summoning to the Avignon papacy

under suspicion of heresy. Four years of his sojourn in Avignon, where he became subject to inquisition, overlaps the time when the Franciscan Order was in a serious conflict with the papacy over the doctrinal orthodoxy of Franciscan poverty. Michael of Cesena, the Minister General of the Order, requested Ockham to study a series of papal bulls that criticized and later officially condemned Franciscan poverty. The examination led him to believe that the Pope had fallen into heresy. He devoted the rest of his life henceforth to combat 'pseudo-popes' and their heretical doctrines of spiritual and temporal powers. Ockham's personal experience of inquisition against himself thus coincided with his discovery of papal heresy, which constituted the circumstances that drove him to an exhaustive enquiry into the idea of heresy.⁴ Thus the purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that Ockham's discourse was not only a uniquely full-scale account of the concept but also a revolution in the medieval language of heresy.

The inquisition of heresy became an indispensable part of the history of academic debates in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Nonetheless, conceptualizing heresy failed to capture the serious interest of contemporary theologians. Although the Poverty Controversy revolved around the question of whether or not the essence of the mendicant doctrine of poverty was heretical, very few works were ever written on the idea of heresy exclusively or extensively. Instead, theologians treated the subject in various parts of scholarly treatises, in particular commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Yet, the accounts of heresy in many of the Commentaries on the *Sentences* remain relatively brief.⁵ Heresy does not appear to be one of the major issues discussed in quodlibetic disputations.⁶ Given their serious involvement in the Poverty Controversy, the accounts of Franciscan theologians, like Peter Aureole and Duns Scotus, are surprisingly meagre. Bonaventure's discussions of heresy are not extensive and are unsystematically scattered throughout his commentary. No surviving manuscripts seem to suggest that Michael of Cesena, the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, ever reflected upon what was heresy, although he repeatedly accused Pope John XXII of heresy. Polemical works on the subject of heresy also can be counted on the fingers of a hand: the Carmelite Guido Terreni's *Summa de haeresibus et eorum*

confutationibus and the Franciscan William of Ockham's *Dialogus*.⁷

This observation on theologians' dearth of interest in heresy is not only mine; Ockham testified to it. Part I of his *Dialogus* was a gigantic work on heresy, with special focus on papal heresy, in the form of a dialogue between a Master and a Disciple. In it, the Master makes the following remark: 'a sufficiently long special title on heretics has been inserted in the book of *Decretals*. There is also treatment, often copious, of heretics in the *Decretum*. However, mention is rarely made of heretics in theology.'⁸ This statement on canonist scholarship was not groundless. Every gloss and commentary on the *Decretum* and *Decretales* devoted a considerable number of pages to heretics. Indeed, Gratian compiled numerous writings on heretics mainly in the *Causae* 23 and 24 of the second part of the *Decretum*, and the *Decretales* also contain some chapters on the topic (e.g. *Extra, de haereticis*). It was decretists and decretalists who commented on heretics extensively.

But attention needs to be called to the fact that the Master said that canonists often discussed 'heretics'. He did not say 'heresy'. The choice of the term was deliberate, and not insignificant: discussing heresy was one thing; writing of heretics was quite another. Indeed, defining heresy, or heretical assertions, did not interest canonists so much as theologians, whilst defining heretics, or heretical persons, was the focus of the attention of canonists rather than theologians. Glossing the word 'heresy' in the *Decretum*, Joannes Teutonicus did not offer a definition of heresy itself but, instead, explained in what way one is called a heretic.⁹ Decretalists such as Goffredus Tranensis and Hostiensis did not dwell on the definition of heresy: they were commenting on the texts with the heading of *De haereticis* (*On Heretics*). Canonists discussed heretics, not heresy. By contrast, theologians expressed interest in the definition of heresy. Their starting-point was usually patristic writings on heresy such as those of Jerome and Augustine. According to these Fathers, heresy was the belief in, and support of, false and newly created doctrine, and the interpretation of the Bible in a way other than the Holy Spirit demands.¹⁰ Theologians drew on this patristic definition of heresy to give their own definitions. For instance, Alexander of Hales held that perfect heresy was a

combination of false credulity, perverse will, and pertinacious defence or offence.¹¹ Thomas Aquinas wrote that heresy was 'a species of disbelief, attaching to those who profess faith in Christ yet corrupt his dogma.'¹² Later, Guido Terreni stated that 'heresy is obviously a false and erroneous opinion because it is a species of disbelief.'¹³ As I stated earlier, few theologians discussed the idea of heresy extensively, but many did not fail, at least, to give their own definition. Clearly, identifying heretical persons interested canonists, while defining heretical beliefs attracted theologians.

Ockham's perception that theologians rarely discussed heretics, however, does not really hit the mark as far as his contemporaries are concerned. The distinction between the theological interest in heresy and the canonist focus on heretics was not so obviously dichotomous, for some of the leading theologians in the early fourteenth century expressed serious interest in heretics in their theological treatises. The interest in heresy among theologians in Ockham's time was actually polarized. On the one hand, some theologians were conventionally concerned with what doctrines are heretical rather than who is a heretic. The substantial part of Terreni's *Summa de haeresibus*, for instance, is devoted to the analysis of heretical errors made by the Jews and the Greeks, popular movements such as those of Cathars and Waldensians, and the Franciscans Joachim of Fiore and Peter Olivi. On the other hand, others embraced the juristic concern with the identification of a heretical person. Dominican theologians such as Pierre de la Palud and Durand de St Pourçain, in particular, were more inclined to handle the question of who is to be judged heretical. Indeed, the Dominicans' interest in heretics echoes canonist language. For instance, Durand de St Pourçain characterized heresy as a crime of *lèse majesté*. This notion was first invented by Innocent III in reception of the Roman law, and exercised great influence among his successors and canonists. Pierre de la Palud modelled his *Sentences* commentary on Durand's, with notable concern for the fusion of theology and canonist scholarship, which made his commentary distinctly 'practical'.¹⁴

Pierre's 'practical' commentary was widely circulated and copied frequently. This success epitomizes the increasing mutual

infiltration between theology and canon law in the early fourteenth century. Theologians attempted to incorporate canon law into theology and canonists integrated theology in canon law. For instance, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe produced what Beryl Smalley called 'canon law type' exegesis by interpreting the Bible in the light of canon law.¹⁵ On the other hand, canonists such as William of Pagula produced manuals of ministration that provide every priest with authoritative answers to frequently asked questions on theological issues.¹⁶ The Dominican juristic focus on heretical persons rather than heretical doctrine may be grasped as an aspect of the fusion of the two disciplines.¹⁷

In this intellectual landscape, William of Ockham's *Dialogus*, Part I in particular, occupies a unique place in a number of ways. Firstly, as I stated before, it is a rare work of the genre. Secondly, the sheer volume of the work is enormous: the fifteenth-century Lyon edition prints the whole text in 164 folio pages, a little less than the size of his commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which is available in the modern critical edition of 4 volumes, some 2300 pages. It is literally a full-scale treatment of the subject of heresy; Terreni's *Summa de haeresibus* can hardly match this. Thirdly and more significantly, it was arguably the only synthetic account of both heretical doctrine and heretical persons. Theologians were aware of the distinction between heretical doctrine and heretical persons, and yet they did not conceptualize it fully. In Part I of the *Dialogus*, by contrast, Ockham made the distinction explicit, and expounded on it extensively: Book 2 was devoted to the concept of heresy, and Book 3 to the concept of the heretic, both being substantial discussions.

But this is not to say that Ockham's substantial account of heresy demonstrated his encyclopaedic erudition by chronicling contemporary notions of heresy and heretics. Perhaps one of the most important features of the work was that it highlighted and undermined the common hierarchical premises of the contemporary discourse on heresy and heretics and reduced the concepts of heresy and heretics to purely interpretative categories in theological enquiry. It might be summarized as the dejuridicization of the contemporary notions of heresy and heretics. To understand this requires some analysis of Ockham's

discourse on heresy and heretics in the context of contemporary conceptions.

Ockham defined heresy in a twofold manner: in the strict sense and in the broad sense. Heresy in the strict sense was an assertion that was not consonant with Scripture. More specifically, the strict sense of heresy may take a threefold mode: an assertion may be judged heretical, (1) if it not only opposes and but also verbally contradicts the truth as found in a proper form of the Bible, (2) if it denies the content of Scripture as it is obvious to both the learned and the ignorant, or (3) if it is shown through lengthy and skilful deliberation by learned and wise scholars that the assertion objects to Scripture, although in such fashion that is not necessarily evident to all other people.¹⁸

Ockham defined heresy primarily against Scriptural truths, and yet Scripture should not be deemed as the only source of Christian doctrine. Heresy in the broad sense – what Ockham called 'mortal error' (*error mortiferus*) – was not only that which contradicts the Bible but may also be dissension from chronicles, histories or oral traditions that was deemed worthy of belief by the Church. According to Ockham, there are five modes of 'mortal error': (1) to contradict Scripture, (2) to oppose the unwritten doctrine of the apostles, (3) to deny what has been revealed to the Church since the time of the apostles, (4) to contradict the approved chronicles, histories or oral traditions, and (5) to contradict the sources of catholic truth, which are apparently not evident but demonstrable.¹⁹ In short, heresy was defined as a contradiction to either Scripture or the extra-Scriptural sources of Christian doctrine.

What deserves attention here is that for Ockham, heresy can only be identified either evidently or demonstrably when it contradicts doctrinal sources. The obverse of this is the exclusion of any arbitrary – neither evident nor demonstrable – determination of heresy. What, then, if the authority of the Church declares without any evidence or demonstration that an assertion is heretical? Would it be possible that the mere declaration by ecclesiastical authority makes a certain assertion a new catholic truth without evidence or demonstration? Ockham made the Disciple draw readers' attention to this question, and the Master's reply is highly significant: the Church

could not determine or define the truth unless it is done evidently or demonstrably.²⁰ Mere declaration by the Church does not constitute the truth-value of the assertion. An important implication of this is that the Church could define heresy wrongly. Ecclesiastical authority cannot guarantee the truthfulness of a declaration.

This forms a sharp contrast to the discourse on heresy by Ockham's predecessors and contemporaries. Augustinus Triumphus's discourse serves as a case in point. This Austin theologian, who is well known as a staunch papalist, rejected the view that those who were better versed in Christian doctrine than the pope could better judge on doctrinal problems than the pope. He cited Distinction 20 of the *Decretum* in order to argue that what was required for settlement in doctrinal disputes was not only knowledge but also power. Indeed, the idea that *potestas* is required to settle doctrinal disputes has been commonplace since Gratian.²¹ Thorough knowledge of Scripture is one thing, pronouncement of final judgement is quite another.²² Furthermore, Augustinus asserted that it was not permissible to inquire into heresy without papal mandate because heresy can be recognized by the pope alone, who is the judge of the universal Church.²³ The definition by the authority of the Church, the pope in particular, is a parameter for defining heresy. R. I. Moore wrote in his celebrated work *The Formation of A Persecuting Society* that 'heresy exists only in so far as authority chooses to declare its existence. . . . heresy can only arise in the context of the assertion of authority.'²⁴ This hierarchical premise indeed underpinned the discourse on heresy by leading theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

It is clear that Ockham removed this hierarchical element from his conceptualization of heresy. Heresy exists only in so far as it is defined correctly. The sources of orthodox faith are purely textual, and so is heresy: it is nothing other than what was perceived evidently or demonstrably as a contradiction of the written texts that manifest Christian faith. Ecclesiastical authority can only authenticate the correct definition of heretical error.

So what is the repercussion of this conceptual transformation on the discourse on heretics? It was a redefinition of the idea of

pertinacity. Theologians acknowledged pertinacity or obstinacy as the main characteristic of a heretic.²⁵ Yet, few discussed the concept seriously. Perhaps the idea of pertinacity did not appear to them to deserve thorough investigation, since the method of identifying the pertinacious had already been established in inquisitorial theory and practice. For instance, Thomas Aquinas's comment on the condemnation of the pertinacious reflects such contemporary practice.²⁶ Aquinas alluded to Titus 3: 10 ('After a first and second admonition, have nothing more to do with anyone who causes divisions') to argue that one should be excommunicated by the Church if he is regarded as pertinacious 'after a first and second admonition'.²⁷ Likewise, Matthew 18:15-17 provided the model of the due procedure of correcting the allegedly erring believer, starting with secret admonition leading to public coercion.²⁸ In this case too, repeating the act of correction constituted the essence of the due process of doctrinal correction. Conversely, repeated refusal to accept doctrinal correction was labelled as 'pertinacious'.

Our attention should be drawn to the fact that this due process of correction is not a process for the corrected to discover the truth. The repeated demand of recanting errors was essentially a process for the corrector to decipher whether the corrected is obedient or disobedient. The conventional discourse on doctrinal correction presumes an ecclesiastical monopoly of truth; hence, the correction is supposed to be correctly informed. An assertion becomes an error once it is declared as such by an ecclesiastical authority, and must be recanted during the due process of correction. Pertinacity, then, is rather synonymous to disobedience to ecclesiastical admonition.

Ockham's discourse on pertinacity places a question mark on this equation of pertinacity with disobedience. We have seen that Ockham reduced the idea of heresy strictly to a contradiction of the textual sources of the Christian faith. This 'cognitive' perspective was also introduced into the discourse on pertinacity. Pertinacity was defined not in relation to the authority but in connection with the texts. To do so, Ockham anchored his idea of pertinacity in the distinction between catholic truths that must be believed explicitly and those that do not have to be believed explicitly (or are sufficient if they are believed implicitly). What is the catholic truth that must be

believed explicitly? In a short, anti-papal treatise entitled *Tractatus contra loannem*, Ockham explained that it was twofold. Firstly, it is what is prevalently and commonly taught as Catholic truth among Catholics, prelates and laymen, literate and illiterate, educated and uneducated.²⁹ The best example of such a Catholic truth may be the articles of faith. Secondly, Ockham wrote, some Catholic truths which one is bound to believe explicitly are not necessarily known prevalently or commonly among Christians; in which case, whether or not a certain catholic truth is to be believed explicitly depends upon the rank one occupies within the ecclesiastical hierarchy.³⁰ For instance, the bishops are obliged to know more Christian truths than their inferiors (although a bishop, who may be able to memorize everything written in Scripture, would not commit a mortal sin by forgetting some biblical facts). In short, what is prevalently known to every catholic determines the minimal level of the knowledge of catholic truth one is bound to believe explicitly and, the higher the office one occupies in the ecclesiastical order, the larger amount of knowledge of such catholic truth one is expected to have.³¹ This theological version of *noblesse oblige* obviously implies forbearance towards the uneducated and ignorant as well as intolerance of errors committed by the learned and the occupants of teaching offices in the Church, who are presumed and expected to have good knowledge of Christian faith. If one errs, therefore, the better the theological knowledge one is supposed to have, the more likely one is to be convicted of pertinacity. The degree of knowledge and understanding of Scripture is the fulcrum of the conviction of pertinacity.

The feature we should highlight here is that Ockham's definition of the object of explicit faith lays emphasis on cognitive commonality. He defined explicit faith as what is *prevalently known* as catholic truth among Catholics. His concept of the object of explicit faith allows for no misinterpretation; every single catholic is presupposed to know the propositions that must be believed explicitly in their precise meaning. Such commonality of understanding should not allow a Catholic to make any assertion (*asserere*) contrary to, to state any opinion (*opinari*) contrary to, or even to cast the slightest doubt upon, the object of explicit faith. Conversely, contradiction of such

catholic truths is manifestly evident to every believer including one who commits errors. So, for example, if an individual who has the use of reason and understanding and has lived among Christians denies a publicly known catholic assertion such as 'Christ was crucified', he has to be at once judged pertinacious. Contradiction to prevalent knowledge would unconditionally and immediately be pertinacious.³² He will never escape from conviction to pertinacity even if he expresses readiness to be corrected because, due to the cognitive commonality of the truth that he contradicted, his error is supposed to be evident to any rational individual, including himself.

It is now evident that Ockham's idea of pertinacity is quite different from repeated refusal to be corrected. His concept of pertinacity is rather what is perceived as deliberate failure to assent to the truthfulness of Christian faith. One need not reject or doubt catholic truths repeatedly to be determined as pertinacious; a single denial of the prevalent knowledge of the Christian faith is sufficient to be deemed 'pertinacious'. Hence, 'the due process of correction' was utterly meaningless to Ockham; instead, he often spoke of immediate condemnation. According to the conventional understanding of pertinacity, immediate condemnation was impossible because correction must be repeated before proceeding to public condemnation.

Ockham's unique concept of immediate condemnation depends on the nature of the error and the knowledge concerning Christian faith that is expected of the person concerned because the level of his doctrinal knowledge determines whether his rejection or doubt of the truthfulness of Christian faith was deliberate (*scienter*). Thus the entire discourse on heretics revolves around the flexible concept of the catholic truth one is bound to believe explicitly. Its content may be reduced to a small number of simple propositions, such as 'Christian faith is true' and 'Christ was crucified', if the suspect of heresy is uneducated, simple or illiterate. If the suspect occupies a high ecclesiastical office, on the other hand, the content of explicit faith may swell to a number of minute, biblical facts and of the details of papal decrees or the decisions of the general councils. High ecclesiastics were thus expected to rise to this doctrinal challenge.

In view of the above analysis, one may discern a shift in

Ockham's discourse on heresy and heretics from an authoritative (or hierarchical) conceptualization to an interpretative one. Heresy is not something that exists because it has been defined by ecclesiastical authority. Heresy is, for Ockham, deliberate choice to reject the truth-value of the texts that are the sources of Christian faith. Heresy was thus reduced to a matter of incorrect reading; more precisely, a reader's failure to comply with rational interpretative possibilities of the doctrinal texts. So heresy does not necessarily require institutional authority to be identified. Any literate, rational believer can decipher it. Likewise, a heretic is not an individual who deliberately chooses to reject the authority of the Church. For Ockham, a heretic is a person who deliberately fails to assent to the catholic truths, to which he is communally obliged to subscribe. The cognitive commonality of what is explicitly believed among the believers makes every assent to, or dissent from, the explicit faith epistemologically manifest to all the members of the Christian community. In the light of contemporary conceptions of heresy and heretics, then, Ockham transformed what was commonly perceived as the juridical process of the detection of heresy and heretics into an interpretative process of theological enquiry. Put another way, he de-juridicized the discourse on heresy and heretics. Ockham's substantial account of heresy was not merely synthetic but also highly idiosyncratic.

Ockham's reduction of heresy to an interpretative category shows that heresy exists in so far as truths that must be believed unconditionally exist. For Ockham, heresy is not merely an error contradicting any text. It is an error specifically against Scripture. Ockham wrote that there were two kinds of belief: one is to believe 'firmly', and the other is to believe 'with conviction'. In the former, one ought to listen to an argument contrary to the assertion one believes, whilst in the latter one ought not to listen. Ockham maintained that Scripture, and Scripture alone, must be believed 'with conviction': no one ought to listen to any dissent from the truths manifested in Scripture. Clearly Scripture contains a set of beliefs that cannot be contradicted. Conversely, where there is nothing other than beliefs that allow for disagreement, we only have simple errors. The history of theological conceptions of heresy from c.1250 to c.1350 seems to suggest that heresy always exists where

authority manifests incontestable beliefs, whether such authority be human, institutional, or textual.

¹ Richard M Fraher, "'Ut nullus describatur reus prius quam vincatur": Presumption of Innocence in Medieval Canon Law', in Stephan Kuttner and Kenneth Pennington (eds), *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Monumenta iuris canonici Series C: Subsidia vol. 7)* (Vatican City, 1985), pp. 493-506.

² See J. M. M. H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia, 1998).

³ The literature on the Poverty Controversy is massive. See especially M. D. Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order, 1210-1322* (London, 1961); Gordon Leff, *Heresy in the Later Middle Ages* (2 vols, Manchester, 1967); Kenneth Pennington, *Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia, 1984); Brian Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150-1350* (Leiden, 1988) and Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights* (Atlanta, 1997). For a brief overview, see Takashi Shogimen, 'Academic Controversy' in G. R. Evans (ed.), *The Medieval Theologians*, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 233-249.

⁴ For Ockham's biography, see Léon Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam: sa vie, ses oeuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques* (Paris, 1949).

⁵ See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera omnia*, pp. 1-4 (Quaracchi, 1883-89); Peter Aureole (Petrus Aureolus), *Commentariorum in Primum (Quartum) Librum Sententiarum Pars Prima (Quarta)* (2 vols, Rome, 1596-1605); Pierre de la Palud (Petrus de Palude), *Quartus Sententiarum liber* (Paris, 1514); Durand de St Pourçain (Durandus de Sancto Porciano), *In Petri Lombardi Sententias theologicas Commentarium Libri IV* (Venice, 1621).

⁶ See 'heresy' in the index of P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique* (2 vols, Paris, 1925-35).

⁷ Guido Terreni, *Summa de haeresibus et eorum confutationibus* (Paris, 1528); William of Ockham, *Dialogus, in Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperii*, ed. Melchior Goldast (Frankfurt, 1614), vol. 2, pp. 392-739. I have also consulted the critical edition that is under preparation under the editorship of Dr John Kilcullen and Dr John Scott. Sections of it are available on the British Academy Website. In my reference to the *Dialogus* I shall follow Goldast's pagination. Whenever I refer to the *Dialogus*, I shall use the abbreviated form like this: 'I *Dialogus* c. 15, 422', for instance, denotes Chapter 15 of Book 2 in Part I of the *Dialogus*, at page 422 in the Goldast edition.

⁸ Ockham, I *Dialogus*, c.11, 407.

⁹ Joannes Teutonicus (Joannes Semeca), *Glossa ordinaria in Decretum Gratiani* (Lyon, 1584), cols. 1427-8.

¹⁰ See Othmar Hageneder, 'Der Häresiebegriff bei den Juristen des 12. und 13. Jahrhundert', in W. Lourdaux and D. Verhelst (eds.), *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages* (Louvain, 1976), pp. 42-103, esp. pp. 51-3.

¹¹ Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* 4 vols in 5 (secunda pars secundi libri), (Quaracchi, 1930), vol 3, p. 739.

¹² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 32: Consequences of Faith, ed. and trans., Thomas Gilby (London, 1974), 2a2ae, q. 11, a.3, 82-3.

¹³ Terreni, *Summa de haeresibus*, c. 3, fol. 3: 'Quod autem haeresis sit falsa et erronea opinio patet: quia haeresis est quaedam species infidelitatis.'

¹⁴ Durand de St Pourçain, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias*, dist 14, q. 5, fol. 327. On heresy as a crime of *lèse majesté*, see Henri Maisonneuve, 'Le droit romain et la doctrine inquisitoriale', in *Etudes d'histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras* (Paris, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 931-42; and Walter Ullmann, 'The Significance of Innocent III's Decretal "Vergentis"', *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 729-42. Jean Dunbabin observes the practical character in Peter de la Palud's account of heresy. See her *A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church* (Oxford, 1991) pp. 43, 51.

¹⁵ Beryl Smalley, 'John Baconthorpe's Postill on St Matthew', *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958): 91-145; reprinted in Smalley, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif* (London, 1981), pp. 289-343.

¹⁶ Leonard Boyle, 'The "Summa Summarum" and Some Other English Works of Canon Law', *Monumenta iuris canonici*, Ser. C, 1 (1965): 415-56.

¹⁷ See Takashi Shogimen, 'The Relationship between Theology and Canon Law: Another Context of Political Thought in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999): 417-31.

¹⁸ Ockham, *I Dialogus* c. 15, 422. Guido Terreni proposed a distinction similar to this. Cf. Terreni, *Summa de haeresibus*, c. 4, fols. 4v-5.

¹⁹ Ockham, *I Dialogus* c. 16, 422-23.

²⁰ Ockham, *I Dialogus* c. 5, 416.

²¹ Georges de Lagarde, *La naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1963), vol. 5, p. 144. See also Arthur Stephen McGrade, *The Political Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Institutional Principles* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 56.

²² Augustinus Triumphus, *Summa de ecclesiastica potestate* (Rome, 1584), q.10, a.1, 77.

²³ *Ibid.*, q.10, a.4, 80: 'ad spiritualement ludicem inquisitione iudiciaria pertinet de ea cognoscere. Sine ergo mandato Pape, qui est iudex vniuersalis Ecclesiae, nulli licet de ipsa haeresi inquirere.'

²⁴ R. I. Moore, *The Formation of A Persecuting Society* (Oxford, 1987), p. 68.

²⁵ But this is not the case with theologians before the thirteenth century. Both Peter Abelard and St Bernard of Clairvaux, for example, considered that heretics are characterized by pride seeking fame. See Heinrich Fichtenau, *Heretics and Scholars in the High Middle Ages, 1000-1200*, trans. Denise A. Kaiser (University Park, PA, 1998), pp. 7-8.

²⁶ Henri Maisonneuve, *Études sur les origines de l' inquisition*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1960), p. 363.

²⁷ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae, q. 11, a. 3, 88-9.

²⁸ Matthew 18.15-17: 'if another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the fault when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church: and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you a Gentile and a tax collector.' Further on the due process of doctrinal correction, see Takashi Shogimen, 'From Disobedience to Toleration: William of Ockham and the Medieval Discourse on Fraternal Correction', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 52 (2001): 599-622.

²⁹ Ockham, *Tractatus contra Ioannem*, c. 6, in H. S. Offler (ed.), *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica* (Manchester, 1956), vol. 3, p. 47.

³⁰ Ockham, *Tractatus contra Ioannem*, c. 7, p. 49.

³¹ In I *Dialogus* vii, c. 18, Ockham reiterated this idea, and added that inferior prelates must know whatever the pope pronounced publicly and solemnly.

³² Ockham, I *Dialogus* iv, c. 11, p. 452. Cf. Ockham, *Tractatus contra Ioannem*, cc. 13-15, pp. 60-74.

Chapter 5

A Heretic Hiding in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Marsiglio of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* in the Thought of Nicole Oresme

Cary J. Nederman

Introduction

Heretical doctrines were often reported and transmitted during the Latin Middle Ages, and hence in this sense heresy had a history in medieval Europe.¹ By and large, however, this history was strictly partisan: it was recounted both by authors who wished to keep it alive — not *as* heterodoxy, to be sure, but as true or pure teaching — and by those who sought its identification and eradication. Therefore, one ought not to expect to encounter the sort of historicized treatment of heresy that emerges in early modern writings. Yet the transmission of heretical ideas during the Middle Ages was not always so clear cut as this generalization implies. The doctrines of notorious heretics sometimes found favor in the texts of medieval thinkers who were otherwise beyond reproach in their orthodoxy. One may reasonably speak of various 'subterranean' or quasi-submerged efforts to incorporate heretical views that were known to be heretical in such a way that the taint of heresy nevertheless did not attach to them.

In the present chapter, I offer an instance of such a semi-covert 'orthodox' employment of heretical teachings with reference to one of the most notorious works of academic heresy of the fourteenth century, the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio (Marsilius) of Padua. Much remains to be discovered about the story of Marsiglio's transformation from a respected University

of Paris Master of natural philosophy into a condemned heretic. The facts that can fairly be established are these: in June 1324 he completed the *Defensor Pacis*, which seems to have circulated among fellow Parisian schoolmen. There is no evidence that he was hounded or subjected to any charges on the basis of his authorship,² which, despite common myth, was hardly anonymous, since he peppered the book with unmistakable references to himself ('son of Antenor') and to his known associates (Matteo Visconti).³ Thereafter, Marsiglio and his colleague John of Jandun departed Paris and took up residence with Ludwig of Bavaria, king of the Germans and pretender to the imperial throne, to whom the *Defensor Pacis* had been dedicated. As Frank Godthardt has now shown, there was no panicked 'flight,' no hint of danger, in this move; best evidence points to a planned and calculated decision to enter the service of Ludwig, an event which probably occurred in later 1324 or perhaps 1325 (rather than the once universally ascribed date of 1326).⁴ Even with this departure, there seems to have been no hue and cry about the heretical character of Marsiglio's book, no immediate change in the eyes of the Church. Rather, only in 1327 was he declared a heretic and excommunicated, with the *Defensor Pacis* condemned by Rome for its views about the nature of spiritual and ecclesiastical power. Marsiglio's heretical standing, as we shall see, turns out to be part of a larger political gambit by the papal curia to discredit Ludwig.

In future times, Marsiglio's reputation as a heretic notorious for his writing continued to circulate, as did, apparently, manuscripts of the *Defensor Pacis*. Jeannine Quillet has demonstrated that the French anti-clerical treatise entitled *La Songe du Vergier* (1378) — written as a dialogue of the 'knight and clerk' variety — is replete with (unattributed) references to characteristic Marsiglian doctrines concerning the Church.⁵ In the fifteenth century, likewise, the conciliarist Nicholas of Cusa appropriated major elements of the *Defensor Pacis* to bolster both the ecclesiological and the secular aspects of his arguments in *De Concordantia Calholica* (even as he sometimes publicly condemned Marsiglio's statements about the Petrine Commission).⁶ The fact that authors were still raging against Marsiglio and his doctrines in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries testifies to the extensive long-term dissemination of his

work.⁷ The present paper examines the ambiguous status of Marsiglio and the *Defensor Pacis* during the later Middle Ages. I argue that the Marsiglian 'heresy' comes to be defined narrowly by some subsequent readers who were attracted to elements of his theory but recognized that invoking his name or the title of his work required a measured and circumscribed rhetorical strategy. I illustrate this with reference to the work of Nicole Oresme near the end of the fourteenth century, an author who was untainted by the accusation of heresy that rested upon Marsiglio's head. While remaining an orthodox and respected figure, Oresme was clearly drawn to concepts derived from a text that he knew to be written by a proclaimed heretic.

I am interested in two related issues: first, the ways in which Oresme used (and did not use) Marsiglian themes and doctrines, both overtly and implicitly; and second, the reasons why (unlike, say, the author of the *Songe du Vergier*) he bothered to cite an infamous heretical source at all, rather than slip Marsiglian ideas into his writings without making any explicit reference to them. Why did Oresme court the charge of promulgating heresy? My hypothesis is that his acknowledgement of an awareness that some of his ideas found a source in Marsiglio was in fact a defensive strategy in order to ward off charges that other ideas of a more extreme or dangerous character were derived from the *Defensor Pacis*. In other words, if he admitted that some of his ideas came from Marsiglio's work, but were not among those propositions that had been condemned, he could more easily refute charges that other doctrines he proposed — specifically, regarding the Church and its relation to the state — originated with or had been propounded by the *Defensor Pacis*. This is not as convoluted as it sounds. Should Oresme be challenged on his adherence to a Marsiglian line of thought, he could show that his citations carefully avoided endorsing the propositions that had been the source of Marsiglio's condemnation. Such honesty about the use of sources 'proved' good faith, such that any resemblance between his views and those of the 'notorious heretic' Marsiglio were purely coincidental. Oresme hid the heretic Marsiglio in plain sight.

Origins and Nature of Marsiglio's Heresy

To appreciate the way in which Marsiglio's ideas came to be applied by Oresme, it is first necessary to have some understanding of the *Defensor Pacis* itself and of the circumstances surrounding the declaration that it contained heretical views. At the center of Marsiglio's political project is his stalwart opposition to the earthly pretensions of the priesthood and especially the papacy. This theme, more than any positive dedication to a particular set of constitutional arrangements, shapes his theory. The character of this opposition is not, however, always immediately evident, due in part to the organization of the *Defensor Pacis* into three distinct discourses. Discourse I discusses the origins and nature of earthly political authority; the second discourse severely criticizes claims made on behalf of the rights of the Church and, particularly, the papacy, to exercise temporal power and defends an alternate, conciliar ecclesiology; a brief third section summarizes those conclusions derived from the preceding discussions that Marsiglio regards to be especially useful or worthy of emphasis. The structural division between the substance of Discourse I and of Discourse II was unusual for its time, inasmuch as it implies a distinction between the treatment of temporal government and of ecclesiastical affairs. Yet the *Defensor Pacis* is by no means formed of two separate, self-subsistent and internally coherent treatises. Rather, it is possible to identify a single central theme that binds together the tract as a whole: the danger posed to human happiness (as experienced in the peaceful and self-sufficient community) by the interference of papal government in secular life. The entire force of the argument in the *Defensor Pacis* is directed toward demonstrating the disruptive effects of the papacy's attempts to regulate temporal affairs. Approached from this perspective, Discourse I stipulates the arrangements necessary to bolster the stability and unity of secular communities so as to repulse papal interference, while Discourse II substitutes the principles of papal monarchy with those of a conciliar ecclesiology.

Marsiglio's construction of the case against the so-called papal *plenitudo potestatis* (a fullness or plenitude of power that authorized the papacy to command the absolute obedience of

the faithful in all matters, independent of either the Church as a whole or secular government) and in favor of the supremacy of the Church's General Council depended upon a distinctive application of sources. Marsiglio contended throughout the *Defensor Pacis* that the condition of the modern Church should be judged against the yardstick of the historical arrangement of the early Christian community. Thus, scripture and historical record (as collected in documentary anthologies such as pseudo-Isidore's *Codex*) constituted the only true witness to the proper and divinely ordained constitution of the Church. Leaving aside the vexed and unresolved issue of Marsiglio's 'historical consciousness'⁸ the passages of Dictio II that address the foundation of the true Church of times past as contrasted with current practices depend overwhelmingly upon the evidence of 'history' located in the New Testament and in documents purporting to represent the early organization of ecclesiastical authority.⁹ Origin was everything for Marsiglian 'strict constructionism.' And what the historical record on Marsiglio's reading reveals is that all claims of clerical (especially papal) power are later accretions and that the original governing institution of the Church — the authority to determine what was necessary for salvation by interpreting scripture and excluding heresy — belonged solely to the entirety of the faithful as reflected in the determinations of the General Council. Moreover, Marsiglio concludes from his combing of the original sources that the appointment of the pope and of clerics and the assignment of such worldly goods and powers as they legitimately possess arise only from the secular authorities — the temporal community or its authorized executive — in whose hands exclusively rest the distribution of earthly offices and rewards.¹⁰

In the October 1327 bull *Licit iuxta*, Pope John XXII condemned the author¹¹ of the *Defensor Pacis* on the basis of second-hand reports of some of its leading ideas about the nature of the Church.¹² The specific propositions which *Licit iuxta* identifies as heretical indicate much about the motives behind John's condemnation. Five claims are singled out: 1) that Christ, in surrendering tribute to Roman authorities, did so because he was subject to the coercive power of the temporal ruler; 2) that the apostle Peter enjoyed no special authority over

the other apostles or the Church as a whole; 3) that the Emperor can appoint, remove and punish the pope; 4) that all priests, regardless of title or rank, are equal in spiritual authority, so that distinctions within the clergy are entirely a matter of imperial concession; and 5) that the Church can punish no person coercively without the grant of the Emperor. Each of these propositions turned on the denial by Marsiglio to the pope of *plenitudo potestatis*. In Marsiglio's view, instead, the institutional Church, composed of clerical office-holders, was part of and subordinate to the faithful human legislator, that is, the temporal community gathered in its religious dimension. Thus, the terms of the papal condemnation of the *Defensor Pacis* and its author relate directly to the circumstances of the conflict between John XXII and the German King Ludwig of Bavaria, who had been frustrated in his attempts to arrange for his own imperial coronation.

The expressly political nature of John XXII's motives for the condemnation of the *Defensor Pacis* may reflect Marsiglio's public role at the time.¹³ In early 1327, Ludwig launched an expedition into the Italian peninsula designed to establish his rights over the *Regnum Ilalicum*, that is, the provinces of Northern Italy that were traditionally subject to the German Empire. He undertook this journey on the advice of his Italian supporters, including the Visconti and della Scala families, who counseled that the pope's absence from Rome (the papacy had resided in Avignon under French protection since 1305) enhanced Ludwig's chances of promoting his position. Following a meeting of the commune of Rome, Ludwig was formally invited to enter the city. On 17 January 1328, he was crowned Emperor in St. Peter's by the prefect of Rome, Manfredi di Vico, in the name of the Roman people. Thereafter, Ludwig deposed John XXII and soon appointed an anti-pope, who took the name Nicholas V.

The hand of Marsiglio has been detected in these events during 1327 and 1328. That Marsiglio entered Italy with Ludwig's entourage is certain, although he was not constantly at the side of the German king. Once in Rome, Marsiglio was styled Ludwig's 'vicar,' in which capacity he drafted a number of documents associated with his patron's residence in that city. In particular, Marsiglio bid the clerics of Rome to elect a

commission composed of their members — an approximation of the College of Cardinals — which in turn selected the candidate for imperial appointment as pope. Marsiglio apparently presided over this commission in conjunction with John Colonna, the son of one of the most powerful Roman barons. Certainly, many of the formal and rhetorical features of Ludwig's Roman adventure bear a Marsiglian stamp. But we can only speculate about the true extent of the Paduan's role in designing the entire scenario.¹⁴

The terms and timing of the condemnation of *Licit iuxta*, then, correlate closely with Marsiglio's attachment to Ludwig's court and his activities on the would-be emperor's behalf. As a consequence, the ecclesiological and 'spiritual-temporal issues' stand to the forefront. The bulk of the first discourse of which only [Chapter 6](#) discusses the priesthood, and then in generally naturalistic terms — was apparently unobjectionable to the Church, or at any rate too academic to merit serious consideration when papal power politics was really at stake. The Marsiglian 'heresy,' then, had nothing to do with the *Defensor Pacis*'s famed defense of popular sovereignty or civic consent to laws and rulers or any of the other theses that have attracted the bulk of scholarship in recent times.¹⁵ And so it may have been that Nicole Oresme felt emboldened to cite the presumably unobjectionable ideas of Discourse I without fear of attack as a strategy for disavowing his truer Marsiglian commitments concerning the nature of the Church and its relation to the sphere of temporal power.

The *Defensor Pacis* in Oresme's Thought

Although he has long been acknowledged as one of the towering figures of fourteenth-century philosophy, it is only during the last generation or so that Nicole Oresme's political thought has made much discernable impact among scholars.¹⁶ Perhaps the reason for this lengthy delay stems from the highly unconventional character of his major contribution to political ideas, both in language and approach: a sumptuously illuminated French-language translation of and commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* (*Le livre de Politiques d'Aristote*), finished in

1374 under commission of King Charles V, at whose court Oresme was an influential figure.¹⁷ While Oresme certainly stands within the general tradition of late medieval Aristotelianism, we are now in a position to appreciate more fully the eclecticism of his use of sources — ancient as well as contemporary — and the distinctiveness of his interpretation and extension of Aristotle. Unlike the literal commentaries of Albertus Magnus (which Oresme had before him and to which he offers explicit emendations) and Thomas Aquinas/Peter of Auvergne, he tended to move well beyond the text of the *Politics* and develop Aristotelian themes creatively and in a manner more directly germane to his courtly audience. Oresme demonstrates an innovative spirit that liberates his commentary quite noticeably from the constraints imposed by the expectations of scholastic pedagogy.

Nowhere is this attitude better illustrated than in Oresme's appropriation of the ideas of the *Defensor Pacis*. Oresme's association with Marsiglio's text is particularly noteworthy. Between September and December 1375, along with thirty other Paris Theology Masters, he was compelled to appear at an inquisitional proceeding, at the order of Pope Gregory XI, to establish who might be responsible for an anonymous (and alas, now lost) French translation of the *Defensor Pacis*.¹⁸ If Oresme was personally innocent of the charge — and he certainly made a plausible suspect, his denial of any knowledge about the culprit notwithstanding this event conveys two important pieces of information: first, that the papacy still regarded the *Defensor Pacis* to be extremely dangerous and the prevention of its dissemination very much a priority; and second, that Oresme was known to be familiar with its contents. The reason for the latter, presumably, was two direct references to it contained in the recently completed commentary that — if only because of its magnificent illustrations — must have been widely known among members of the interrelated court and university cultures of Paris.¹⁹

Oresme's explicit use of Marsiglio's thought is quite modest. Glossing the section of Book III of Aristotle's *Politics* that examines the competing claims of political supremacy within various constitutions, Oresme refers to the *Defensor Pacis*. The immediate context is the evaluation of the assertion that the

multitude of a city ought to enjoy the upper hand in making determinations: 'In a book entitled *Defensor Pacis*, it is alleged that our human laws and regulations should be made, promulgated, corrected, or changed by the authority or consent of the whole community or the weightier part of it.'²⁰ He then adapts Marsiglio's distinction between those people who possess specialist knowledge about making some object (say constructing or repairing a house) and those who are able to judge the quality of the work.²¹ While only a few possess the ability to construct an edifice, all or most people know the difference between a well-made and a poorly-built house or a competent repair job. 'In much the same manner, the wise know how to compose and make the laws and the statutes and all the multitude of the wise and the commoners together know which laws are profitable for all,' Oresme observes, 'Similarly, for the correction or change of laws and the reform of the polity, no one can know better what is expedient for the whole than can all of the multitude together.'²² The same principle, Oresme notes, may be applied to 'the correction and the election of rulers. So in the book entitled *Defensor Pacis*, it declares also that the multitude should have domination over the greater (*grans*) and better (*melleurs*) people.'²³ While this is not an entirely accurate representation of Marsiglio's more nuanced views, it certainly captures the spirit of the Marsiglian project to bring the ruling part of the community under the control of the citizen body, both in its original selection and its continuing accountability.²⁴ While Menut asserts that Oresme quotes the text of the *Defensor Pacis* 'with approval,'²⁵ it is evident that the Frenchman was no more sanguine than Aristotle himself about the competence of the masses to engage in self-government on the scale imagined by Marsiglio. The full text of Oresme's commentary demonstrates very little interest in or patience for democracy or any other form of 'popular' government, preferring instead the system of kingship, to which he devotes far greater attention.

These passing citations from the *Defensor Pacis* thus extract from the text a position about earthly government that was hardly controversial during the late fourteenth century — by the 1370s there had been many well-known defenses of republican or populist rule — and was in any case being set up for

refutation. Indeed, there seems no reason to draw attention to one's knowledge of a condemned text by mentioning it by name at all. Hence, one suspects that reference to the *Defensor Pacis* in these circumstances masks another debt that Oresme did not wish to reveal, namely, appropriation of key themes of Marsiglio's incendiary second discourse.²⁶ It is worth noting that Oresme had already made public his reformist tendencies more than a decade earlier than *Li livre de Politiques*, in a Christmas Eve 1363 sermon before Pope Urban V and the College of Cardinals at Avignon that railed against the corrupt condition of the Church and pleaded for its renovation.²⁷ Oresme even makes passing mention of this sermon in the commentary.²⁸ But in the intervening years, Oresme's proposals for how to accomplish such reform became more extreme in their attitude toward the constitution of the Church — possibly as a result of exposure to Marsiglio and other critics of the papacy from a generation or two earlier. And he worked the defense of these changes to ecclesiastical government into the text of *Li livre de Politiques*, perhaps in the hope of stimulating his patron, King Charles V, and the members of the French court to take action.

How did Oresme achieve this rather remarkable effect? He claims early on in the commentary that religious collectives, too, may properly be viewed as a city on a par with any secular community about which Aristotle wrote:

The glorious society (*compagnie*) of Paradise is called a city, as appears in Apocalypse and other places in the Scriptures. Note that the multitude of those who are or will be among the catholic communion of the faith of Jesus Christ can be called a city. ... Note that whichever principal part of the people performs some particular governance can be called a city, and in this manner those whom we call men (*gens*) of the Church are like a city; for it is a polity which performs the governance, distribution, and ordering of all of the possessions and all of the public honors.²⁹

Thus in both a broader and a narrower sense — the congregation of believers and the office-holders of the priesthood — the Church shares important organizational principles of the city. Of course, Oresme admits that the Church possesses special properties — its universal character and mystical unity — which render it incompletely subject to the earth-bound philosophical enterprise of political science.³⁰ Yet this does not mean that Aristotle's *Politics* has nothing to teach

those interested in ecclesiological issues. 'According to St. Augustine and St. Jerome and many other great doctors, natural philosophy confirms and aids greatly in understanding and defending the articles of the faith, and also the moral philosophy of ethics completes the commandments and counsels of God,' Oresme remarks, 'Likewise, political philosophy can administer aid to the government of the polity of the Church.'³¹ Specifically, Aristotle's political theory may assist in sorting out one of the most pressing problems that the Church confronts: the nature of its constitutional organization.

And in the manner that there can be controversy about the city, so likewise [this is the case] in our polity of Holy Church, which is the City of God, about which some have said that what the Pope orders is to be done in the Church. And others object to the contrary, [saying] rather what is ordered by the Holy College of Rome; and still others object to the contrary, [saying] rather what is done or approved by the General Council.³²

Among other things, then, Oresme employs the general discussion of the type of constitution right for a city specifically to the arrangement that best suits the Church. He cloaks his reforming agenda in the authority of Aristotle.

Oresme's Ecclesiology — and Marsiglio's

Even though Oresme's preference for earthly government among the three basic types of regime is quite clearly hereditary kingship, he advocates a different solution for the Church — one that directly echoes the Marsiglian line. On the one hand, he believes that the officers of the Church — holders of so-called benefices — should be designated by the secular authorities within the community, since their positions are attached to forms of temporal jurisdiction that require coordination with earthly rulership. On the other hand, the internal governance of the Church in connection with its laws and tenets of faith pertains uniquely to the General Council, which spoke collectively with the voice of the Holy Spirit. These teachings fit comfortably with the leading doctrines of the *Defensor Pacis* that had caused such considerable (and not unwarranted) consternation at the papal curia.

At the center of Oresme's critical attitude toward the

condition of the Church seems to have been his perception that high levels of corruption plagued it. The main issue was the assignment of ecclesiastical offices and honors. Ideally, Oresme holds, the principle advocated by 'philosophy' (that is, the *Politics*) ought also to be followed by 'the legislators of Holy Church': ... that the good should be promoted to the dignities and the governance of souls and that they ought to be provided with sufficient wealth to lead an honorable life without which one must conduct oneself as a mendicant or perform servile tasks.³³ In particular, offices should be distributed widely, rather than concentrated in a few hands, in ecclesiastical as well as temporal governments.³⁴ As Oresme states the situation in Aristotelian terms:

At the beginning dignities and possessions should be ordained and divided [equitably] and by such conducive laws that too great inequalities would be eliminated. And surely the rule according to good proportionate equality has not been guarded by the polity of the Church, but there was and is in it immoderate and too great an inequality ... And therefore, many have too ardently sought the great dignities of the Church, more by ambition and contrivance than by good intentions, and therefore there have been frauds, deceptions, favoritism, corruption, and electoral division.³⁵

The Church has consequently fallen into a disreputable state because it has succumbed to an unjust measure for the assignment of the offices crucial for the care of souls.

How is the proper standard for the constitution of the Church to be discovered? Echoing one of the most characteristic themes of *Dictio II* of the *Defensor Pacis*, Oresme contends that the early Church constitutes the pre-eminent model for reform of present institutions and practices: the antiquity, not to mention the divine origin, of the Church and its laws demands that every effort be made to remain consistent with traditional ecclesiastical structures.³⁶ Oresme suggests that the failure to accede to canon law, which stipulates a praiseworthy and honorable system of parceling out positions of authority, is to blame for the degenerate condition of the Church. In secular polities, laws that have long been promulgated sometimes fall out of usage. He remarks that 'this consideration could be applied to the polity of the people of the Church with reference to the distribution of honors or benefices as well as the apportionment of temporal goods and the manner and laws of

distributing them ...' Whether the change in procedures represents an improvement, he concludes circumspectly, may be left to 'the discretion of those who are cognizant of the governance of the Church in times past and who know what exists in the present, and of the rights of the ancient Church and of the contemporary one.'³⁷ Sarcasm aside, Oresme insists that in matters of ordering the Church, the past ought to be the guide to the present. Certainly, Oresme must have realized that one of those who demonstrated such 'cognizance' happened to be the author of the *Defensor Pacis*.

The source of ecclesiastical corruption, in Oresme's view, seems to be primarily a desire for worldly gain. While he occasionally hints at a suspicion that the desire for riches plays a role in this temporal orientation, he concentrates mainly on the disproportionate distribution of earthly property among churchmen, so that the very rich and the very poor coexist uncomfortably within the Church.³⁸ In this regard, it is the voluntary poor — the members of the Mendicant orders — whom he primarily criticizes for their unbalancing of the moderate amount of wealth necessary to safeguard the clergy in the performance of the offices necessary to maintain the unity of the Church.³⁹ The Aristotelian model of a polity dominated by citizens of 'moderate wealth' is similarly applicable to the ecclesiastical estate.⁴⁰ Oresme even went so far as to extend the organic analogy between body and political community, which for him signified an egalitarian equilibrium between all parts of the organism,⁴¹ to the healthy ordering of the Church as well.⁴²

Yet it is not so much riches as the pursuit of earthly power that constitutes the primary threat to the good ecclesiastical order for Oresme. Specifically, he targets the 'overreaching' claims to absolute authority reflected in the doctrine of a papal plenitude of power. Commenting on Aristotle's discussion in the *Politics* about whether it is better for good men or good laws to rule, Oresme engages in a lengthy digression about the lessons to be drawn for the condition of the Church. He admits that in the case of 'the statutes, ordinances and customs approved by the Holy Church,' the Holy Spirit must be at work.⁴³ Likewise, in the assignment of clerical benefices, the determination of how they shall be distributed is properly referred to the Holy Spirit alone.⁴⁴ In the current Church, however, the will of the pope,

rather than the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, has become the defining source for governing the faithful. The reason for this, according to Oresme, is that 'many people, out of adulation or in ignorance, have become persuaded about Saint Peter that he possessed a plenitude of power and of making reservations [of office] and new exactions and of granting expectations [for benefices], all of which seem at first glance to be contrary to the ancient canons.'⁴⁵ Such an extreme claim on behalf of the pope — which borders on asserting his omniscience — is harmful to the order of the Church, since it results in the assignment of unqualified or corrupt clerics to positions of great authority.⁴⁶ Thus, the pope should follow the law and the will of the donor in determining who should occupy ecclesiastical offices, instead of asserting the primacy of his will, which, like that of a secular ruler, may 'by error or favor' be corrupt.⁴⁷ In order for royal power of any sort to be legitimate, it must be moderate, tempered by law; otherwise, unchecked power naturally increases until it becomes purely tyrannical. While he expressly declines to apply this lesson to the specific circumstances of the papacy since it originated with God and answers to the Holy Spirit, whereas Aristotle is speaking of temporal regimes — Oresme then immediately undercuts this claim by remarking that, this difference notwithstanding, 'perhaps something profitable about this [ecclesiastical] polity could be culled in a natural light, by reason and human prudence.'⁴⁸ Oresme is careful not to assert directly the relevance of Aristotle's to the spiritual realm, but he clearly feels that useful parallels may be drawn. Echoes of a Marsiglian hostility to papal *plenitudo potestatis* may be detected just below the surface of Oresme's Aristotelian exegesis.

Given the obvious need for reform of ecclesiastical administration to eliminate opportunities for the perpetuation of such corruption, Oresme proposes a plan for the restoration of the Church to its earlier purity. The aims of such a program include reevaluation of the 'quantity and inequality of honors and possessions, which have not been well assigned proportionately,' as well as the improvement of morals and, as a culmination, the establishment of 'good laws and canons' in conjunction with the elimination of 'unreasonable novelties' that have extended clerical power.⁴⁹ In order to realize these goals,

Oresme calls in notably Marsiglian fashion for the reinstitution of the General Council at the heart of the Church: 'In Holy Church, at its beginnings and during the times in which it grew in prosperity and in faith, all notable matters were ordained by General Councils.'⁵⁰ Susan Babbitt comments that 'Oresme did not present a program of conciliar government,'⁵¹ but this claim can hardly be sustained on the evidence of his text. Some of Oresme's most extensive digressions into ecclesiastical affairs argue (on the basis of scripture and historical source material, most notably Isidore's *Codex*) a case for conciliar supremacy that should contain familiar echoes of Marsiglio's second discourse.

In particular, Oresme's defense of the authority of the General Council depends upon the standard of the early Church. Inasmuch as Councils originally determined the organization of the Church, it remains for a Council to reform the Church and retrieve it from its corrupt state. Invoking Aristotle as well as Christian history, Oresme contends that 'such reformation or correction pertains to the multitude. ... And the congregation or assembly of such [a multitude] is the sort of thing that we call a *council*.'⁵² Oresme points out that such renewal of the Church was precisely the reason for which many councils, such as the eleventh Council of Toledo, were convened. Just as the General Council existed as the main authority of the Church in its earliest and most pristine times, so it seems to Oresme that such a body is ordained by God (as well as reason) to achieve the end of restoring spiritual and moral rectitude. Hence, he says, 'Given what has already been said that pertains to the polity of Holy Church, inasmuch as it should be governed by supernatural influence and the special grace of the Holy Spirit, saying that the pope is above the right of the General Council would not bring honor to this polity...'⁵³ The will of God seems better known by a multitude than by a small number. In the governance of the Church, at least, Oresme appears convinced that the faith will be harmed by concentrating authority in a few hands.⁵⁴ Indeed, he proposes on the basis of his knowledge of the traditions of General Councils that they should be convoked on a regular basis (perhaps annually, 'as in the olden days') on a timetable established as a matter of law.⁵⁵

Assisting the General Council in the process of recovering the 'true Church' must be the secular powers within the various

communities and kingdoms. While Oresme prefers that the pope himself call together a General Council when it is necessary, he admits that 'if the opinion of some people were true, ... the royal court of Rome is transforming into the semblance of a princely oligarchy or tyranny.'⁵⁶ Should this be so, and the pope thereby refused to convene a Council, history and reason both demonstrate that kings and emperors enjoy the authority, for the sake of restoring proper Christian belief, to intervene. 'And so it pertains to secular princes to contribute by rendering aid and comfort and security and they ought to wish and desire with all their might and to seek very diligently for the public good of the Christian people,' Oresme proclaims, 'Especially the King of France, who is very catholic and is a true son and champion of the Holy Church and the most excellent of earthly princes who exist in the world.'⁵⁷ The plea for King Charles to act for the sake of reforming a corrupt Church by calling a Council if the pope refuses could hardly be more overt. Indeed, Oresme allows that exalted rulers might even attend and contribute to such a gathering. He provides a clear rationale for what could otherwise be viewed as simply an intrusion into the legitimate liberty of the Church, namely, that the supernatural dimension of conciliar assemblies is matched by an earthly aspect: 'The Holy Church is governed by the Holy Spirit, combined in those works with good human prudence under God.'⁵⁸ The success of reform requires the cooperation of the natural intellect and will of human beings with the inspiration of God, and for this reason, temporal rulers may act with as holy a purpose as pontiffs and other ecclesiastical lords.

The other important function that secular government should exercise in order to improve the condition of the Church is to return to its traditional responsibility for aiding in the assignment of ecclesiastical offices. Following a notable doctrine advocated by Marsiglio, Oresme maintained that religion was necessary for any well-ordered political community — whether Christian or infidel.⁵⁹ As well as contributing to moral education (and the hope of eternal salvation, in the case of Christianity), religion in any organized and sanctioned form constituted a useful instrument for promoting social trust and harmony. Hence, from the earliest pre-Christian times, Oresme reports, kings chose priests on account of their important political

functions. Once the Christian Church arose, the internal government of religion generally pertained to divinely-authorized institutions to select priests. Nonetheless, Oresme insists that when 'the administration and economy or dispensation of goods' is attached to the clerical office — as in the case of bishops — it may properly and lawfully pertain to king, emperors, or the people to chose the incumbent, since his authority reaches into temporal matters outside the purely spiritual realm.⁶⁰ Oresme realizes that the assertion of secular involvement in the assignment of ecclesiastical magistrates may be regarded as an infringement of the liberties ordained by God for the Church — and certainly not a matter for political science.⁶¹ Invoking Aristotle's distinction between distributive and commutative justice, Oresme argues, on the contrary, that clerical officials are implicated in the former, although not in the latter. Thus, it pertains to the 'secular ruler' to distribute all of the honors that exist in the polity, even those to which priests alone can be named, since in all well-ordered polities — Christian as well as non-Christian — the priesthood is an essential part of the communal unit.⁶² Of course, Oresme understands that the issues involved in establishing the preeminence of one sphere over the other is complex, and he acknowledges that the ability of secular government to direct the offices of the Church in certain matters depends upon the 'prudence' of the ruler in relation to the 'wisdom' of the priest.⁶³ Yet he seems generally supportive of the position that temporal rulers must play a part in assuring that the assignments to positions of authority in the Church are given to men whose wisdom and spiritual qualifications for the care of souls and whose competence to exercise power that lapses into the secular realm — are well-established and reliable. In this way, then, the earthly community contributes as well to the reform and renewal of the Church. And these Erastian sentiments could hardly be more in line with Marsiglio's own conclusion: 'Only by the authority of the faithful legislator can and should separable church offices be bestowed and taken away, and similarly benefices and other things established for religious purposes.'⁶⁴

Conclusion

It would be a gross overstatement to classify Nicole Oresme as a wholehearted adherent to the Marsiglian heresy as it had been condemned by the Church. Oresme's position on ecclesiology at least pays lip service to the authority of the 'truth of the divine power of the pope in Rome,'⁶⁵ something that Marsiglio studiously refrained from doing. Yet in the substance of his ecclesiological ideas — with his attack on the 'novelty' of papal absolutism and his demands for conciliar approval of Church laws and secular involvement in 'internal' Church affairs Oresme demonstrates a surprising readiness to pursue Marsiglian themes in the course of his effort to save the Church from its corruption and decline. To ignore the sustained Marsiglian dimension of Oresme's ecclesiological argument — as Susan Babbitt does in her chapter on the topic — misses a dramatic example of the eclecticism that characterizes *Le livre de Politiques*.

Inasmuch as Oresme's commentary was certainly studied by later scholars as well as courtiers associated with the French monarchy, the work may deserve credit for keeping alive and influential salient Marsiglian doctrines that were otherwise reviled and condemned by the Church. Permit me to offer two potentially fruitful lines of this influence. Jean Gerson was one of the leading ecclesiastical reformers of a conciliar persuasion in the age of the Great Schism, as well as a leading figure at the University of Paris and in French royal politics. Gerson wrote widely and significantly on the foundations of Church government; scholars have associated his views with a wide range of sources and intellectual traditions, including William of Ockham, Aristotelian mixed constitutionalism, and canon law-inflected rights theory.⁶⁶ No one has detected any direct lineage from Marsiglio to Gerson, however.⁶⁷ Indeed, John Morrall asserted unambiguously that Gerson cannot 'be accused of influence from Marsiglio of Padua. There is no evidence in his writings that he had any direct acquaintance with the *Defensor Pacis*.'⁶⁸ Yet there is evidence that Gerson had been touched in his ecclesiological writings by Oresme's commentary on Aristotle.⁶⁹ Could there be an indirect link — perhaps one undetected by Gerson himself — to Marsiglio via Oresme's transmission of some of the leading ideas of Dictio II?

Similar speculation might be proposed about Christine de Pizan's political thought. Even more than Gerson — by whom

she may have been influenced — Christine was closely affiliated with the French court, both in her upbringing and in her subsequent career as a professional author. In her writings, she by no means hesitated to discuss the Great Schism and the other religious controversies touching on the condition of the Church in her day. And the positions that she adopted on ecclesiological matters matched rather neatly with those of Marsiglio,⁷⁰ so much so that the present author once invoked an explicit comparison between them on this score.⁷¹ Yet as with Gerson, there is no evidence of a direct connection resulting from the availability of the text of the *Defensor Pacis* to her. On the other hand, like Gerson, there is substantial evidence that Christine knew and drew upon *Le livre de Politiques*.⁷² The cases of both Christine and Gerson are highly suggestive, but also simply illustrative. Might they not point to just the tip of a much larger subterranean tradition of Marsiglian ecclesiology that did not or could not speak its own name, yet that received legitimacy from its availability via the writing of Nicole Oresme? I mean merely to pose a question whose answer may be worthy of further detailed investigation — the pursuit of a heretic hidden in plain sight.

¹ In addition to its presentation at the 'Histories of Heresy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe' conference, this paper was read at the 2003 Texas Medieval Association meeting at Baylor University. I have benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of participants at both venues.

² This was not unusual. In earlier years, scholastic authors who had questioned papal authority, such as the Dominican John Quidort of Paris during the conflict between French King Phillip IV and Pope Boniface VIII, did not necessarily find themselves subject to curial inquisition and discipline.

³ Marsiglio of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, ed. Richard Scholz (Hanover: Hahn, 1932), 1.1.6, 2.26.17.

⁴ The research is reported in Frank Godthardt, 'Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun at the Court of King Ludwig of Bavaria: Exile or Destination?', presented at the International Medieval Congress, Leeds, 2002.

⁵ Jeannine Quillet, *La Philosophie Politique du Songe du Vergier (1378): Sources Doctrinales* (Paris, 1977), pp. 51-60; a complete listing of derivations is given on p. 51, note 3.

⁶ See Paul E. Sigmund, 'The Influence of Marsilius of Padua on XVth-Century Conciliarism,' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), 392-402; and Gregorio Piaia, *Marsilio e Dintorni* (Padua, 1999), pp. 202-219 (and also the further references on pp. 204-205 note 5). Whether Cusa always understands Marsiglio or represents him accurately is another matter, as I have argued in 'Rhetoric, Reason, and Republic: Republicanisms — Ancient, Medieval, and Modern,' in James Hankins (ed.), *Renaissance Civic Humanism* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 259-262.

⁷ See Gregorio Piaia, *Marsilio da Padova nella Riforma e nella Controriforma* (Padua, 1977); and Jean Céard, 'L'influence de Marsile de Padoue sur la pensée calviniste française de la fin du XVIe: Du Plessis-Mornay lecteur du *Defensor Pacis*,' *Medioevo* 6 (1980), pp. 577-594.

⁸ See Conal Condren, 'Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory: Some Aspects of the Poverty Controversy Reconsidered,' *Journal of Religious History* 13 (1984): 30-32.

⁹ See, in particular, Marsiglio of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, 11.18-11.22.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.23-25.

¹¹ Actually, Marsiglio was thought to have co-authored the *Defensor Pacis* with John of Jandun, presumably because when Marsiglio departed from Paris for the court of Ludwig, John left with him. Many years ago, however, Alan Gewirth famously debunked this supposition in 'John of Jandun and the *Defensor Pacis*,' *Speculum* 23 (1948): 267-272.

¹² See Gabrielle Gonzales, 'The King of the Locusts Who Destroyed the Poverty of Christ: Pope John XXII, Marsilius of Padua, and the Franciscan Question,' in Gerson Moreno-Riaño (ed.), *The World of Marsilius of Padua*, (Turnhout, forthcoming).

¹³ For what follows, see the forthcoming University of Hamburg dissertation of Frank Godthardt, 'Marsilius von Padua und der Romzug Ludwigs des Bayern: Zum Verhältnis von politischer Theorie und politischem Handeln im späten Mittelalter'. My thanks are due to him for permitting me to look at chapters of his dissertation prior to its completion and submission.

¹⁴ In any case, Ludwig's triumph was short-lived. During the spring of 1328,

the papacy augmented its efforts to remove the German presence from Rome, Italian opponents of the king began to marshal their forces, and the Roman populace itself grew disenchanted. Ludwig withdrew from the city on 4 August 1328. Marsiglio was positively identified by a contemporary source as one of the members of Ludwig's retreating procession. In the aftermath of his return to Germany, Marsiglio's activities again become obscure.

¹⁵ Conal Condren has also argued how deceptive it is to highlight these themes at the expense of the bulk of the book; see his 'Marsilius of Padua's Argument for Authority: A Survey of Its Significance in the *Defensor Pacis*,' *Political Theory* 5 (1977): 205-218; and 'Democracy and the *Defensor Pacis*: On the English Language Tradition of Marsilian Interpretation,' *Il Pensiero Politico* 13 (1980): 301-316. Condren, however, commits some interpretive excesses of his own, as I have argued in *Community and Consent: The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Padua's Defensor Pacis* (Lanham, MD, 1995), pp. 19-24.

¹⁶ Especially Susan M. Babbitt, *Oresme's Livre de Politiques and the France of Charles V*, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 75:1 (Philadelphia, 1985); James M. Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution* (Princeton, 1992), pp. 203-240; Clare Richter Sherman, *Imaging Aristotle: Verbal and Visual Representation in Fourteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1995); Joel Kaye, *Nature and Economy in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 137-246; Cary J. Nederman, 'Community and the Rise of Commercial Society: Political Economy and Political Theory in Nicholas Oresme's *De Moneta*,' *History of Political Thought* 21 (2000): 1-15.

¹⁷ Serge Lusignan, 'Intellectuels et via politique en France à la fin du Moyen Age,' in B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andújar and Léonard G. Sbrocchi (eds), *Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age* (New York, 1995), p. 270.

¹⁸ For a full account of these events, see Albert D. Menut's 'Introduction' to his critical edition of Oresme's *Le Livres de Politiques d'Aristote* (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 5-8. This text will be cited hereafter as *LLP*.

¹⁹ A thorough contextualization of the commentary is provided by Sherman, *Imaging Aristotle*.

²⁰ *LLP* 96c. References to Oresme's text will be to the folio numbers. Translations from *LLP* are mine.

²¹ Marsiglio of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, I.13.7.

²² *LLP* 96c2d.

²³ *LLP* 97a.

²⁴ Marsiglio of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, I.9 and I.18.

²⁵ Menut, 'Introduction,' p. 9.

²⁶ As has received some attention from Quillet, *La Philosophie Politique du Songe du Vergier*, pp. 132-138.

²⁷ So famous was this sermon that it was reprinted numerous times during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as evidence supporting the Protestant cause against the Roman Church.

²⁸ *LLP* 185d

²⁹ *LLP* 78d279a.

³⁰ *LLP* 157a, 201d, 248a, 250d-251c, 269c.

³¹ LLP 277b-c.

³² LLP 73b.

³³ LLP 67c.

³⁴ LLP 67d.

³⁵ LLP 122d.

³⁶ LLP 277a-b.

³⁷ LLP 137b.

³⁸ LLP 149c-150c.

³⁹ LLP 265a-267a. In this attack on clerical poverty, of course, Oresme stands at odds with Marsiglio, who defends in the *Defensor Paris* the position of the Spiritual wing of the Franciscan Order. But the sincerity of Marsiglio has come into question in the scholarly literature. On this vexed issue, see Condren, 'Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory,' pp. 21-26.

⁴⁰ LLP 150a-b.

⁴¹ As I have argued in an unpublished paper, 'Body Politics: The Diversification of Organic Metaphors in the Later Middle Ages.'

⁴² LLP 150b-c.

⁴³ LLP 122b.

⁴⁴ LLP 247b.

⁴⁵ LLP 123b.

⁴⁶ LLP 123c.

⁴⁷ LLP 123d.

⁴⁸ LLP 20ld.

⁴⁹ LLP 124a.

⁵⁰ LLP 93d.

⁵¹ Babbitt, *Oresme's Livre de Politiques and the France of Charles V*, p. 113.

⁵² LLP 124b.

⁵³ LLP 23ld.

⁵⁴ LLP 155b.

⁵⁵ LLP 232a.

⁵⁶ LLP 124d.

⁵⁷ LLP 125d.

⁵⁸ LLP 124d.

⁵⁹ LLP 260b-262c. Compare this passage with Marsiglio of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, 1.6.

⁶⁰ LLP 108b.

⁶¹ LLP 269a-c.

⁶² LLP 269d.

⁶³ LLP 270a-c.

⁶⁴ Marsiglio of Padua, *Dejensor Pacis*, 111.23.

⁶⁵ LLP 122c.

⁶⁶ John B. Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism* (Manchester, 1960), pp. 20-22, 47-50, 114-116; Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution*, pp. 248-252; Brian Tierney, *The Ideas of Natural Rights* (Atlanta, 1997), pp. 207-235.

⁶⁷ In addition to the studies mentioned in note 65 above, see Louis Pascoe, *Jean Gerson: Principles of Church Reform* (Leiden, 1973).

⁶⁸ Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism*, p. 120.

⁶⁹ Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution*, pp. 250, 252.

⁷⁰ Kate Langdon Forhan, *The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan* (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 88-93.

⁷¹ Cary J. Nederman, 'The Expanding Body Politic: Christine de Pizan and the Medieval Roots of Political Economy,' in Eric Hicks, Diego Gonzalez and Philippe Simon (eds), *Au Champ des escriptures: Ille Colloque international sur Christine de Pizan* (Paris, 2000), p. 389.

⁷² Kate Langdon Forhan, 'Reading Backward: Aristotelianism in the Political Thought of Christine de Pizan,' in Hicks, Gonzalez and Simon, (eds), *Au Champ des escriptures*, pp. 359-381.

Chapter 6

Seduced by the Theologians: Aeneas Sylvius and the Hussite Heretics

Thomas A. Fudge

Introduction

The subject of heresy in the later Middle Ages is both simple and complex. It seemed simple in that it appeared to be everywhere and various manifestations seemed to share common denominators. The fourth Lateran Council (1215) concluded that while heretics had different faces their tails were joined together.¹ The definition was true and false. Heresy was more than whatever the papacy denounced and in medieval writings heresy was described on several templates: intellectual deviance, reform, as challenge to social order, as civil disorder, as madness, disease, perversion and diabolism.² In his historical writings dealing with Hussites, Aeneas Sylvius refers to each explanatory model.³ The Hussites 'refused obedience to the Roman Church', were convinced the church generally had 'deviated too much from the teachings of the apostles' thus requiring reform. These would-be reformers subverted social order by establishing the community of Tabor which led to the 'horrible spectacle' of murder, violence and war. Moreover, these heretics attracted many, including barons, to the 'Hussite madness' which amounted to becoming 'infected with poison' which destroyed the one true faith and the soul. Beyond this, the Hussites 'had become accustomed to ... fornication' and sexual licentiousness. In short, they became 'sons of the Devil' and some of them eventually lost their 'damned souls' 'devoted to Satan.'⁴ This awful situation could be traced straight to unfaithful theologians. 'What error in the faith,' Aeneas demanded to know, 'has come from anyone except theologians?'

The chronicler of Hussite heresy was adamant in this rhetorical question: 'Who seduced the Czechs if not theologians?'⁵ Suspects abounded: the 'archheretic' Jan Hus, the 'unreasonable' Jerome of Prague, 'the master of error' Jan Rokycana, the 'evil bishop' of the Taborites Mikulds of Pelhrimov, the English exile Peter Payne, the 'poisonous' John Wyclif, the banned preacher Jakoubek of Stribro, the 'impious' Traemonstratensian renegade Jan Zelivsky, 'the old slave of the Devil' Vaclav Koranda, the Polish fugitive from the flames Andrzej Galka of Dobczyna, Peter of Dresden, a man 'infected with the Waldensian plague' and others.⁶ Aeneas was quite clear on their collective fate: they 'will suffer forever in hell for corrupting the true faith.'⁷

The Sources and the Motive

There are two principal sources from the pen of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini relating to the heresy of the Hussites. The first is a lengthy letter dated 21 August 1451 addressed to Juan Carvajal, Cardinal of St. Angelo. Carvajal had experience dealing with the Bohemian problem and was the preeminent authority on Central Europe at the Curia. Aeneas composed this letter following visits to the Bohemian city of Tabor in July of that year and the missive can be described as a record of heretical encounters.⁸ Aeneas traveled to the realm of the heretics to attend the national Diet representing the emperor's decision to keep the boy heir to the Czech throne — Ladislav Posthumous — in Vienna. The second source is his 'History of Bohemia' composed seven years later in 1458 just before Aeneas was elected to high ecclesiastical office. The *Historia bohémica* is a chronicle of Czech history from its origins to the 'king of heretics' Jiri of Podebrady in a total of seventy-two chapters. The Hussites are discussed in the foreword and then in detail in chapters 35-52. A cursory examination of the *Historia bohémica* reveals that the Hussite heresy constituted the chief interest for Aeneas in writing his 'history' of Bohemia. The book begins with a preface addressed to Alfonso, king of Aragon which mulls over the course of life contrasting the sufferings of the faithful with the wickedness of heretics. Chapter one deals with the geographical location of Bohemia and chapter two recounts the legendary

Czech origins. Chapters three through twenty-six appear to rely on Czech chronicles. Chapters twenty-seven through thirty-one consist of a brief overview of the Bohemian kings up to the Luxembourg dynasty. Chapters thirty-two to thirty-four treat the kings of the fourteenth century. These thirty-four chapters, covering a period of 500 years from the tenth century to about 1400, take up about 43 pages in the modern edition used here. As noted above, chapters thirty-five through fifty-two are devoted to examining Hussite heresy. This comprises 42 pages and less than forty years. The remainder, chapters fifty-three through seventy-two, covers the period from the death of Sigismund in 1437 to the regency of Jiri of Podebrady in the 1450s. This is a span of about twenty years and takes up 41 pages.

In his letter to Juan Carvajal, Aeneas justified his narrative about the Hussites on the grounds that it was valuable for the Apostolic See to understand the situation in Bohemia. Aeneas says his letter must be lengthy otherwise its usefulness would be limited. That said, he admits he will 'omit much and will touch upon only the significant topics.'⁹ The letter, then, is no chronicle of a visit to Bohemia but instead a perspective. Aeneas acknowledges he might be criticized for having engaged heretics in debate — he describes it as a 'juvenile battle between bold old men' — but defends himself saying he was unwilling to leave 'barking wolves without punishment' and was driven by zeal neither to 'desert the truth' nor 'fail the Church.' Happily, Aeneas reports he received divine assistance and God effectively spoke through him and he refuted the 'wretched laborites' silencing the 'voices of sinners.' He concedes his letter had been composed in haste but defends the veracity of its content.¹⁰ What is apparent in this correspondence is an effort to suggest the foundations of a papal policy. His view of Jiri of Podebrady represents a way forward and his perspective on the heretics at Tabor the basis for a doctrine of elimination. Aeneas attempted to develop these ideas seven years later.

In the *Historia bohémica*, Aeneas begins more philosophically, musing on the meaning of life and death. He notes that the 'worst people' dwelling in his lifetime are the Czechs who disobey the Roman Church, despise the faith of their fathers, murder the servants of Christ, destroy legitimate places of

worship and live in depravity. 'There is no other country which has produced more martyrs of Christ than Bohemia.'" While taking the baths at Viterbo in the summer of 1458, Aeneas decided to compose his book because Bohemian affairs were 'useful' and there was, in his mind, merit in recording these 'memorable events.' Aeneas declares recent events the more significant read Hussite heretics — 'both doubtless and remarkable.' According to Aeneas 'there is no other kingdom in which has taken place so many changes, so many wars, defeats and miracles as Bohemia.' Cultivating such interests — recording useful information, answering the heretics, defending truth and the Roman Church, and summarizing the history of the horrible Hussites Aeneas paints a portrait of a late medieval heresy. What did Aeneas think he was doing in his writing about Hussites? There seem to be three points of consciousness. First, constructing a record. Second, defending official religion. Third, refuting Hussite heresies. What Aeneas accomplished was less a historical record and more the creation of a vivid mythology. He defended the official church but his refutation of the Hussites is so one-sided and limited in its literary version that it cannot be viewed other than failure.

Aeneas had first-hand knowledge of the heretics from visits to Tabor in 1451 and also from documents and information accessed elsewhere. Beyond this, there are several individuals with whom Aeneas came in contact who were further sources of information. The most important source was the ex-Hussite Jan Papousek of Sobeslav whom Aeneas met in 1451 and who supplied the latter with materials for his 'history.'¹² It is safe to say Aeneas formed the essential aspects of his opinion of the Czech heretics before visiting Bohemia and engaging with the 'monsters of impiety.' Having made the trip, the experience only solidified in his mind that the heart and root of Hussite heresy was the religion of Tabor. His letter to Cardinal Carvajal confirms this view and an analysis of the *Historia bohémica* reveals this conviction — erroneous though it was — remained at the center of Aeneas' understanding of the problem of heresy in the Czech lands. That misconception had serious consequences for later papal policy and continued diplomatic relationship with Bohemia. The burden of these historical writings, especially the latter, was to provide a defensible

rationale for why the agreements made with these heretics at the Council of Basel in 1433 — the Compactata — should be abrogated.¹³ There are two revealing clues which serve to illuminate motive and strategy in this 'history' of heresy: language and selectivity. The deliberate and evocative terminology used to describe these Czech miscreants is a splendid example of words creating reality. The other matter — what to put in and what to leave out — yields a construct amenable to the purposes of the historian in any age. In this case both factors are key components in interpreting the portrait of Hussite heresy presented by Aeneas Sylvius.

An Image of Heresy

Exposed to the cold north winds and situated on the far side of the Danube lies Bohemia and within that country the 'asylum and stronghold of heretics' called Tabor. With this comment Aeneas begins his great work of creating his portrait of the heretical Hussites. Straightaway, he labels the Hussites a 'perfidious lunacy' built upon the 'Wyclithe poison' which infected Jan Hus and others in Prague. King Vaclav was too lazy or too drunk to thwart the heretics and Archbishop Albik described as 'a unique bottomless pit of immense greediness' proved to be a suitable candidate for passively 'abetting in the strengthening of heresy'.¹⁴ According to Aeneas, Wycliffite theology entered Bohemia from England through the hands of a Czech student called Nicholas 'the rotten fish' along with other heresies from Germany. Jan Hus preached these heresies and eventually was ordered to cease disseminating false doctrine. His successor Jakoubek converted to the Waldensian 'lunatic sect' and began to preach that communion in both kinds was essential to salvation. Hus and Jerome were summoned before the Council of Constance where, showing themselves to be contumaciously committed to the 'Wycliffite delusion,' they were executed. Aeneas is disgusted that reason could not prevail over contumacy but his description of the heretics' fate betrays traces of suppressed admiration. They 'rushed to the stake as if they were invited to a feast ... when the flames took hold of them they sang hymns which the flames and the crackling of fire

could hardly deafen. None of the philosophers is said to have gone through death so bravely like these endured burning to death.'¹⁵

Ignoring the multiple levels of reform in Bohemia and the diversity therein, Aeneas introduces 'another would-be priest' whom he declares appeared in Prague ready to commit any crime. This was the Praemonstratensian monk Jan Zelivsky whose sermons Aeneas reports were so ridiculous that he was expelled from his pulpit only to 'worm' his way into other pulpits where he persuaded 'blood-thirsty mobs' to murder the town government while he stood looking on 'showing the holy body of Christ.' The trajectory constructed by Aeneas runs along a radical spur of presentation in which the main characters have become 'blinded with hate' for the true faith, holy Mother Church, and sound religion. Aeneas fails to distinguish among the Hussite parties, choosing instead to lump them together thus presenting the Hussite heresy as unified subscribing to the radical doctrines espoused at Tabor. Hussite theology articulated in the *Historia bohemia* is referred to in the letter to Cardinal Carvajal as a sordid mess applicable to all 'Hussites'. 'I believed these people were separated from us by rite of communion only, but I have discovered them to be heretical, unfaithful, rebellious from God, and having no judgment or true religion:¹⁶ The humanist bishop could either not detect the differences among the Hussites or saw no point clarifying distinctions. 'The unbridgeable gulf in doctrine and societal foundation between Taboritism — the congregational society — and the Prague Hussitism of Rokycana a national and hierarchical establishment — escaped the Bishop of Siena, who saw in both only disobedience and deviation:¹⁷ Hence, Aeneas could adjudicate that prior agreements granting recognition to the religious practices of Hussite heretics should be suspended. Utraquism had to be stopped because of the 'danger of heresy.' Beyond this, utraquism caused division and one side had to surrender to the other. It was obvious which side Aeneas thought should capitulate. The Roman See had carefully decided on the merits of ecclesiastical rite with the conclusion that the practice of Hussite heretics with respect to the eucharist was 'unnecessary, improper and without merit.' Since Holy Mother Church never errs it is good, right and proper to adhere to her decisions.

Pernicious heresy had already brought the Czech lands under the darkness of curse and ruination.¹⁸

The next character appearing on the canvas of Aeneas' heretical image is Jan Zizka, introduced to the reader as 'infected with Hussite poison and eager to rob.' Leading a gang of thugs Aeneas asserts that Zizka attacked churches, engaged in iconoclasm, sacked religious houses and expelled monks. A portrait of a ruthless man of violence emerges from the background of heresy. We see Zizka engaged in military campaigns, employing tactical genius and winning improbable victories. He is a fortress builder who constructs a 'refuge for all heretics.' The mad man is seen marching throughout the land destroying churches, demolishing monasteries and putting to death men, women, children and priests all of whom adhered to the true faith. Priests and good Catholics are herded into wooden buildings at Zizka's instigation and the structures burned down over them. Tragedy strikes Zizka during one of his criminal outings and he 'was struck with an arrow and lost the one eye with which he still saw the light of the skies. He was borne from there to Prague where doctors treated his wound so that he survived but he did not regain his sight. Notwithstanding this, he did not retire from his work as a conqueror of castles or from directing military operations. These blind people were delighted to follow a blind leader. Generations to come will be amazed by this tale and will not believe it.'¹⁹ Aeneas is loathe to admit it but his narrative betrays a reluctant admiration for the old soldier. Though blind and aged, Zizka 'continued raging against churches more and more' and with each triumph became more puffed up with contempt and destroyed churches everywhere, persecuted priests and slaughtered his enemies without mercy. The portrait suggests Zizka was completely committed to his task, unable to relent and unstoppable. Aeneas devotes an entire special chapter to the death of this anti-hero and the imaginative prose of this history of heresy achieves a veritable climax.

Now Zizka had appointed a time to assemble for the purpose of attacking Sigismund when, near the castle of Pribyslav, by divine inspiration, if you will, that detestable, cruel, horrible and savage monster was stricken with an infectious disease and died. The one whom no mortal hand could destroy was extinguished by the finger of God. As he lay ill, he was asked where he

wished to be buried after his death. He ordered that his body be flayed, the flesh discarded for the birds and animals, and a drum be fashioned from his skin. With this drum in the lead they should go to war. The enemies would turn to flight as soon as they heard its sound.²⁰

The death of Zizka deprived Aeneas of one of his more colorful personalities but that loss is compensated for with the introduction of a group called the Orphans and another striking criminal. The Orphans took their name because their father, Zizka, was dead. 'These blind people considered this blindness deserving of veneration ... and thus followed it all the way to hell.'²¹ In 1451 at Tabor itself, Aeneas came face to face with the legendary presence of the old warrior. 'Outside the fortress entrance hang two rectangular shields. On one ... Zizka, an old man blind in both eyes, has been painted.' The door into Tabor was the gateway to hell and Aeneas writes that Taborite heretics regarded Zizka as practically divine, 'religiously venerating his image' while denying the same devotion to Christ. Elsewhere, Aeneas notes that the heretics annually hold a special requiem Mass in honor of the cruel heretic Jan Zizka.²²

The history goes on to cover in brief form the aborted crusade efforts to militarily subdue the heretics and their eventual invitation to the Council of Basel. In the midst of this narrative the only man ever regarded worthy of being Zizka's successor is introduced: Prokop Holy. Prokop was a priest but joined himself to Zizka's program and 'because he was strong, skillful and did not back away from any work, he gained an important position with him [Zizka] and usually was leading the front lines of the troops, a criminal suits best to a criminal.' This is the man who later received the surname 'Great' for his brave acts, becoming 'famous for many victories and for even greater crimes.'²³ If Hus provided the movement with a martyr and Zelivsky mobilized radical mobs, it was Zizka and Prokop whom Aeneas used to demonize the Hussite heretics. When they arrived at Basel on Sunday, 4 January 1433, to face the judgment of all the sage men of Christendom, Aeneas was on hand to record the reception the people of Basel gave to the heretics.

Multitudes thronged the streets ... They looked at the awful and dreadful faces of the men [Hussites] and especially their wild eyes. Many claimed

that it was probably true that such men had done the deeds rumoured of them. However, most of the people looked especially at one man: Prokop. It was this fellow who had often defeated the armies of the faithful, who had destroyed so many towns and killed many thousands of people. This man was feared by his foes as well as his own countrymen for he was the undefeated, brave and fearless leader who had shown himself invincible in the face of every test and terror.²⁴

Colorful and descriptive prose was utilized to create more imaginative strokes across the canvas of his portrait. The heretics were coming to life. The heretical 'Taborites and Orphans were men exceeding black from the sun and the wind and also from the smoke of their camp fires. Their very appearance was ugly and frightful to behold. Their eyes were like those of an eagle, their hair unkempt and standing on end, their beards long and their stature prodigiously tall. Their bodies were hairy and their skin so hard that it appeared able to resist iron as though it were a plate of armour.'²⁵ These are not men at all. The image is bestial and inhuman. The colors of the portrait painted by Aeneas Sylvius were deep and dark; these heretics were 'evildoers' and wicked children of the Devil.

Accordingly, 'there is no more unhappy human race than the Czechs.'²⁶ Aeneas dramatically brings his narrative to 1434 when Czech defeated Czech in the interests of Rome. In this last great battle Prokop went down, but again the begrudging admiration of Aeneas comes through when he writes that Prokop 'fell wearied with conquering, rather than conquered himself.' His lieutenant Prokupek [Little Prokop] was killed also. Recovering his composure and retreating from his sketch of gallant defeat Aeneas puts the heretics in their proper place within the grand portrait. 'This was the end of the two most harmful and heinous monsters. Thus the previously undefeated army of criminal Ta.borites and Orphans were defeated and annihilated.'²⁷ Aeneas later had to correct what seems to be a final chapter when three years later the 'Hussite frenzy' raised its head once more when Jan Rohac of Duba, one of Zizka's old friends, possessing an 'evil nature' and holding to the 'worst opinions' gathered together a criminal gang and began once again to proclaim the heretical program. This was a short-lived revolt and Emperor Sigismund had the castle of 'robbers' demolished and the heretics hanged in Prague from a three-

storey gallows.²⁸

The final strokes of the portrait are applied in the earlier 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal' which reflects Aeneas' visit to Tabor where he personally discovers 'all the monsters of impiety and blasphemy' inside the walls of the heretics' fortress enjoying protection. 'In order to find out how many heretics are in this place, it is sufficient to count heads.'²⁹ These people, Aeneas alleges, previously followed Zizka's orders shedding the blood of Christians, destroying towns, burning monasteries, violating young women and murdering priests. Aeneas drives home the point that 'it is significant that the Taborites followed ... a blind man. In fact what sort of leader but a blind person would be suitable for people like this ...?'³⁰ These heretics are 'deadly, detestable and deserving of the maximum punishment.' The people living at Tabor are 'sacrilegious and wicked' and 'deserve to be exterminated.' If that option proves untenable then at the very least, Aeneas suggests, they ought to be 'confined in quarries away from the human race and made to dig and break stone.' This is the only way to prevent the rest of Bohemia from becoming 'corrupted' and 'contaminated' by this heretical 'scum.'³¹

Based upon his experiences and observations Aeneas proclaims that Tabor exists as a 'senate of heretics', a 'synagogue of cruelty', a 'temple of Belial' and a 'kingdom of Lucifer.'³² The 'indecent' men and women of Tabor continue to pose a threat and in Prague the sermons of Jan Rokycana 'spread like cancer and fills the hearts of listeners with a deadly poison ... [and Rokycana himself] is distinguished for corrupting the truth' and is no different than the people of Tabor who are 'enemies of the faith.'³³ Disputing with them is to no avail and of little benefit. 'The labor is useless and makes no difference, like offering light to a blind man, a sermon to a deaf man, or wisdom to a brute.' Their seduction by theologians was complete and irreversible. In all the earth there are no people 'more monstrous than the Taborites ... they are monstrous with the vices of a depraved mind When I took my leave of them it seemed I had returned from the lower depths of hell.'³⁴

The Significance of Aeneas' 'History' of Heresy

Aeneas Sylvius created the first full-length history of the Hussite heresy and this remained a standard treatment for a long time.³⁵ There can be no gainsaying the *Historia bohémica* brought Hussite history to the attention of Europe. His portrait of the Czech heresy demonstrated the movement could not succeed. Though heretics in Prague and Tabor had been truly and thoroughly seduced by theologians Aeneas sought to demonstrate in his 'history' and in his account to Cardinal Carvajal that the Hussite program was impossible and could not succeed because it was hopelessly naive. It has been pointed out that Aeneas' historical insight was more profound, sharper and ultimately more shrewd than that displayed by his opponents in the 'juvenile battle between bold old men' at Tabor in the summer of 1451. Some scholars dismiss the Taborite theologians as subscribing to 'totally unhistorical naiveties.'³⁶ That may be too sweeping but Aeneas went to Tabor as an apologist for the official church and in his disputes with the aging heretics defended the veracity of the Roman Church, its rite and theology. By standing up for the official church as it existed at the end of the Middle Ages, Aeneas likewise defended the dominant social order of European civilization. In this sense, the 'history' presented by Aeneas is one constructed on the pillars of medieval social order and the Italian Renaissance.³⁷ Medieval social order regarded itself as divinely ordained and there was little separation of church and society. Aeneas saw religion and politics as two sides of one coin. The church was rooted in the social order; indeed the church and official religion helped create and sustain social order. To reject one meant refusing the other. The social implications of Hussite heresy were everywhere present in the portrait of the heretics drawn so extensively upon the canvas of the later Middle Ages as imagined and executed by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini. The experiment at Tabor challenged God, the church and the world. Calling into question ecclesiastical hierarchy, dissolving legal structures, innovating economic tradition, dismissing gender boundaries and declaring their version of divine law normative for all, had far-reaching implications religiously and socially and few of these indeed were lost on Aeneas. It is little wonder he concluded his consideration of the Hussites with the dismissive charge that the Czechs are drawn to 'all kinds of heresies' and

many 'pestiferous inventions.'³⁸ Still, Aeneas could scarcely pull himself away from the history of these wretched people with all its drama, pageantry, heroism, violence, bloodshed, perversion, strange doctrines, extraordinary success and astonishing feats, to say nothing of the stalwart stoicism of Hus, the incredible triumphs of Zizka and Prokop and the gloomy presence of the fierce Taborites — 'maniacs' — and that 'bunch of poor and dirty fellows' called Orphans.³⁹ Moreover, he confessed that while these were wicked people they had the 'single salutary quality of loving letters.'⁴⁰ That appealed to the humanist diplomat. In writing his history of heresy, Aeneas Sylvius was almost as fascinated by his subject as he was repulsed.

One of the factors dealt with by Aeneas to which heresy is joined is the problem of 'nationalism.' Aeneas clearly sees the religious dissent practiced by Hussite heretics as linked to the national question and indeed he alleges heretical poison is spread through nationalist sentiment and conversely nationalism promotes heresy.⁴¹ Problems at the University in Prague, the hereticating of the masters, the isolating of the kingdom in general is put down to an alarming symbiosis of heresy and nationalism.⁴² It can be noted that this point of departure and explanatory matrix, while interesting, constitutes the most serious flaw in the book itself for it determines the presentation and restricts the heresy to this essential characteristic which functions in Aeneas as causation and limit.⁴³

Theologically, Aeneas is both useful and problematic. He is useful inasmuch as there is considerable space devoted to the doctrines of the heretics. In his account to Cardinal Carvajal, Aeneas attempts to recount, practically verbatim, his head-to-head debates with Taborite theologians.'⁴⁴ It is revealing that Aeneas gets longer speeches, scores more telling points and speaks in a more sophisticated way. As noted earlier, he fails to discriminate theologically among the various groups comprising the Hussite religion: Praguers (of which there were at least three parties represented by Jakoubek, Zelivsky, and Jan Pribram respectively), Taborites, Orphans, and Chelcice Brethren. While he must have been aware of these various factions, for reasons not altogether clear, he lumped them together as a single identical unit. Since Aeneas is clearly a partisan historian — an unsympathetic enemy of all heretics — he does not simply

dismiss the strange doctrines, as one might expect, but makes an effort to understand and refute them. There is a clear tendency to associate Hussites with Waldensians but this can be put down at least in part to the fact that some of his material was supplied by Papousek who affirmed that Hussites were Waldensians.⁴⁵ The attribution of Waldensian theology across the spectrum of the Hussite movement is unfortunate, distorting and inaccurate. A tendency is sustained throughout the narrative to define, describe and understand Hussite heresy through the gates of Tabor which Aeneas describes as a dungeon of mischief. It results in a magnificent portrait filled with deep brooding shadows, colorful characters, dramatic action, and exotic beliefs all portrayed with verve and flair. Unfortunately, the colors and shapes are misleading.

The fatal flaw in this 'history' of heresy relates to the failure of the humanist papal diplomat to appreciate the depth and strength of Hussite religion. There is no excuse for this lack of perception. After all, Aeneas had written clearly about the matter. At Christmas 1454 Jiri of Podebrady was in Breslau and became engaged in conversation with a court jester from the retinue of King Ladislav. The jester asked Jiri why he remained in the Utraquist communion instead of adhering to conventional liturgical practice. The answer is revealing. Jiri answered that everyone celebrated according to whatever they believed and it was proper to worship out of conviction. 'I am completely convinced of the religious truth as I was taught by our own priests. If I made an effort to follow yours I might be able to deceive people but this would only be to the detriment of my soul. However, I could not deceive God who looks into the inner places of the heart.'⁴⁶ Aeneas recorded these words or placed them into the mouth of Jiri of Podebrady. There could be little question this constituted *prima facie* evidence that Hussites had been seduced by theologians. It appears Aeneas never took seriously this sentiment which applied not only to this one man but also to the worst of the heretics, the Taborites and Orphans.

Historiographically, the *Historia bohémica* remained controversial. Some scholars dismiss the work as chiefly invention, manufactured for propagandist purposes and therefore unreliable.⁴⁷ Some point out the difficulty in establishing truthfulness in Aeneas since he wrote partly with

propagandist purposes in mind and partly for literary reasons so much so that the book can still be read in the sense that Aeneas was skilled in 'maintaining the tension of his exciting story.'⁴⁸ Others comment tersely: 'read with interest, don't believe anything.'⁴⁹ Other historians are more sympathetic in contextualizing bias, clear errors with an underlying concern for historical truth. Regardless of merit or critique, the *Historia bohémica* of Aeneas Sylvius became a stepping stone, perhaps even the cornerstone, in the establishment of a narrative tradition supporting the historical perception and interpretation of Hussite heresy. That tradition stretched from the mid-fifteenth century to the eighteenth century before undergoing serious challenge.⁵⁰ The image of Hussite heretics created by Aeneas Sylvius was unforgettable and persisted as the standard for generations. It not only inaugurated a narrative tradition, it became the foundation for papal policy after 1458 when the humanist scholar and writer of 'histories' Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini was elevated to the see of St. Peter and took the name Pope Pius II.

Seduced by theologians, these blaspheming monsters bearing the awful scars of warfare were clearly demonic, clearly fascinating, definitely heretical, definitely noteworthy. The man who wrote their 'history' was never in danger of being seduced himself by the lure of the heretics or the wily arguments of their theologians but at least with reference to men like Zizka, Aeneas had 'gone rather far in what might almost be called the glorification of one of the most dangerous heretics of all times.'⁵¹

¹ Norman P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (London, 1990), vol. 1, p. 233.

² Thomas A. Fudge, 'Images Breakers, Image Makers: The Role of Heresy in Divided Christendom', in Paweł Kras and Wojciech Polak (eds), *Christianity in East Central Europe* (Lublin, 1999), pp. 205-9.

³ Editions cited for the 'History of Bohemia', in Dana Martinková, Alena Hadravová and Jiří Matl (eds), *Aeneas Silvii Historia Bohemica* (Prague, 1998), hereafter *Historia bohemica*. For the letter to Cardinal Carvajal, see Rudolf Wolkan (ed.), *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, in *Fontes rerum austriacarum*, 67, 2 (Vienna, 1912), pp. 22-57. Hereafter 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal'.

⁴ The citations are from *Historia bohemica*, pp. 2, 100, 114, 116, 106, 130, 90, 108, 116, 118, 162 and 172.

⁵ Aeneas Sylvius, letter 'Concerning the Education of Children', February 1450 in Wolkan, *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, vol. 67, pp. 2, 139.

⁶ References to *Historia bohemica*, chapters 35, 36, 44 and 49, and from 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', pp. 34 and 36.

⁷ *Historia bohemica*, p. 4.

⁸ Aeneas journeyed to Bohemia in July 1451 among the delegation of King Friedrich III to the Bohemian Landtag convened in Prague, relocated to Benelov because of the plague in the capital. The Austrian contingent arrived 18 July and remained four days. The visits to Tábor were on either side of these dates.

⁹ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', pp. 22-3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹¹ *Historia bohemica*, pp. 4, 6.

¹² Excellent overview by Smahel in preface to the edition of *Historia bohemica* used in this essay, pp. lxx-lxxvi.

¹³ These historic agreements recognized the right of Hussite religion to exist making allowance for the practice of communion in both kinds to continue in Bohemia. Text in Thomas A. Fudge, *The Crusade against Heretics in Bohemia, 1418-1437: Sources and Documents for the Hussite Crusade* (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 368-72.

¹⁴ *Historia bohemica*, pp. 96, 98, 104.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 100. The famous letter of Poggio Bracciolini on the death of Jerome reveals similar sentiment, in Thomas de Tonellis (ed.), *Poggii Opera Omnia* (Florence, 1832), vol. 3, pp. 11-20.

¹⁶ Aeneas outlines Hussite doctrine in *Historia bohemica*, pp. 92 and 94 and in 'The Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', pp. 26-7, quotation in the latter, p. 27.

¹⁷ Howard Kaminsky, 'Pius Aeneas among the Taborites,' *Church History* 28 (1959): 294.

¹⁸ Speech by Pius II on 31 March 1462. Text in G.A. Stenzel (ed.), *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum* (17 vols, Breslau, 1835-1902), vol. 8, pp. 82-3.

¹⁹ *Historia bohemica*, p. 124.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, chapter 46, 136, 138. On this see Thomas A. Fudge, 'Zizka's Drum: The Political Uses of Popular Religion,' *Central European History*, 36 (2003): 546-569.

²¹ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', p. 24.

²² Ibid., pp. 23-4 and *Historia bohémica*, p. 138.

²³ *Historia bohémica*, pp. 130, 132, 150.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 150.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 162.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 156.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 160.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 170, 172.

²⁹ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', p. 23.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 24.

³¹ Ibid., p. 25.

³² Ibid., pp. 26-7.

³³ Ibid., pp. 34-5 and 36.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 56.

³⁵ Survey of editions and transmission in Smahel's introduction to the edition cited herein, pp. lxxxv-xcvi; and Howard Kaminsky, 'The Hussite Movement in History,' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1952), pp. 163-4.

³⁶ Kaminsky, 'The Hussite Movement in History', p. 149.

³⁷ The point is made in Kaminsky, 'Pius Aeneas among the Taborites', pp. 288-9.

³⁸ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', p. 56.

³⁹ The Táborites are called 'maniacs' in the anonymous text 'Václav, Havel and Tábor.' Edition in Frantiska Svejkovského (ed.), *Versované skladby doby husitské* (Prague, 1963), pp. 116-50 at 116. Orphans described in Jan Papoušek, *Pro declaratione Compactatorum et decreti in Basilea "cacti pro communione unius speciei"*, in Konstantin von Höfler (ed.), *Geschichtschreiber der hussitischen Bewegung in Böhmen* (3 vols, Vienna, 1866), vol. 3, pp. 158-62.

⁴⁰ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', pp. 36-7.

⁴¹ On this Frantisek Smahel, 'The Idea of the 'Nation' in Hussite Bohemia,' trans., R.F. Samsour *Historica* 16 (1969): 143-247 and 17 (1969): 93-197; Smahel, *Idea národa v husitských Čechách* (Prague, 2000), and Thomas A. Fudge, "'An Ass with a Crown': Heresy, Nationalism and Emperor Sigismund", paper presented at the World Congress of the Czech and Slovak Society of Arts and Sciences, June 2002, Plzen, Czech Republic, forthcoming.

⁴² *Historia bohémica*, pp. 90, 92.

⁴³ Kaminsky, 'The Hussites in History', p. 156.

⁴⁴ 'Letter to Cardinal Carvajal', pp. 37-55.

⁴⁵ Papoušek, *Pro declaratione Compactatorum et decreti in Basilea cacti pro communione unius speciei*, p. 158 and *passim*.

⁴⁶ *Historia bohémica*, pp. 218, 220.

⁴⁷ Frantisek M. Bartos, 'Zizka v dijeptsectví' in Rudolf Urbánek (ed.), *Sborník zizku*, (Prague, 1924), pp. 170-99; but more fully in his *Eneas Sylvius* (Prague, 1925).

⁴⁸ Frederick G. Heymann, *John Zizka and the Hussite Revolution* (Princeton, 1955), pp. 256 and 423.

⁴⁹ Smahel's introduction to *Historia bohémica*, p. xcvi.

⁵⁰ The principal study is still Kaminsky's, 'The Hussites in History.' Relevant survey on pp. 143-326.

⁵¹ Heymann, *John Zizka and the Hussite Revolution*, p. 425.

Chapter 7

Heresy Hunting and Clerical Reform: William Warham, John Colet, and the Lollards of Kent, 1511-1512

Craig D'Alton

Introduction

Between 28 April 1511 and 5 June 1512 fifty-three men and women were accused of Lollardy, the popular form of the Wycliffite heresy, in the English diocese of Canterbury. Five of these were handed over to the secular authorities to be burned. Forty-five others had penances imposed upon them.¹ Canterbury was only one of many English dioceses which saw attacks on Lollards during the first years of the reign of Henry VIII. Between 1510 and 1512 London, Lincoln, Coventry and Lichfield all saw major anti-Lollard campaigns.² Other less systematic prosecutions occurred in Rochester, Winchester, Salisbury, Norwich and Hereford.

In 1965, John Thomson wrote that the large number of Lollard trials in England in the decade preceding the first rumblings of Lutheranism constituted 'incontestable proof that the ecclesiastical authorities were seriously concerned with the problem of heresy.'³ Thomson was right, and his work has led to further and more detailed explorations of Lollard trials and texts. Regional studies of Reformation and pre-Reformation religion have included analyses of Lollard 'resurgence', and Margaret Aston and Anne Hudson among others, including most recently Kantik Ghosh have examined the intellectual basis of what had long been regarded to be a non-intellectual movement.⁴

Without question, the first years of the reign of Henry VIII witnessed heresy prosecutions on a scale not seen in England for

almost a century. Yet whilst there is little to link the anti-heresy proceedings in most dioceses with any other episcopal actions, in Canterbury the Lollard trials formed only one part of a much larger program of diocesan activity. In the same year in which he attacked Lollards, Archbishop Warham also mounted a full-scale visitation of his diocese. The archbishop regarded the reforming of heretics and the reforming of wayward clergy to be two parts of the same task of pastoral discipline, and his 1511-12 actions in Kent were a direct response to the calls for ecclesiastical reform at the Canterbury Convocation of 1510. In 1512, as the trials and visitations drew to their end, John Colet, at Warham's behest, preached his famous reformist sermon to the Convocation of Canterbury, providing a retrospective rhetorical justification for combining the reform of heretics with the reform of the clergy. Colet's sermon, deeply grounded in reformist traditions with roots in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), was perhaps intended to be a spur to action. Yet rather than being prophetic, Colet simply gave definition to an idea that had already run its course. By the end of 1512, the renewed Lollard persecution had come to a halt, and Warham's desire for a province-wide clergy reform program was all but dead. This chapter re-reads Colet's text in the light of the actions of the archbishop for whom he composed it, and argues that, far from being a 'Fore-runner of the Reformation', Colet's sermon was designed as much to promote the enforcing of doctrinal orthodoxy amongst the laity as the reforming of the moral life of the clergy.

I

In 1510, as the English episcopate first sought to define its place in the new regime of the self-proclaimed 'humanist prince' Henry VIII, the humanist emphasis on efficiency and responsible reform had a direct impact upon pastoral administration. The support of learning, increased efficiency in pastoral responsibilities generally, and the suppression of heresy in particular, became almost fashionable amongst bishops with court connections. Whilst few of the bishops who moved against Lollards could reasonably be called 'humanist scholars', their

number included all the major episcopal patrons of university education in the first decade of Henry VIII. Moreover, even those who were not overt scholarly or institutional patrons employed as administrators, and especially as heresy judges, their most progressively educated officials. Many of these officials had close connections of patronage with other pro-humanist bishops, who together constituted what might be described as a practical reformist circle.

To the extent that this reformist circle had a leader, it was William Warham, archbishop of Canterbury, patron of Erasmus, whom John Foxe correctly identified as the most vigorous prosecutor of Lollards in almost a century. The list of those who joined Warham as prosecutors of Henrician Lollards included Bishops Edmund Audley (Salisbury), Richard Fitzjames (London), William Smith (Lincoln), Geoffrey Blythe (Coventry and Lichfield), Richard Mayew (Hereford), Richard Foxe (Winchester), Richard Nykke (Norwich), scholars of such international note as John Colet and Bishop John Fisher, as well as a veritable galaxy of minor officials who had received an Italian education, and an impressive number of senior Oxbridge graduates, particularly those drawn from the more progressive Wykhamist foundations of Magdalene and New Colleges. Together these officials constituted the educated elite of the English ecclesiastical machine.⁵

Warham, as archbishop, presided in 1510 over the first Canterbury Convocation of the new reign. Very little remains to reveal the work of that Convocation, but the little which does suggests that it broke for the first time from the standard pattern of debating almost exclusively on fiscal matters, and concentrated instead on the need to reform abuses within the Church.⁶ In the light of the spirit of reform which dominated this first episcopal gathering of the new reign, it is not completely surprising to discover that Warham's register for the subsequent year reveals an increase in the level of diocesan activity. What is interesting is that the increase was dramatic rather than measured.

The modern reader of Warham's register cannot but be struck by the sheer volume of activity concentrated into this one year. Registered actions for all other years of his long episcopate are dwarfed by comparison. Both the archbishop and his

commissaries set a cracking pace through Kent, visiting religious houses and parochial deaneries as well as prosecuting heretics. For example, between 9 September and 2 October 1511, Warham personally visited twenty-two religious foundations and a plethora of parishes in an area covering most of his diocese.⁷ His chancellor, Cuthbert Tunstal, accompanied him for most of these visits, and conducted several himself under the bishop's authority in the ensuing months. Moreover, between 28 April and 29 September that same year, Tunstal and his bishop had been engaged in the trial of at least thirty heretics, sitting in court for at least twenty-one days over that period. It needs to be emphasized that these are minimum figures. The only dates recorded in the register apply to the day of a heretic's first appearance in court and, sometimes, the date of a deposition. The many abjurations and other proceedings noted in the manuscript, at most of which the archbishop himself seems to have been present, are not dated. It is probably not going too far to suggest that a full two months or so of Warham's time went into these heresy proceedings, in the same period when he was preparing to carry out a full scale visitation; all this whilst he was Lord Chancellor in only the second and third years of the reign of a young King eager for war.

In all there are thirty-one people in addition to the bishop mentioned as being present at the Canterbury trials in some official capacity. Four of these acted solely as scribes or notaries, and do not directly concern us at this point.⁸ All except two of the remaining twenty-seven are mentioned as holding degrees. Most were Oxford men — some fifteen at least. Five were educated at Cambridge. Five more are listed as having degrees but cannot be traced to either university. Some four — including two of those most frequently present — received at least part of their education in Italy, with an additional clerk having traveled to Louvain for his international experience. Perhaps most remarkable of all, some eight of the Oxford men went to school with Warham — taking the Wyckhamist route from Winchester College to New College through the 1470s-90s. In other words, these were all highly educated clerics, several of whom were adherents of the most upto-date humanist scholarship taught in Italy and elsewhere, and many of whom had known each other and their patron for years.⁹

The list was not a random construction. Virtually all those mentioned owed some major part of their position and influence to the patronage of archbishop Warham; they were not merely senior clerks inherited from the previous administration.¹⁰ A remarkable number were in receipt of other income from benefices granted by the select list of bishops who, like Warham, were actively engaged in heresy prosecution in the period 1510-12. Some of them were present at heresy trials in those other dioceses as well. Stephen Thompson and Michael Kelly have shown that, in the administration of his diocese, William Warham greatly favored university educated clerics, and tended to choose those sympathetic to new ideas, who were efficient administrators, and who were willing to be resident, or at least to provide adequate deputies in their cures.¹¹ The story of Warham the prosecutor of the heretics of Kent in 1511-12 is thus completely enmeshed with the story of Warham the patron of scholar-administrators. Even if the archbishop himself could not be called a 'humanist scholar', the ideals and priorities of the Northern humanist movement had, by 1511, made a dramatic impact upon the administration of his diocese:¹² Bright young scholars, especially those of his own acquaintance from Oxford, populated the most lucrative cures of the diocese, and were the backbone of his heresy tribunals. These well patronized officials were thus the educated elite of the diocese, and the sheer number of senior diocesan officials involved in these proceedings is indicative of the seriousness with which the problem of heresy was regarded. However not all of the judges had direct links with Canterbury diocese. One additional category of commissary needs to be mentioned from the period when the court moved from Knoles to Lambeth Palace—other bishops and senior clerics. Both Bishops John Fisher of Rochester and Richard Nykke of Norwich were present in cases which led to burning, as was John Colet, the dean of St Paul's London.¹³ Overall, the commissaries and observers may be described as a well-educated, high-powered group. It was evident from day one that this was to be not a minor prosecution, but a major one.

The heresy proceedings in Kent ran from 30 April to mid-September 1511, winding down just as the diocesan visitation began to take over the pressure of business. Proceedings were

revived for a day in December, and again in June 1512, after Cuthbert Tunstal and Thomas Myllyng had completed their visitations of those parochial deaneries which Warham had not had time to inspect himself.¹⁴ The modern editors of both the visitation and the heresy proceedings have emphasized that the two processes were distinct, even unrelated.¹⁵ Why they have done so is unclear, but probably results from the mis-perception that, whilst heresy proceedings might sometimes follow visitations, the former is never a precedent for the latter. The concern of these scholars to separate out the two activities may be challenged by a comparison of the personnel present at the respective proceedings. One soon discovers that the names regularly coincide. Indeed there seems, from the lists of personnel alone, to be a strong case for arguing that the two processes were intimately related, part of a broader program of diocesan reform. Some nine of the heresy judges also figure in the visitation proceedings. Only two additional names — Andrew Benstead and Rowland Phillips — appear in the list of visitors, and then only as one-off preachers.¹⁶ Once one removes from the anti-Lollard list Fisher, Nykke and Colet, and other extra-diocesan observers, it becomes clear that the same group of senior diocesan officials was running both programs. Whilst this is perhaps to be expected — there were, after all, only so many officials — it would be remarkable indeed if these men did not see some connection between their activities in April-September 1511 and their activities from September 1511 to July 1512.

The new year, 1512, saw Warham's attention drawn away from his diocese and back towards Westminster as he began to prepare for the new Parliament and for the second Convocation of the reign. War — and the need to pay for it — was very much the focus of government attention. Yet Warham's diocesan work of the previous six months quickly became key background for his plans for Convocation. He was determined to remind the episcopal bench of the previous year's call for reform, holding up his own actions as a model of how others might now proceed. We have already made brief notice that the attack on

heresy had not been unique to Canterbury; several of those bishops closest to Warham had spent the year engaged in similar tasks. Yet the mounting of a full-scale diocesan reform program, which included the visiting of clergy and institutions as well as the prosecution of heretics, appears to have been Warham's unique response to the Convocation of 1510. In this new Convocation he hoped, in vain as it turned out, to inspire his colleagues on to greater action. It would have been impolitic in the extreme to berate his colleagues for their inaction whilst praising his own activity, and so he lit upon John Colet as a figure of sufficient *gravitas* to deliver the message for him.

John Fines, back in 1963, hinted at a relationship between Colet's sermon to the Canterbury Convocation and the contemporary prosecution of Lollard heretics.¹⁷ Noting that Bishop Geoffrey Blyth's prosecutions of Lollards in his diocese of Coventry and Lichfield occurred in the same year, Fines highlighted Colet's reference to heretics as 'men mad with maruelous folysshnes', using the quote as a catch-phrase to introduce his discussion of Blyth's Court Book and the stories of the heretics detailed therein. In 1988 Christopher Harper-Bill extended Fines' oblique suggestion that the sermon and the prosecution of heretics might be related, noting the contemporary heresy prosecutions throughout Canterbury province. Harper-Bill read Colet's text as being critical of episcopal actions of the previous year. He concentrated on the way Colet's sermon suggested that to reform the vices of the clergy was more important than to reform heretics, and from this extrapolated that Colet disapproved of the 1510-12 anti-heresy drives. However Harper-Bill, and many subsequent revisionists, have also argued that Colet's description of the decayed late medieval Church and its corrupt clergy and episcopate should not be taken too much at face value, but as a rhetorical device.¹⁸ It is indeed true that all is not as it might first seem in Colet's text. For example, if his portrayal of late medieval decay is erroneous, one might ask whether his apparent rejection of anti-heresy measures is also more rhetorical than real. Colet himself took part in these prosecutions, yet there is no sign of self-criticism when he enjoins his colleagues to turn from their concern with heresy to focus on clergy vice. Moreover Colet and many of the bishops

would have been well aware of Warham's other pre-Convocation activity, the diocesan visitation. When one combines the text of the sermon with the information that Colet was one of Warham's commissaries in the Kent trials and that Warham was in the process of expending considerable energy on clergy discipline in his diocese, it becomes clear that Colet was preaching the archbishop's party line. A deeper exploration of Colet's complex use of the term 'heresy' further reveals the degree to which his sermon was intimately related to the archbishop's actions in the previous twelve months.

Colet's sermon was delivered to Convocation at St Paul's, London, on 6 February 1512.¹⁹ In the preamble, he made it quite clear that he was speaking at the request of 'the most reuerent father and lorde the archebysshoppe, presydent of this councell'.²⁰ This was a signal that what followed had the archiepiscopal imprimatur. It was also a sign to the assembled prelates that his words were to be taken not as a criticism of the current actions of their 'presydent', but as a vindication of the policy of diocesan reform which many if not all would have realized had been occupying much of Warham's time over the previous six months.

Colet's theme was taken from Paul's Letter to the Romans: 'Be ye nat conformed to this worlde, but be you reformed in the newnes of your vnderstandynge, that ye may proue what is the good wyll of God, well pleasing and perfecte.'²¹ The published version of the sermon falls into two parts. The first part deals with 'confirmation' (conformity), and the second part with 'reformation'. The fact that Colet's text was taken from Romans has probably been one of the major reasons for post-Luther scholars latching onto his sermon as a 'precursor of Reform'. However both Colet's own commentaries on Romans and the content of this very sermon amply illustrate that his concern was with the unity of Christendom and the Church rather than the doctrine of justification.²² Indeed, in terms of later developments, it is probably more useful to see Colet's ideas as comparable to the Marian reform program of Cardinal Reginald Pole than to the programs of, say, Thomas Cromwell or Thomas Cranmer.²³

Colet's treatment of this same Romans text in his *Enarratio in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos* provides some interesting

contrasts with the 1512 text, as well as demonstrating that he had chosen one of his favorite texts for this sermon. The *Enarratio* discussion of chapter twelve of Paul's epistle takes a full quarter of the total commentary text, with a comparatively tiny amount of space given to the earlier theological section which would become so problematic for Martin Luther.²⁴ For Colet's commentary the major issues in Romans were unity and conformity, and these concepts still informed his outlook in 1512. In the *Enarratio* his discussion of chapter twelve made much of the metaphor of Christ's body being incomplete when one of the limbs is removed or diseased. By 1512, heretics and corrupt clerics both fell squarely into the category of diseased limbs.

In the 'confirmation' part of the 1512 sermon, Colet presented a four-fold argument on the corruption of the clergy. Their faults are described under the headings 'pride of lyfe', 'carnall concupiscence', 'couetousnes', and 'continuall secular occupation', which he also calls 'busynes'.²⁵ The sermon up to this point concerned itself exclusively with the vices of the clergy, and it was these vices which were held to have resulted in greater destruction than the persecution of the early church, or the barbarian invasions. Interestingly, and not accidentally, the barbarians were described as 'heretics'.²⁶ This was only the first use of the term, one of three different ways in which it would be employed in the ensuing three paragraphs.

By this first usage, Colet presented heretics as outsiders, as those who invade, as those who destroy order, and as those who capitalize on corruption — in the literal case the corruption of the tyrant emperors of Rome, in the metaphorical case the corruption of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Interestingly, the invasion of 'heretics' had a positive side — 'the church beyng shaken was made wyser and more cunning in holy writte'.²⁷ Was there perhaps a hint that the contemporary Church might have something to learn too, and that its response to contemporary heresy, if the right response, might strengthen it all the more? Lest the metaphor become too far extended, however, Colet was quick to point out that the postinvasion Church had not capitalized on its wisdom and cunning, but had allowed secular preoccupations to push it off center stage. Indeed, 'charite — was extincte. The whiche taken away, there

can nother wyse nor stronge church be in God.'²⁸ The tense here is important. Colet was still speaking of the past when he talked about the growth of secular pre-occupation, just as the 'heretic' invasions were in the past. Perhaps, then, the problem was not so universal in the present as it once was? Perhaps there had been some change for the better, and not all was gloom?

So, what of the present? In the very next paragraph Colet updated his argument to 'this tyme', and turned to 'contradiction of [ie. opposition by] the laye people'.²⁹ The spread of anticlericalism here noted by Colet has been much discussed in subsequent historiography, and Christopher Harper-Bill has dealt adequately with the flaws in earlier arguments.³⁰ Colet himself was concerned to down-play the extent to which the laity were causing trouble for the clergy, for his main point was that 'theyr [the laity's] contrarines hurteth nat vs so moche as the contrarines of our [the clergy's] euylly lyfe'.³¹ The extent to which the clergy were damaging themselves would soon be illustrated with stark rhetorical flourish, but first the point would be reinforced by reference to those commonly understood as heretics, those 'men mad with maruelous folysshenes' who were the Lollard communities currently under persecution. This was the second sense in which heresy was employed, and was the sense which would have been most familiar and comfortable to Colet's auditors. Only too well would the episcopal bench have realized that they were being well 'greued' by such persons, and that the current round of prosecutions was turning up an uncomfortably large number. 'But', says Colet, 'the heresies of them are not so pestilent and pernicious vnto vs and the people, as the euylly and wicked lyfe of pristes': thus the refrain which equated closely with the earlier comment on anti-clericalism. But then came the knock-out blow – 'the whiche [evil and wicked life of priests], if we beleue saynt Barnard, is a certeyn kynde of herese, and chiefe of all and most perillous'.³² One can well imagine even Archbishop Warham raising an eyebrow at this point. Capitalizing on what by now must have been the riveted attention of all present, Colet continued in a manner which would doubtless have continued to shock his audience, but perhaps allowed the archbishop to relax a little into his chair:

that same holy father [Bernard], in a certeyne conuocaion, preachynge vnto the pristes of his tyme, in a certayne sermon so he sayde by these wordes: "There be many catholyke and faithfull men in speakynge and preachynge, the whiche same men are heretykes in workyng. For that that heretikes do by euyll teachynge, that same do they throughe euyll exaample: they leade the people oute of the ryght way, and brynge them in to errour of lyfe. And so moche they are worse than heretyckes, howe moche they workes preuaile their wordes."³³

The issue here was that the rhetoric of the clergy must be matched by their practice, and that any attempt to correct errors of belief or lifestyle amongst the laity must be conducted by a clergy whose own lives reflected the purity which they sought in others. Colet was presenting a classic Christian reform program. He was concerned that the clergy should become a godly example to the people, in order that the people's vices — including anti-clericalism and heresy — might also be reformed. The reformatory challenge was not directed at doctrine but at practice. Those several bishops for whom efficiency, good government and the enforcement of conformity were second nature would, upon reflection, probably have been well pleased with what they had heard. After all, it vindicated their own actions and equated well with their own earlier rhetoric in 1510. The sermon was appropriately challenging and conformed well enough to the aspirations of the government to be published *cum priuilegio*. Colet's words exemplified the spirit of the new reign, and would have found favor with the power-brokers of church and state — bishops like Lord Chancellor and Archbishop William Warham, Lord Privy Seal Richard Fox, Richard Fitzjames of London, John Fisher of Rochester, Richard Nykke of Norwich and even one of Fox's proteges, hammer of heretics and soon to become Lord President of Wales — John Blyth of Coventry and Lichfield.³⁴ All of these has spent the previous year prosecuting Lollard heretics in their dioceses.

The second part of the sermon — 'of Reformation' — is in many respects merely a footnote on the quote from St Bernard. It provides a remedy and a way forward. It outlines, to all intents and purposes, a slightly refined and idealized version of Archbishop Warham's diocesan reform program, which he now evidently intended should become provincial. What needs to be noted, however, is that Warham's reform program had

concerned both practice (clerical standards) and belief (doctrinal deviations amongst both clergy and laity). Colet's sermon used the emotive rhetoric of heresy — an issue at the forefront of the minds of his hearers — to attempt to provoke them into action on the less straightforward part of the archbishop's program. In effect, he was reminding them of their own reformist zeal evident in the legislative program of 1510. It was no easy thing to mount a wholesale reform of the clergy of the province of Canterbury, as had been attested by the failure to act substantively on the 1510 program, and would be again by the fact that this new, perhaps rather strident, call to action met with only a limited response. The reformation of heretics had been a comparatively straightforward process, and one which produced tangible short-term rewards in the form of abjurations and, occasionally, burnings. There were, however, only so many heretics available, as was shown by the rapidity with which the Kent program had run its course. There was no great 'rise' in Lollardy to be countered at length. Thus, when the heretics ran out and the second part of the program failed to be taken up with the hoped-for gusto, Warham's program ground to a halt. The impact of Colet's sermon proved to be negligible. The sermon became an appendix to Warham's reformist aspirations rather than itself a prelude to further action. One cannot help but suspect that the archbishop would have been rather disappointed by the lack of concrete outcomes. Even as he was appointing Erasmus to the benefice of Aldington, the humanist and pro-humanist officers of his diocese and province were concluding both the diocesan visitation and their involvement with Lollard heretics, and getting back to the more mundane business of diocesan administration. The reformation of the diocese of Canterbury was at an end, and so was Warham's attempt to harness the impetus for reform first put forward in 1510, in the heat of the new reign of the 'humanist prince'.

Conclusion

Fifty years after these events John Foxe, the martyrologist and great English historian of heresy, included both Warham and Colet in his list of those who had hindered and persecuted the

Gospel in England.³⁵ The Lollards of Kent were listed among those who had suffered in the proto-Protestant cause. Ever since, historians have been happy enough with the description of Warham, but have tried to turn Colet into an English Erasmus — one of those whom Fredrich Seebohm once called 'The Oxford Reformers'.³⁶ One balance, however, Foxe was probably more correct. Colet was no 'forerunner of the Reformation', but an anti-heretic in the tradition of Lateran IV, who saw equal danger in clerical corruption and doctrinal heterodoxy. Moreover his sermon to Canterbury Convocation contained sentiments which would correspond almost exactly to the words of Julius II opening the Fifth Lateran Council only a few months later.³⁷ Colet's sermon was not an attack on the clergy of a corrupt Church, but a call to arms, completely in tune both with his archbishop and his Pope.

¹ Norman Tanner (ed.), *Kent Heresy Proceedings, 1511-12* (Maidestone, 1997), vol. 26, p. xv.

² See the table in John A. F. Thomson, *The Later Lollards, 1414-1520* (Oxford, 1965), p. 238.

³ p.251.

⁴ For relevant regional studies, see especially John F. Davis 'Heresy and Reformation in the south east of England, 1520-1559' (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968), and Davis, *Heresy and Reformation in the South East of England, 1520-1559* (London, 1983). Susan Brigden, *London and the Reformation* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 82-106, examines the relevant material for the capital. See also Margaret Aston, *Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion* (London, 1984); Anne Hudson, *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard history* (Oxford, 1988); Kantik Ghosh, *The Wycliffite Heresy. Authority and the Interpretation of Texts* (Cambridge, 2001).

⁵ It is salutary to note Alistair Fox's stinging critique of those scholars who see a humanist every time they see someone who 'both attended one of the universities and also enjoyed royal patronage.' The use of the term 'humanist' in this paper does not imply the sort of wide-ranging definition which Fox repudiates. But it is rather more inclusive than Fox's narrow version, which restricts the term to those who themselves engaged in humanist scholarly activity. The patrons of humanist scholarship might also be placed in the humanist camp. It was they, after all, who funded the projects, and without their support the entire Erasmian movement would have foundered. See Fox's introduction to Alistair Fox and John Guy, *Re-assessing the Henrician age: Humanism, Politics and Reform, 1500-1550* (Oxford, 1986), p. 11.

⁶ Christopher Harper-Bill, 'Dean Colet's Convocation Sermon and the Pre-Reformation Church in England', *History* 73 (1988): 206. Michael Kelly, 'Canterbury Jurisdiction and Influence during the Episcopate of William Warham, 1503-1532' (Cambridge: Unpublished PhD thesis, 1963), pp. 113-115, outlines the three surviving constitutions, on stipendiary chaplains, simony and clerical dress. Cf. A. T. Bannister, (ed.), *Register of Richard Mayew, Bishop of Hereford* (London, 1921), vol. 27, pp. 34-47, 103-109.

⁷ See the table in K. L. Wood2Legh, (ed.), *Kentish visitations of Archbishop William Warham and his Deputies, 1511-12* (Maidestone, 1984), vol. 24, Appendix II, pp. 297-8.

⁸ Their names are William Potkyn, David Cooper, Thomas Laurence and John Colman. See Tanner, *Kent heresy proceedings*, pp. xi-xii.

⁹ There were four main judges: Cuthbert Tunstal, Thomas Wells, Gabriel Sylvester, and Clement Browne. For Tunstal see A. B. Emden (ed.), *Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to AD 1500* (3 vols, Oxford, 1955-9), (hereafter *BRUO*), vol. 3, p. 1513; A. B. Emden (ed.), *Biographical register of the University of Cambridge to AD 1500* (Cambridge, 1963) (hereafter *BRUC*), pp. 597-8, 684; Charles Sturge, *Cuthbert Tunstal* (London, 1938), pp. 9, 13-16. For Wells see Peter G. Bietenholz (ed.), *Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation* (3 vols, Toronto, 1985-7), vol. 3, p. 436. For Sylvester see *BRUC*, pp. 573-684. For Browne see *BRUO*, vol. 1, pp. 283-4. John Thornden was present from day one, see E. B. Fryde and others, *Handbook of British chronology*, (3rd edn, London, 1986), p. 286. So too were Robert Woodward (see *BRUO*, vol. 3, p. 2085, and Kelly, 'Canterbury jurisdiction', p.

25), Robert Ashcome, John Piers, John Aylove, Thomas Baschurche (see *BRUO*, vol. 1, p. 126), and Robert Cooper (see *BRUC*, pp. 164-5). Those who joined later sittings included John Colet himself, Thomas Mylling, Thomas Woodington (see *BRUO*, vol. 3, p. 2083), Thomas Perte (see *BRUC*, p. 451), Bishop Richard Nykke, Bishop John Fisher, Peter Potkyn, John Esterfeld (see *BRUO*, vol. 1, p. 649), Robert Gosborne (see *BRUO*, vol. 2, pp. 79324), and Roger Domville (see *BRUO*, vol. 1, pp. 584-5).

¹⁰ Kelly, 'Canterbury jurisdiction', p. 20, notes that there was little continuity between the Canterbury curias of Morton and Deane and that of Warham.

¹¹ Stephen Thompson, 'The pastoral work of the English and Welsh Bishops, 1500-1558' (Oxford: unpublished D.Phil. thesis, 1984), pp. 30-31 and his table, at p. 28; Kelly, 'Canterbury Jurisdiction', pp. 16-19.

¹² Only one example of Warham's non-epistolary prose is known to be extant: Corpus Christi College Cambridge MS 114, 387. It is a fragment of a treatise on the Church. I am grateful to Prof Diarmaid MacCulloch for pointing me to this reference.

¹³ Fisher was present 10 May for the case of Edward Walker, and 12 May for the case of John Brown. Nykke was present on 19 May for John Brown and four others. Colet was present on 8 May for Edward Walker and John Brown.

¹⁴ These visitations take place in April 1512. See Wood-Legh, *Kentish Visitations*, pp. xi and ff.

¹⁵ Wood-Legh, *Kentish Visitations*, pp. xv, xix n. 22; Tanner, *Kent Heresy Proceedings*, p. xii.

¹⁶ Wood-Legh, *Kentish Visitations*, p. xii.

¹⁷ John Fines, 'Heresy trials in the diocese of Coventry and Lichfield, 1511-12', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 14 (1963): 160-174.

¹⁸ Harper-Bill, 'Convocation sermon', especially pp. 191-192.

¹⁹ See *Letters and Papers*, vol. 1, no. 1049. This traditional dating is correct. John Gleason's emphatic acceptance in *John Colet* (Berkeley, 1989), p. 181 of Michael Kelly's re-dating of the sermon to 1510, based on a series of absences in Colet's text, is convenient for Gleason's chronology of Colet's intellectual development, but does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Kelly argues from what the text does not say — there is no mention of war. ('Canterbury jurisdiction', p. 112). Yet, as is demonstrated below, internal evidence of what the text *does* say in relation to heresy makes the 1512 date virtually certain. Further weight is added by the bibliographic evidence. The title of the Pynson edition states that the sermon was *preached* (not published, as Kelly extrapolates) in 1511. It would have been preached on 6 February if at the second of the two convocations, and thus in 1511 by old dating. The sermon was printed in two known editions: *RSTC* 5545 for the earlier Pynson edition; 5550 for the later Berthelet edition, translated into English by Thomas Lupset. Note that Lupton's dating of the Berthelet edition to 1511 is almost certainly spurious. However the translation itself could well have been made in the period before 1515, when Lupset was a student at Colet's school at St Paul's. This English version is reprinted in J. H. Lupton, *Life of John Colet* (reprint, Connecticut, 1961, orig. London, 1909), pp. 293-304. Given its accessibility and that it is a quite faithful translation of the Latin original it has been thought most convenient to draw quotes directly from the Lupton edition. I am grateful to Mr Andrew Hope for discussion about the

date of this sermon, which helped to confirm my instinct that the old dating ought to stand.

²⁰ Lupton, *Life of Colet*, p. 294.

²¹ Ibid. See Romans 12: 2.

²² There are two extant commentaries on Romans by Colet. The first is *An Exposition of St Paul's Epistle to the Romans* ed. J. H. Lupton (reprint, Farnborough, 1965, orig. London, 1873), which treats the complete text of the epistle. The second is 'In Epistolam divi Pauli ad Romanos', in J. H. Lupton (ed.), *Joannis Coleti opuscula quaedam theologica: Letters to Radulphus on the Mosaic account of Creation, together with other treatises* (London, 1876), pp. 199-281, which is an incomplete commentary dealing with the initial five chapters only. This latter does not contain a discussion of Romans 12: 2.

²³ See Rex Pogson, 'Reginald Pole and the priorities of government in Mary Tudor's Church', *Historical Journal* 18 (1975): 3220. Cliff Davies makes a similar point in *Peace, Print and Protestantism, 1450-1585* (revised ed., London, 1995), pp. 135-36, but links Colet up with fifteenth-century reformers, seeing his sermon as more in the tradition of John Myrc than that of later preachers. Note too that Colet was preaching in the context of the reformist calls of the Fifth Lateran Council. A Commission for Silvestro Gigli, John Fisher, Thomas Docwra and Richard Kidderminster to represent England's interests at that council was dated only two days before Colet's sermon. BL MS Cotton Vitellius B.ii.10.

²⁴ In Lupton's 1873 edition, chapter twelve runs for 33 pages (pp. 58-90), whilst chapters three to five come to a combined total of a mere eight pages (pp. 5-12).

²⁵ Lupton, *Life of Colet*, pp. 295-298.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Harper Bill, 'Convocation sermon', *passim*.

³¹ Lupton, *Life of Colet*, p. 298.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., pp. 298-299.

³⁴ Cf. Harper2Bill, 'Convocation sermon', pp. 199-210.

³⁵ *The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe*, J. Pratt (ed.), (6 vols, London, 1877), vol. 4, pp. 181-82.

³⁶ Frederic Seebohm, *The Oxjbrd Reformers: John Colet, Erasmus and Thomas More: Being a History of their Fellow-Work* (London, 1887).

³⁷ See Nelson H. Minnich, *The Fifth Lateran Council (1512-17)* (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 163 and ff., esp. 165-167.

Chapter 8

Curtailing the Office of the Priest: Two Seventeenth-Century Views of the Causes and Functions of Heresy

Conal Condren

It is a corrosive half-truth that history is written by winning side. Celebratory histories are common enough, but if one recalls who wrote *The History of The Peloponnesian Wars*, or surveys the dominant historiography on indigenous peoples and European settlement in Australia, it is clear things are not so simple. Very often an impulse behind, or an unintended consequence of historical writing is to undermine the commonly accepted. History can as easily subvert as it can support, be as heretical as it can be orthodox. In all events, historical writing is apt to complicate the nostrums of orthodox, heterodox, winners and losers alike, for it proffers an unreliable resource to the future.

I propose to look at two attempts to understand the historical nature of heresy in seventeenth-century England: Hobbes's *Historical Narration Concerning Heresy*, and Archbishop John Sharp's writings on heresy's historical functions. In this way, I am bringing together a layman and a cleric, a philosopher and a theologian. Each used a sense of the past to challenge the power of accusations concerning heresy in the present, and thereby mew up the men of cloth to a more defined and reformed office. The juxtaposition of Hobbes and Sharp does not pretend to a complete picture of writings critical of the arbiters of heresy, but it gives a fair idea of the resourcefulness of debate on the eve of the first full-scale history of heresy by the tome-maister Gottfried Arnold.¹ I shall not be making claims as to the singularity or uniqueness of either Hobbes or Sharp. The arguments each presents are redolent with what we call the

medieval and have clear cross-cultural ramifications.

The arguments, however, are also highly suggestive of the future and so in conclusion, I want to draw out a sub-theme: namely, the capacity of theological dispute no matter how arcane it might seem now, to generate theories and conceptions that, once decontextualised, seem to anticipate important secularised theories. This has direct consequences for the very nature of intellectual and conceptual history, not least such histories addressed to heresy.

Discussions of heresy in seventeenth-century England take their place in the tense periodic struggle over the office of the priest. Traditionally and for Catholicism, the office of the priest, or more precisely the theologian, extended to the demarcation of heresy and thus to policing the bounds of the church. This understanding did not go unchallenged as the views of the Hussites and the relentless arguments of William of Ockham attest.² And nothing gave a greater impulse to a concentration of effort on the very idea of heresy and priestly office than the poverty controversy, the 'heresy of the fraticelli' that combusted, for some quite literally after the death of Francis of Assisi.³

The Reformation was not, then, lightning from a clear sky. From the early sixteenth century, heresy was debated in an increasingly clear context of secularisation in a precise sense of that term. For some Protestants, and ambivalently for the *spirituale* of Italy, religion was too important to be in the hands of priests; and this meant relieving them of the burdens of determining heresy. In the presbyterian model of ecclesiology, worked on assiduously in Scotland, the Low Countries and Geneva, lay elders were important as a means of clerical control; but what marks the English Reformation as opposed to its European and Scottish counterparts, is that it was not led by priests but by monarchs. From the beginning there was an incipient erasitanism which always threatened to restrict the office of the priest, making clerics functionaries of rule, or leaving them with the job of presenting a persona of piety to teach by example. It also gave a particularly iconic significance to The Emperor Constantine, and so an impulse towards a

historical specification of his significance as a Godly prince.

During the seventeenth century there were additionally economic pressures on the church requiring increased lay involvement. It is little wonder that priestly attempts to break forth and assert a larger office or, indeed, to keep an older sense of their sphere inviolate by claiming an authoritative voice in determining heresy, were viewed as popery. The seventeenth century thus sees an expansion of the range of the accusation of popery, from one levelled at Roman Catholics, to a more general 'priestcraft' — an accusation applied to any minister thought to be abusing office by interference. Heresy was a crucial litmus test.

Mark Goldie has argued that criticisms of popish heresy mongering harboured a concept of false consciousness, suggesting that the classic nineteenth-century Marxist theory of ideology had its origins in anti-popery, a theological origin, it seems for something very secular.⁴ In this context, heresy was held to be a means of control, maintaining a delusion about the world that served only the interests, not the office, of priests. A similar story could be told about the history of purgatory which was construed from Simon Fish in the 1530s as a myth of oppression and a delusion that aided only the interests of Rome.⁵ As Hobbes would remark, in Fish's idiom and applauding Cicero for once, so it is worth noting, in all such matters the question is *cui bono* whose interests does any doctrine serve.⁶

The notion of priests having an interest rather than fulfilling an antithetical office became very common in England and was itself an impulse to a secularising account of clerical identity over time. By the end of the seventeenth century, as Bishop Burnet remarked, 'priestcraft' was a most fashionable and indiscriminate word and all religious debates were construed as attempts to advance clerical interest.⁷

No one had been more attuned to this explanatory possibility than Thomas Hobbes. The *Historic, ecclesiastica* and the *Historical Narration Concerning Heresy and the punishment thereof* were published posthumously in 1680. They were almost certainly written much earlier, however, the *Historical Narration* being finished in the 1660s when Hobbes feared being tried for heresy, and recognised an unholy alliance of presbyterians and

episcopalians as his enemies.⁸ The two works, one in Latin verse, the other in English prose are broadly of a piece. They have their place late in the anti-clericalist trajectory which saw Hobbes diminishing the priestly office to a locus of pious advice concerning the next world, and an obedient demeanour to civil authority in this.⁹ The *Historia ecclesiastica* deals with the history of Christianity within the anti-Roman framework, decisively established by Marsilius of Padua, but mediated and elaborated by such writers as Paolo Sarpi, and Antonio de Dominis, in his Jacobean Protestant moment in counterpoint to the vision of the past reasserted by Cesare Baronio on behalf of the Counter-Reformation.¹⁰ The *Historical Narration* is more specific. As the work is little known, and as Martyn Thompson notes, has been unduly dismissed, it will bear a synopsis.¹¹

Hobbes begins crucially with the word: 'The word *heresy* is Greek'.¹² It signified without prejudice taking an opinion, and became important as a function of philosophical debate and the development of doctrinal schools — Platonists, Epicurians, Stoics and so on. Heresy was no disgrace then, he remarks, and 'the word heretic not in use at all'.¹³

But philosophy joined with primitive Christian piety. One result was an effective spread of Christianity because of the argumentative and proselytising capacities of philosophers. Another, however, was an intensification of philosophical dispute within the early church, making Christianity doctrinal. Ancient philosophy with all its dogmatism, was the ultimate Greek gift to Christianity. The words catholic and heretic were 'relative' terms, each giving meaning to the other, helping to define a church. So, he writes, heretic 'became a name and a name of disgrace, 'both together'.¹⁴

The prime, and hardly surprising site for this process was the problem of the Trinity. But matters were complicated greatly when Constantine became a Christian Emperor, and he was obliged to maintain peace within an already disputatious church. So he called a council of bishops to establish basic articles of faith at Nicea, 325, although Hobbes gives no dates. This was not, remarks Hobbes, in the pursuit of truth but, for the sake of peace. Whatever the bishops should decree, Constantine would 'cause to be observed'. It was 'a greater indifferency than would in these days be approved of. But so it

is in the history'.¹⁵ The unstated implication here, emphasised by its very absence, is that such great indifference, a maximised realm of *adiaphora* to be controlled by the sovereign is indeed something to be preferred to the situation 'in these days'. In this alone we can get some glimpse of why Hobbes irritated so many of his contemporaries; for despite all his claims to the contrary, he did not always argue with robust directness, but often by the insinuation of *aposiopesis*, implicating his reader though formally remaining distant from the desired inference. It is the dominant trope of the *Narration*.¹⁶ At any rate, Hobbes's Constantine would have approved of a statement attributed to President Eisenhower, 'This country has one religion and I don't care what it is'. Hobbes's Constantine is more immediately an idealised erastian sovereign in the English post-Reformation mould. This is a more positive image than is fashioned in the *Historia ecclesiastica*, where Constantine's location at the beginnings of the decline of the pristine Church is more overtly in the tradition that runs from Marsilius through to the very Hobbesian Edward Gibbon.¹⁷

Hobbes then digresses to point out how a number of the disputes were basically confusions over language. Most important, (to use modern jargon) was the reification of substances from predicate variables. From Aristotle and Plato, and the Greek Fathers who followed them, arose the confusion between 'the latitude of a word' and the identification of a substance, and on this basis grew 'the error of attributing to God a name, which is not the name of any substance at all, viz. *incorporeal*'.¹⁸ Hobbes reminds the reader of what he claims Constantine knew, that divinity is hidden from human understanding.¹⁹ The effect of the confusions he notes between honouring and predicating God — to be found tumbled in the meanings of words such as *phantasmata* and *entia*, and elucidated through his elementary lessons in nominalistic logic — is twofold. First, it intimates that the civil ruler Constantine is a better philosopher than his bishops, knowing his duty and the limits of human knowledge. Secondly the decontextualised lists, one debated word, doctrine or school solemnly placed after another, in a transmission, as Patricia Springborg has indicated, from minor philosophers to dim disciples, creates a sense of weasels fighting in a hole.²⁰ It was a satirical technique he had

used before, and complements his use of *aposiopesis*, for rather than leaving the reader to draw the inevitable conclusion, the context that makes sense of individual word-use is erased. Thus in *Leviathan*, he had diminished established religion in an exquisitely derisory sequence of the specimens priests had got people to worship from 'the unformed matter of the World' to 'a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke Deified'.²¹ It is the scientist's dismissive glance into a virtuoso's cabinet of curiosities.

But a rabbit also emerges from the Nicean credal hat. Heresy, claims Hobbes, was at least narrow in scope and heretic was a term applied only to those who contradicted the creed outright. But as Hobbes well knew, the problem with texts, however straightforward and minimalist they might seem, is that they generate controversy; it is always possible to see or invent an exploitable *différence*: one philosopher's answer is, as it were, another philosopher's problem. So, more arguments were generated and heresy became, or needed to become, a punishable crime.²² Thereafter he sketches several closely related changes, though with scant detail. When heresy became punishable, a socially significant power was given to the clergy — their office was extended into the sphere of civic authority. The function of the Nicean Creed changed from being an aid for peace and unity, to becoming a matter of truth, and on that basis, a necessary means towards salvation; heresy was no longer within the realms of *adiaphora*. This also enhanced the power of priests because they became in an enlarged sense mediators of the divine and putative possessors of truth. The range, or content of heresy was also increased and so it became a mighty tool.²³ Here we have 'popery' in a nutshell.

Hobbes then turns directly to England. Wycliffe and the Lollards suffered and, under Henrys IV and V, heresy became first an instrument of civil control then its punishment was expanded to include life and the property of the condemned heretic. Galileo, it is noted, was also troubled by priests with charges of heresy. In this respect, the true Reformation began only with Edward VI in whose reign laws for punishing heretics were abandoned.²⁴ Elizabeth then repealed not only the ecclesiastical laws of Mary, but all laws concerning the punishment of heretics. Heresy was put back in the hands of an

ecclesiastical High Commission and the range and punishment for it curtailed. The Protestant Prince was stepping back towards the Constantinian ideal.

The Civil Wars saw the heresy-hunting Presbyterians of Scotland and England attempt to expand their power again. To appease them the Elizabethan High Commission was abolished. But the war was lost; episcopacy and monarchy were themselves destroyed, and a Rump or Commonwealth set up. At this point, there is a curious elision in the text. Hobbes admits that any doctrine concerning religion could be spoken freely, remarking immediately that in the heat of war it was impossible to disturb the peace of the state, there being none.²⁵ So the dissolution of the Civil Wars (bad) is merged with the tolerance of doctrinal difference fostered by Cromwell's Commonwealth (nice and Hobbes prospered, but not a point to be dwelt upon during the Restoration). The reason for this effective and convenient collapse of the Commonwealth into the Civil Wars becomes apparent. At this time, states Hobbes, *Leviathan* was written and in that book, not a word against bishops or episcopacy (really?).²⁶ It was written only to defend the King's power. The conflation of Civil Wars and Commonwealth into an undifferentiated state of nature in the absence of the king is needed to massage Hobbes's own more complicated past.

Nevertheless, he writes, it has now pleased God to restore the monarchy. With this has come the restoration of bishops and forgiveness for the Presbyterians. Both are in parliament and have accused *Leviathan* of heresy.²⁷ Implicitly, this converts the reference to Galileo into a figura for the persecuted philosopher himself. Fierceness in doctrinal debate (the Greek legacy) overcomes all sense of law and Christian piety. In the accusation of heresy men forget the gentleness, patience and meekness St. Paul insisted were essential in trying to rid the obstinate of error, a point made also in *Leviathan*.²⁸

In this conclusion we are brought back to the beginning and the implications are clear: heresy is a function of doctrinal dispute and its history is of a word's conversion into a tool of priestly interest and an instrument of spleen. As with *Leviathan*, for all the ostensible focus on the evils of Catholicism, an accusatory shadow is implicitly cast over the priests of all existing cults. Because for Hobbes accusations of heresy and the

urge to punish it are at odds with true Christianity, the implications for the English clergy, gathering ominously around him and his philosophy, are underlined by their formal absence: the dogmatism they manifest has corrupted civic and ecclesiastical offices alike and remains a threat to true philosophy. Against a fundamentally Romish interest stand two authentic traditions: of Godly princes, for which we are given the schematic lineage of Constantine, Edward, Elizabeth and again it can only be inferred, hopefully Charles II;²⁹ and of philosophy, for which we are given Galileo and by tacit association Hobbes himself. This was a potent if over-confident appropriation of iconography to the cause of *Leviathan*.

The allusion to Galileo also gives a glimpse of what in other works had been Hobbes's open embrace of Lucian.³⁰ Despite on one occasion calling Lucian a heathen scoffer, (derisory labels applied to Hobbes), for the most part his allusions to Lucian are commendatory.³¹ This is something overlooked in discussions of Hobbes's philosophy, perhaps because orthodox histories of philosophy have long since excluded Lucian, as at best a sort of heretical satirist. Yet, as Hobbes recognised and applauded, central to Lucian's work had been the satire of Greek philosophical dogmatism, its intellectual triviality, disruptive nature and lack of gentleness, patience and meekness in dealing with error. The persecution of Galileo at the hands of the theological dogmatists of Rome, indicates how seriously the reader should take Lucianic insight into the consequences for philosophy. The overreaching priest is philosophy's enemy and a target fit for laterday Lucianic scorn. The true philosopher may rightly scoff at fools and charlatans.³²

As I have noted, Hobbes did not condescend to giving dates, but he did encourage what would now be seen as historiographical sophistication. For, the *Narration* shows the sort of sensitivity to change in continuity that is essential to any historiographical narrative. More importantly, the narrative structure needs to be placed within the context of Hobbes's theories of scientific explanation, finalised in *De corpore* (1655), which cover in similar fashion the empirical problems of natural and human history. A problematic empirical identity is broken into its parts and reassembled as an effect of identified causes. There can be in such a world, no real contingencies, but rather

contingent outcomes are the results of a collision of causal chains. In the *Narration*, the problematic identity is the status of the charge of heresy in the present, and the direction in which it may be moved. That charge is the combustible consequence of two chains of causation, of the Greek and Christian inheritance coming together in certain patterns of word use. But the point is certainly not modernly historicist. It is, rather, to defend his embattled *Leviathan* with which the *Narration* is at one in substance, as it is at one in method with *De corpore*. It also exhibits the same ambivalent attitude to the riches of Greek antiquity as was expressed in *Leviathan*. Nothing, Hobbes had notoriously remarked, had been so dearly bought as our knowledge of antiquity. We live with the destructive consequences of venerating a world of violence and dogmatism. As the *Narration* illustrates, physical and verbal abuse are two sides of the same ancient coinage.

In all this there is great continuity with Hobbes's earlier writings. In no way is this more obvious than in the conception of God which above all prohibits dogmatism. Hobbes's *apophatic* conception of God is found central to his early work, the 'Anti-White' of 1643 where it was used to define the limits of legitimate philosophy.³³ But in the *Narration*, it has a direct implication for the problem of heresy. If God is unknowable, he, it, being an improper topic for philosophical dispute, renders dogmatism dangerously absurd, a point made emphatically against Bishop Bramhall;³⁴ so, whatever else heresy concerns, it is not truth. That is the philosopher's business, a point that also distances Hobbes from William of Ockham, with whom in other respects he is eminently comparable.³⁵

The delineation of philosophy and the persona of the philosopher had been a long-term theme in Hobbes's work, entailing a re-definition of adjacent and even competing realms of intellectual endeavour. In this preoccupation, he was walking in the footsteps of Francis Bacon, who had explicitly traced the erroneous intermingling of philosophy and theology to Plato, another pre-Christian origin for the intellectual confusions of Christendom.³⁶ In this context, the striking absence in the *Narration* is any explicit consideration of theology and the intellectual responsibilities of the theologian; as truth is the business of the philosopher, it is difficult to see Hobbes as doing

anything less than evaporating theology as a discipline. Certainly, if honouring God is at the core of religion, the theologian can carry no more authority than the dancer.³⁷ But again this is an inference that is left to the reader. Much of the specific work of the philosopher (how superficially Wittgensteinian) involves letting the fly of perplexity out of the bottle by untangling words, exactly as Hobbes had done in the opening passages of the *Narration*. Constantine who knew heresy was not about truth is posited as a somewhat embattled model of a civil sovereign. Implicitly also, Hobbes depicts the priesthood as a potentially destructive incubus in any society, if it is not kept to its offices. Bishops, in particular, he had written in *Leviathan*, (in which not a word against them) were apt to forget that their powers were derivative of the civil pastor, 'and sliely slip off the Collar' of subjection to the damage of the commonwealth.³⁸ The narrative force is to present heresy as a principle and popish means to that aggrandising and destructive end.

Archbishop John Sharp would probably have been alarmed to find himself keeping company with Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* had been well burnt by the public hangman at the time he came to write. He was prepared to discuss heresy in terms of truth, but this does not mean that he and Hobbes disagreed over a shared concept. Whereas for Hobbes truth was a function of propositions, Sharp regarded it more as moral assurance. There was, however, a convergence of interests in sabotaging the social and moral force of accusations of heresy.

Sharp was a high churchman preferred during the reign of Catholic James II, but after the Revolution of 1689 became Archbishop of York, in 1691. The Church of England split and Sharp was excoriated by the departing Jacobites (non-jurors loyal to James) who considered him a turncoat, abandoning his true office for advantage. Accusations of apostasy and heresy turned the air blue with holy smoke from 1690-1710, and in 1715 there would be a serious Jacobite rising supported by disaffected non-jurors as well as Catholics.

Sharp, needless to say, saw things differently. He was that

unusual phenomenon, a high church latitudinarian who, like Hobbes, regarded the overextension of priestly office as itself a cause of the erosion of priestly authority. His being a latitudinarian should alert us to a consanguinity with Hobbes, for despite their often studied distance from him, Latitudinarians held to an erastianism in the interests of peace and were sensitive to what they saw as priestly meddling in civil affairs. For Sharp in particular, the cobbler should stick to his last and leave 'state points' to civil authority.³⁹ To this end, in a series of sermons and discourses, some undated and published posthumously, he argued that schism and heresy were too easily insisted upon, zealotry was at best an ambiguous virtue, and that the church should not only stay within its official sphere but within it maximise comprehension, debate and diversity of doctrine. The Gunpowder Plot was after all nothing if not a manifestation of zeal.⁴⁰

Hobbes would have approved. Indeed, like Hobbes, Sharp held that the very notion of heresy had been over-extended: many views might be questionable or erroneous without being heretical. Heresy, as we find in Hobbes's reading of the Nicean Creed, was properly either deliberate subversion of religion, or schism.⁴¹

His main point, however, is one the *Narration* did not confront, and if this makes Sharp less interesting on the aetiology of heresy, he is more so on its historical functions. What was the meaning and truth in St Paul's dictum (1.Cor. 11.19) that heresy was inevitable?⁴² This had been much observed during the seventeenth century, and was used to stiffen the sinews of the vigilantly orthodox. George Gillespie, for example, in working from the same Pauline *topos*, argued that heresy is inevitable because God knows all and had assigned a role for the Devil. The early Christians could take so much agreement for granted that they used terms loosely, but the works of the Devil have obliged reflection, discrimination and refinement of doctrine.⁴³ In short, the problem with heresy is that we haven't found enough of it yet. There is an incipient history in all this, a celebration of theological triumph, the very kind of history Hobbes's *Narration* was designed to combat.

Sharp's counter to the Gillespies of the world, whether presbyterian or high church like his *bete noir* the non-juror

George Hickes, was altogether more urbane. St. Paul, of course, was right. Heresy is historically inevitable. This was in part because humans were prone to error and dogmatism. But in this there was a positive value. Heresy shored up belief and defined the faithful.⁴⁴ Thus what Hobbes had seen as a matter of definition — heresy and catholic are relative terms — Sharp treats as an historico- sociological function. More than this, heresy helped stimulate the continuing search for truth and encouraged diligence in religion, an echo of arguments which, as Craig D'Alton has shown, go back in England to John Colet's Convocation Sermon of 1512.⁴⁵ For Sharp, however, heresy actually advanced truth.⁴⁶ It is a casually presented but carefully wrought paradox. Whatever is thought erroneous has a part in the search for truth and the testing of what is thought true.

There are, writes Sharp, so many disputes over truth that nothing might not be doubted, and in what seems like allusion to Carneades, or perhaps Montaigne, nothing has been beyond doubt.⁴⁷ Does this mean we cannot believe anything? No, he answers, a wide scattering of fake stones does not mean there are no jewels. More importantly, such doubt is hardly a basis on which we can live. We must therefore act on probable grounds and motives not the certainties that make us censorious, holy and pure.⁴⁸ The truth, then, is not a Hobbesian deductive certainty based on philosophic definitions and procedures; it is a balance of practical probabilities, appeal to which remains a useful means of diffusing accusations of heresy. In this there is also some sign of a shift in the model of mathematics thought best for human understanding, away from the deductivism of Galileo and Hobbes, towards the mathematics of empirical testing and statistical probability being pioneered by writers like Huygens, Petty and Arbuthnot.⁴⁹ Given the nature of truth, it is a pity, Sharp continues, that we can't all agree more and be less zealous in disagreement.⁵⁰ This sort of doctrine, had it been Restoration orthodoxy might have stopped Hobbes from writing his *Narration*. It expressed an attitude once found typically at the margins of the priesthood, in The *Engagement* theorist John Dury, now promoted to its apex.

What is really striking is how the commonplaces of latitudinarian strategic diffusion and de-escalation look with hindsight like the conceptual novelties later to be lauded in

philosophy. If Hobbes's *Narration* is suggestive of contemporary historiographical priorities, Sharp's argument sounds by turns like those developed by the Scottish school, especially Hume and Kames, on unintended consequence as the great outcome of focused human endeavour; and it is strikingly like Flume on academic scepticism. — Hume and Sharp both asked can we live as if such doctrines are true, and answered in the same way, no, which is a good enough reason to dismiss them. This in turn has a tintinabulation of Piersian pragmatism about it: if the meaning of a concept is the sum of its consequences and unqualified doubt has no consequence, it has no meaning. Most noticeably, however, Sharp's insistence on the value of heresy seems to anticipate J. S. Mill's dialectics of liberty. Other passages, on the adjacent topic of the conscience sound like the later Wittgenstein — forget definitions, to what ends do we use words in what sorts of discursive context.⁵¹ Precise and polished these points may be; but knowing the future might make it all seem tantalising but insufficiently developed. My having heard of Wittgenstein and Hume was, unfortunately, John Sharp's blunder; but he had bigger fish to fry than could swim in an academic history of philosophy.

And from all this I hazard the following conclusions: that paradoxically, we cannot write a historicist history of philosophy without first imagining away its present shape by, to use Hobbes's expression, an act of privation;⁵² and that much of what we see as anticipations of a later discursive form and the concepts defining its present shape, appear to be such because we have not been imaginative enough. Rather, they are likely to be the unintended and undwelt upon consequences of other endeavours. A little like Hobbes's early Church Fathers confusing words with substance, we isolate and reify these postulated intimations as concepts, in order to provide a principle of continuity around which a narrative can be sustained. But in doing so we actually erase the diverse discursive contexts that give concepts rather different identity and meaning. Concepts may not be the stable subjects of history, as the Lovejoyan history of ideas and *Begriffsgeschichte*

seem to presuppose, but rather the heuristic means of establishing a narrative largely on the evidence of semantics and pragmatics, systems of roughly stable meaning and patterns of word use.

The history of ideas has long viewed concepts as intellectual entities manifesting themselves in the material and textual domains. In this way, Arthur O. Lovejoy presented as a conceptual discovery what was an implausible invention — the same concept of creative divinity in Thomas Aquinas and the landscapes of Capability Brown. This did, however, allow him to get from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century in one bounding book. The intellectualist model is unpromising, though, when it comes to understanding such concepts as heresy, toleration and liberty, whose stability — such as it is — depends upon patterns of discourse in turn dependent on historical uses and purposes. There is indeed a degree of plausibility in viewing Sharp's comments on the value of heresy as part of a conceptual narrative of liberty reaching forward to Mill's dialectic of truth and error. This, however, I suspect is still myth-making, involving the projection of a shared concept of liberty, positive or negative, onto a world in which the word functioned rather differently.⁵³

Even if I am going too far in this scepticism about the historiographical status and fragility of conceptual continuity, we do at least need to look beyond what we call philosophy to fashion an adequate context, somewhat as Hobbes looked beyond Christianity to find heresy. His principle of continuity was not the concept, after all, but the Greek word and the different things it was used to accomplish. One of the places to look for the fullness of what we call philosophy is beyond to theology and religious apologetics, another is Lucianic satire. The word heresy and its capacity to intimate a future beyond religion may be a case in point.

¹ See in particular the contributions to this volume by Thomas Ahnert and Ian Hunter.

² See respectively Thomas Fudge and Takashi Shogimen in this volume.

³ Conal Condren, 'Rhetoric, Historiography and Political Theory: Some Aspects of the Poverty Controversy Reconsidered', *Journal of Religious History*, 14, (1984): 15-34.

⁴ Mark Goldie, 'Ideology', in T. Ball, J. Farr, and R. L. Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 266-91.

⁵ Stephen Greenblatt, *Hamlet in Purgatory*, (Princeton, 2001), ch. 1.

⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1651 ed. R. Tuck, (Cambridge, 1991), ch.47, p. 474.

⁷ Gilbert Burnet, *History of His Own Time*, (Oxford, 1823), vol. 4, p. 378.

⁸ Patricia Springborg, 'Hobbes on Religion' in Tom Sorell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 351-52. See also Martyn P. Thompson, 'Hobbes on Heresy', in John Christian Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For and Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration*, (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 77-100; and, on dating, Philip Milton, 'Hobbes, Heresy and Lord Arlington', *History of Political Thought*, 14, (1993): 501-46.

⁹ Conal Condren, 'Natura naturans: Natural Law and the Sovereign in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes', in Ian Hunter and David Saunders (eds), *Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 61-75.

¹⁰ Paolo Sarpi, *Historia del concilio tridentino*, 1619; Antonio de Dominis, *De respublica ecclesiastica*, 1617-22; Cesare Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1588-1607. For aspects of Marsilius's later significance see also Cary Nederman, in this volume.

¹¹ Thompson, 'Hobbes on Heresy', p. 79.

¹² Thomas Hobbes, *An Historical Narration Concerning Heresy and the Punishment Thereof* in *English Works*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, (London, 1840), vol. 4, p. 387.

¹³ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 388. See also Richard Vines, *The Authors, Nature and Danger of Haeresie*, 1647, p. 35.

¹⁴ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 390; Vines, *Haeresie*, pp. 34-6.

¹⁵ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 392.

¹⁶ I have suggested wrongly in the past that this trope was not typical of Hobbes's satiric style. See my *Thomas Hobbes* (New York, 2000), p. 149. Quentin Skinner found only one example of it in *Leviathan*, ch.47, 481. See his *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 419.

¹⁷ Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* is perhaps the last great presentation of the Marsilian vision of the Catholic Church as the corrupter of pure Christianity, but by the eighteenth century this had become a generalised and widely disseminated Protestant orthodoxy.

¹⁸ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, 398; cf. *An Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall* (1680), in Sir William Molesworth (ed.), *English Works* (London, 1840) vol. 4, pp. 305-9.

¹⁹ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 393.

²⁰ Springborg, 'Hobbes on Religion', pp. 351-2, for a succinct discussion.

²¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch.12, p. 79.

²² Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, pp. 398-400.

²³ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 402.

²⁴ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, pp. 403-5.

²⁵ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 407.

²⁶ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 407; cf. *Leviathan*, chs. 42, 44, 46.

²⁷ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 407.

²⁸ Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, pp. 40728; *Leviathan*, ch. 42, p. 351.

²⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 42, p. 381, for Constantine as supreme pastor of the Church.

³⁰ Springborg, 'Hobbes on Religion', p. 352 touches on this.

³¹ Cf. Hobbes, *An Answer to a Book*, p. 316 especially with *De corpore* (1655), in Sir William Molesworth (ed.) *Opera Latina* (London, 1845), vol. 1, l.ix.

³² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 46, pp. 461-2.

³³ Thomas Hobbes, *Critique du de Mundo de Thomas White*, (1643?) ed. Jacquot and Jones, (Paris, 1973).

³⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance* (1656) *English Works*, ed. Molesworth, vol. 5, pp. 442-3.

³⁵ See Takashi Shogimen in this volume.

³⁶ Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (1606), in Basil Montague (ed.), *Collected Works* (London, 1825), vol. 2, p. 49.

³⁷ '...and dancing is one kind of worship', Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 45, p. 457.

³⁸ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 42, p. 374. See also Hobbes to William Cavendish, 23 July-2 August, 1641, giving cautious approval to 'root and branch' reform, in Noel Malcolm (ed.), *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, (Oxford, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 120-21; and Thompson, 'Hobbes on Heresy', p. 88.

³⁹ Dr. John Sharp, *Farewell Sermon* (1691) in *Works*, (London, 1754), vol. 1, p. 246.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 229; Sharp, *Zeal for Religion* (November 5th Sermon, 1691), ibid., 267.

⁴¹ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', nd, ibid., vol. 6, p. 4.

⁴² Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', pp. 11-12.

⁴³ George Gillespie, *A Miscellany of Questions* (1649), pp. 16, 153-4, 15. See also Vines, *Haeresie*, 1-3; Thomas Hodges, *The Growth and Spreading of Haeresie*, 1647, p. 1, on the constant fight against the hydra head and pandora's box of heresy; and most notoriously Thomas Edwards, *Gangraena* 1646, discussed Sammy Basu, "'We are in Strange hands, and things are come to a strange passe': Argument and Rhetoric Against Heresy in Thomas Edwards's *Gangaena*", in Laursen, *Histories of Heresy*, pp. 11-32.

⁴⁴ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵ See Craig D'Alton, contribution to this volume.

⁴⁶ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', p. 19.

⁴⁸ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', pp. 19-20.

⁴⁹ See Richard Cumberland, *De legibus naturae* (1672) for a critique of Hobbes's reliance on deductive mathematical models. On Cumberland, see Jon

Parkin, *Richard Cumberland and Natural Law* (Woodbridge, 1999). Sharp had an interest in the new mathematics of probability.

⁵⁰ Sharp, 'Sermon on Heresy', pp. 23-4.

⁵¹ Sharp, 'Discourse on Conscience', nd, *Works*, vol. 2, pp. 172-3.

⁵² Hobbes, *De corpore*, 2.7.1.

⁵³ Conal Condren, 'Liberty of Office and its Defence in Seventeenth-Century Political Argument', *History of Political Thought*, 18/3 (1997): 460-82.

Chapter 9

Historicizing Heresy in the Early German Enlightenment: 'Orthodox' and 'Enthusiast' Variants

Thomas Ahnert

Introduction

In the early Enlightenment the history of the Christian church and its heresies was a common subject of controversy, in Germany as much as in the rest of Europe.¹ In the German territories the most famous publication on these questions was probably Gottfried Arnold's *Impartial History of the Church and its Heresies* (the *Unpartheyische Kirchen- and Ketzerhistorie*) of 1699. But there are many other examples ranging from the essays on the early church by the jurist and philosopher Christian Thomasius,² to the ecclesiastical histories of the theologians Joachim Lange³ or Johann Franz Budde,⁴ and Samuel Pufendorf's history of the papacy.⁵

An important reason for this interest in past heresies was the contemporary problem of religious dissent, which was as prominent in the Holy Roman Empire, as it was in other parts of Europe. In France official toleration of the Huguenots ended in 1685, with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In England the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 was followed by the increasing suppression of religious dissenters. In the German territories the years around 1700 were marked by the proliferation of millenarian religious sects and individuals, such as the 'enthusiastic' prophetesses in the duchy of Magdeburg, who became the subject of an official inquiry, chaired by the chancellor of the university of Halle, Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff.⁶ These radical dissenters on the fringe of Protestantism typically claimed to be immediately inspired by

God and appealed to the authority of their individual conscience, independently of the authority of the institutional church. Their hostility to established forms of religion made them appear to be direct successors to the radical Anabaptists of the early sixteenth century and raised fears of a renewal of the religious and civil unrest they had caused.⁷ Moreover, the legal status of these sects was uncertain. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which had ended the Thirty Years War, had guaranteed certain rights to the Empire's three main confessions, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist, but toleration did not extend automatically to other Christian congregations as well.⁸

It is not surprising, therefore, that, indirectly, histories of the church and its past heresies were often comments on 'heretical' sectarian movements in the present and on the appropriate response to them. This response could involve juristic considerations.⁹ But it also depended on theological argument and it is this theological context of early Enlightenment historiography, which will be the main focus of this chapter. In particular, I will be concerned with the relationship between religious enthusiasm and the early Enlightenment. Enthusiasm, it has been argued, was the 'anti-self of the Enlightenment.'¹⁰ But in the case of these ecclesiastical histories, there is not always a clear-cut opposition between enthusiasm and the Enlightenment. Almost everyone denied being an enthusiast, but among those criticized as enthusiasts by their contemporaries was the philosopher and jurist Christian Thomasius, who is also considered to be one of the first representatives of the Enlightenment in Germany. Enthusiasm during this period still was the 'anti-self' not so much of Enlightenment, but of theological orthodoxy.

The central theological question, which divided enthusiasts from orthodox, was the importance of doctrine as the foundation of religious faith. Orthodox theologians emphasized the role of doctrine, but, as critics of 'orthodoxy' argued, were uninterested in the sincerity with which doctrinal beliefs were held. Enthusiasts emphasized the sincerity of religious faith, but, so the orthodox argued, neglected the importance of doctrinal truth for faith and were ready to tolerate any doctrine, as long as belief in it was sincere. Both of these views are to some extent caricatures, which were used to attack opponents in

polemical debates around 1700. However, it is possible to identify a spectrum of beliefs, which lie between these two extremes of pure enthusiasm and literalist orthodoxy. The histories of heresy, which are examined in this chapter, illustrate the importance of this question of theological doctrine. The three authors, whose works will be discussed, are Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius and Joachim Lange. None of these were strictly orthodox. Thomasius was by many considered an enthusiast. Pufendorf was criticized as religiously heterodox, but was not regarded as an enthusiast. And finally, the Pietist Joachim Lange, although described as an enthusiast by more traditional theologians, claimed to be putting forward a middle way between the extremes of traditional orthodoxy and religious enthusiasm.

Although the historical interpretations of heresies provided by these three authors are similar in some ways, it is arguable that there are central differences between them, which are related to their views on the importance of doctrine in defining religious faith. In turning first to the jurist and philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) I will focus on his history of the papacy, which first appeared in 1679 and in which Pufendorf commented on the question of heresy in a historical perspective.¹¹

I. Heresy in Pufendorrs History of the Papacy

In this history of the papacy Pufendorf put forward an account of the growth of the 'papal monarchy' since the time of the early Christian church. Pufendorf has little to say about heresies directly in this work, because his interest is mainly in the usurpation of the powers of secular rulers by the papacy, rather than in the persecution of heretics. The origins of the papal monarchy, he writes, lie in the peculiar situation of the Christian church under the pagan emperors. Their hostility to Christianity forced the early church to administer itself to a large extent. Under the Christian emperors, however, as under any Christian orthodox ruler, this self-administration became superfluous, because the emperors were now willing to assume responsibility for certain external matters in the church. The

problem was that in late antiquity the clergy could not be removed from the administrative positions they had occupied under paganism. Pufendorf explained that the Christian emperors were 'new-comers' (*novitii*) and could not deprive the bishops of their power, especially as the bishops were supported by the majority of the population, which was now Christian. The first Christian emperors also failed to realize that the primitive church's direction of itself was only provisional and a result of the special circumstances under pagan rule.¹²

What proved to be particularly dangerous were the disciplinary powers Christians had exercised over their fellow believers under pagan rule. As Pufendorf wrote, 'this [power of discipline] can easily be abused and grow into a sort of political power, severely restricting the sovereign's powers.'¹³ Before Constantine extended toleration to the Empire's Christians they had preferred to settle their disputes by appealing to the arbitration of their bishop, because they did not want to acquire a reputation for litigiousness among the pagans and because pagan morality and laws were too lax by Christian standards. Nevertheless, the bishops at no point held coercive powers of jurisdiction over the members of their church. They therefore did not encroach on the rights of the pagan sovereign.¹⁴

By the time both the majority of the population and the Roman emperors had converted to Christianity the recourse to the authority of the bishops became superfluous, because now a sympathetic Christian emperor could enforce the stricter moral and legal standards desired by Christians. 'For this reason it [the authority of the bishops] became irrelevant, after all commonwealths together with their princes had embraced Christianity, because this sanctity of morals no longer served to shame the pagans, since after the disappearance of pagans all citizens aspired to the same purity in moral life'.¹⁵ The disciplinary practices of the bishops persisted, however, in the transition to Christian rule and became the foundation for the gradual usurpation of secular jurisdictional powers by the clergy.

Although Pufendorf does not discuss historical heresies in detail, his views on the nature and development of the papal monarchy are important for understanding his interpretation of heresy. In some cases Pufendorf praises those heretics who

resisted the papacy's pretensions to universal spiritual, and thereby temporal, power. Once he comments that before the Reformation only the Waldensians and the Hussites held out against the papacy's claims:¹⁶ Clearly, he considers these so-called heretics to be, in fact, witnesses of Christian truth. At the same time, however, he is very critical of other heresies, especially those that have come to light since the Reformation, such as the Anabaptists and the Socinians.¹⁷

The common characteristic of papalism and heresies such as Anabaptism and Socinianism, it seems, is their radical contempt, in different ways, for revealed doctrine. Papalists corrupt and distort Christian doctrine in order to use it to legitimate the clergy's pursuit of secular wealth and influence. Anabaptists abandon doctrinal orthodoxy in favour of a belief in direct divine inspiration. And Socinians falsely believe that revealed doctrine can be reduced to rational truths, which are accessible to human understanding. As Pufendorf observed, 'those, who adhere to the first [that is, Socinianism], do not consider the Christian doctrine other than a moral philosophy, and the latter [that is, the Anabaptists] scarce know what to believe themselves'.¹⁸

Pufendorf argued that doctrine, however, was essential to faith and that it could only be based on revelation, recorded in Scripture. The meaning of Scripture was self-evident to any impartial reader. Controversies over doctrine between the different confessions arose only from the passions and self-interest of their members. As Pufendorf wrote in the *Jus Feciale Divinum* (translated as *The Divine Feudal Law*) published posthumously in 1695, once Scripture was examined without these distractions, its meaning on any contested point would be obvious.¹⁹ All other differences of opinion, which could not be resolved by recourse to Scripture concerned only a few particular articles, which were not fundamental to faith. The study of revelation also had to be separated from philosophy. Human reason was inadequate to understand the mysteries of faith and the philosophical investigation of revealed truths could only lead into error and disagreement.²⁰

In his argument that religious belief required at least a core of revealed doctrines, Pufendorf was a traditional Lutheran.²¹ Heresies might be pseudo-heresies and labelled heretical only

because they deviated from the papal church. So-called heretics might actually be witnesses of truth and represent the true church. But this was not necessarily the case. Heresies might also be real deviations from religious orthodoxy and therefore jeopardize the chances for salvation, if they departed from the fundamental Christian doctrines revealed in Scripture.

H. Enthusiasm and the History of Heresy

There was, however, a separate strand of mystical or 'enthusiastic' historiography in the early Enlightenment, which was characterized by a very different attitude towards doctrinal truth. Arnold's *Kirchen-und Ketzerhistorie* is the best-known example of this, but it is possible to argue that even a philosopher such as Christian Thomasius, one of the central figures of the early German Enlightenment, is a representative. Both Arnold and Thomasius drew on earlier authors, such as Joachim Betkius (1601-1663) or Christian Hoburg (1607-1675).²² These authors adopted a more sceptical attitude towards doctrinal orthodoxy than either Pufendorf or the traditionalist Lutherans. Hoburg and Betkius emphasized the state of the believer's heart and his or her sincere love of God, rather than the particular doctrinal opinions which accompanied this love. Doctrinal orthodoxy was secondary, maybe even superfluous. They argued that doctrine itself, not just false doctrine was often a means of oppression by the established church. By designating particular doctrines as a sign of true faith even though these could be professed superficially by any hypocrite the established church turned doctrine into a coercive instrument, with which to justify disciplining its members.

The argument that doctrine itself, not just false doctrine, was an instrument of oppression by the clergy had important implications for the chronology of the church's corruption. Orthodox historians typically argued that the corruption of the church, which led to papalism, set in very gradually at some point under the early Christian emperors and culminated at a much later time. But this meant that the church under the early Christian emperors was not yet corrupt and that their

condemnation of heresies therefore was not necessarily an aberration. Orthodox historians thus could argue that the early church's suppression of heresies, such as Arianism in the fourth century, had been legitimate and praiseworthy and represented an example to be followed by the modern church.

Gottfried Arnold and other 'enthusiastic' historians, however, who believed that all condemnation of heterodoxy was a sign of oppression by an established church, had to shift the decline of faith to an earlier stage. If they did not do so, it became impossible to explain why particular heresies had been persecuted as early as the age of Constantine the Great. Christian Hoburg, for example, believed that the accession of Constantine already marked the corruption of the early church: 'when the pagan emperor [that is, Constantine] with his pagan mores, laws and regulations entered the kingdom of Christ, Christianity became a Babel'.²³ In Hoburg's *Der Teutsche Krieg*, in which he presented the Thirty Years War as a divine punishment for the pitiable state of Christian faith, an interlocutor expresses his surprise at Hoburg's critique of Constantine: 'I always thought that the church had, on the contrary been miserable until then [that is, the accession of Constantine]', because it suffered from the pagan persecutions.²⁴ Hoburg's response is that 'the church was never more miserable than when it began to be able to breathe more freely under Constantine.'²⁵ Betkius similarly traced the decline of the Christian church to the time when Christians were first granted toleration in the Roman Empire. The reason for this decline was that the persecutions had guaranteed the purity of the Christian congregations, whereas security under the Christian emperors opened the doors to opportunists and fair-weather converts, who would never have endured the trials of the pagan era.²⁶

The rise of Christianity to a state religion also was accompanied by the transformation of the primitive church's faith of the heart into the dead letter of doctrinal correctness, which became corrupt clergymen's means of exercising power over the laity. 'Heresy' became the pretext under which the representatives of doctrinal orthodoxy persecuted the true Christians, whose faith was defined by the state of their heart.

This account of the *invention* of the category of heresy in the early Christian church was shared by Christian Thomasius

(1655-1728), who is generally considered to be one of the most important figures of the early German Enlightenment.²⁷ Thomasius' description of the age of Constantine was very similar to that offered by authors such as Hoburg, Betkius and Arnold. In a journal, the *Observationes Selectae* of 1700, Thomasius published within one volume three historical investigations of the time and character of Constantine the Great. Thomasius' essays were directed against the orthodox Lutheran interpretation of Constantine's rule. To orthodox Lutherans Constantine was the outstanding example of a pious prince, under whose rule the Christian church flourished and heresies were corrected. Thomasius' opponent at the university of Leipzig, the orthodox theologian Johann Benedikt Carpzov, thus referred to Constantine as the paradigmatic godly prince.²⁸ Thomasius, however, denied that the Constantinian era was a positive example for the government of a Christian church. He did so by proving that the accounts of Constantine's life were probably biased²⁹ and that Constantine himself, in all likelihood, was an impious, even criminal tyrant, whose good deeds for the church were restricted to material endowments and building projects, which only corrupted the church further.³⁰ Moreover, Constantine was, if at all, not baptized as an orthodox Christian, but as an Arian.³¹

Thomasius adhered to this view until the end of his life. In a much later work, the *Historia contentionis inter imperium et sacerdotium* of 1722, he wrote that it was an error to believe that the state of the Christian church under Constantine had been 'florentissima', 'most flourishing'. The emperors had not been the pious nursing fathers of the church and ambitious priests had gained the upper hand well before the investiture contest in the reign of emperor Henry IV. Only gradually, Thomasius writes, did he himself recognize that the idealization of the church under the early emperors was a relic of 'political papism' (*Papatus politici*) and begin to search for the origins of clerical tyranny in the early church.³²

Like Arnold and other 'enthusiastic' historiographers of the early church, Thomasius believed that an original faith of the heart, which consisted in sincere love of God and one's neighbours, was already in the early church replaced by a *Hirnglaube*, a faith of the mind, obsessed with doctrinal

correctness. The origin of this corruption, Thomasius suggested, was an almost natural and inevitable decline from the purity of the apostolic age. In the time of Christ and the apostles saving faith was regarded as a work of the heart, rather than doctrinal orthodoxy. But already in the second century, even before the accession of Constantine, faith was gradually reduced to doctrines based on philosophical speculation and adopted by the intellect, without any regard to the purity of the believer's heart.³³ As in many other histories of the church, Greek philosophy and Jewish legalism were presented as the main culprits for this development.³⁴ Until the end of the apostolic age the sole criteria of faith were 'love of one's fellow brethren and the fruits of the spirit, that is, charity, joy, peace, lenity, benignity, goodness, faith, amiability and moderation'. There was no belief that this consisted in 'certain and determinate words, and, so to say, technical terms, but it was believed that it was sufficient to put forward the divine mysteries in any words whatsoever, as long as they did not detract from the spirit and its fruits'.³⁵ It was also impossible for humans to use anything other than metaphors when speaking of the divine mysteries, because these mysteries exceeded human comprehension and could not be described in literal expressions. There could therefore be no heresy in the sense of a divergent doctrine, because no definite conception of the divine mysteries existed and, in any case, was not necessary for faith.³⁶ Doctrine, and the definition of heresy as a deviation from doctrine, were part of 'priestcraft' and invented by the corrupt clergymen, who entered the church immediately from the end of the apostolic age onwards.

The similarities to Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* are apparent and it seems to me that Martin Pott's assessment of Thomasius' historiography as, in some sense, more 'rationalist' than Arnold's is difficult to defend.³⁷ There is, of course, also a different, more strictly juristic aspect to the question of heresy, which is not examined here.³⁸ But the theological views underpinning Thomasius' historical account are very close, if not identical to Arnold's. Arnold and Thomasius were also in contact with each other. In 1693 Thomasius published a piece by Arnold on the early Christians³⁹ and later praised Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* as the 'best and most useful book with the

exception of Holy Scripture'.⁴⁰

Like Thomasius, Arnold argued that the very attempt to establish an orthodox faith and enforce it was an excuse for the clergy to persecute those they considered their opponents. The suppression of so-called heresies was no more than another example of the suppression of the weaker by the stronger, which entered the world with Cain's murder of Abel.⁴¹ There was no self-evident Christian doctrine, especially in the first three centuries after Christ's death, when there was no agreement, which texts were to be included in the Bible, and no scriptural norm of faith existed.⁴² Faith at that time was measured in terms of the believer's spirituality. God's works and thoughts, moreover, were often too profound and mysterious to be grasped by human reason. The orthodoxy constructed by the 'I(ä.tzermeister', the 'masters of heresy', mixed fallible human reason, pagan philosophy and human authority with Christian religion.⁴³

Thomasius' views were regarded as 'enthusiastic' by more orthodox Lutherans and, like Arnold's, they were often associated with the views of the so-called 'Pietist' theologians in Halle. Modern commentators have also maintained this association.⁴⁴ The so-called 'Pietists', however, who generally were very reluctant to apply this description to themselves, were also unwilling to be associated with the theological views of Thomasius or Arnold. While the Halle theologians criticized traditional orthodoxy for neglecting the state of the heart in faith, they were also anxious to defend some kind of agreed doctrine against the perceived danger of enthusiasm. The history of the church written by one of their members, Joachim Lange, reflected this desire to mediate between the two extremes of 'literalist orthodoxy' and 'enthusiasm'.

III. Between Orthodoxy and Enthusiasm: Halle 'Pietism' and the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of Joachim Lange

The desire of the Halle theological faculty to defend its reputation of doctrinal orthodoxy becomes particularly clear in the disputes initiated by a critique of Pietism, the *Report of a*

Swedish Theologian on the Pietists. This was published by an orthodox theologian at the university of Greifswald, Johann Friedrich Mayer in 1706.⁴⁵ In it he accused the Halle theological faculty of 'enthusiasm'. Although Mayer published the *Report* anonymously, the identity of the author was soon known. Within a year both the Halle theological faculty and August Hermann Francke, founder of the orphanage in Glaucha near Halle, had produced replies, in which they claimed their own teachings to be impeccably orthodox. The Halle theologians rejected the term 'Pietists', saying that their opponents should consider the 'unspeakable harm which has been done with the phrase "Pietists"' and avoid it.⁴⁶ It was, moreover, unjust defamation to describe theologians such as Phillip Jakob Spener or Francke as the 'most terrible enthusiasts and seducers' of believers as their opponents did.⁴⁷

Mayer had accused the theologians in Halle of locating faith 'not in the intellect, but exclusively in the human will', because, he claimed, they did not consider Scripture to be God's word, denied the existence of heresy altogether and believed that salvation was possible without Christ's death on the cross, merely on the basis of holiness of life achieved through regeneration. Ultimately, he wrote, the Pietist theologians in Halle thus defended the sufficiency of holiness of life and of good works in attaining salvation, without any belief in specific doctrines. Therefore, whether they admitted it or not, they were enthusiasts.⁴⁸

The Halle theologians protested that all of the accusations were unfounded. They declared that they believed faith to be based on the adoption of certain doctrinal beliefs, though these beliefs had to be held sincerely to be effective, not professed hypocritically.⁴⁹ It was also true that sincere faith brought about a regeneration of the believer's nature and was reflected in a new purity of conduct, but this holiness of conduct was not sufficient for salvation, as 'enthusiasts' maintained.⁵⁰ Orthodox Lutheran doctrine, the Halle theologians argued, was based on Scripture, Christ was the necessary mediator between God and humans and good works by themselves did not contribute to salvation. One important reservation the Halle theologians did express was that the traditionalist theologians' emphasis on justification through faith alone was excessive and instilled a

false sense of security in those who merely professed their belief in the merit of Christ's death on the cross. By saying that good works were not necessary for salvation orthodox theologians led their congregations to believe that faith was not even necessarily accompanied by good works. Good works, the Halle theologians insisted, were not meritorious or efficacious with respect to salvation, but once a person had been truly converted he or she invariably performed good works, because sincere faith effected the moral regeneration of corrupt human nature.⁵¹

In his critique of the Tietists' Mayer often referred to Thomasius who, he wrote, 'had defended the cause of many main enthusiasts against the orthodox'.⁵² Also, together with his students Enno Brenneysen and Jakob Friedrich Ludovici, Thomasius had written in defence of doctrinal 'indifferentism' (that is, the belief that one doctrine was as good as another),⁵³ mocked doctrinal orthodoxy and asserted that pagans could be saved without believing in Christ.⁵⁴ He had maintained that salvation was a matter of the heart and did not depend on a belief in particular doctrines. Mayer also equated Thomasius' position with that of the Halle theological faculty.⁵⁵

The Halle theologians, however, tried to distance themselves from Thomasius' heterodoxy. They protested that Thomasius and his students were jurists, over whom the Halle theological faculty had no influence. Although some of the works by jurists which had offended the orthodox (such as Johann Samuel Stryck's *De Jure Sabbathi* of 1702) had been printed at the Halle orphanage's press, the Halle theological faculty was not responsible for them, because the orphanage press was also the university press. Censorship was a matter for the faculty whose member published the work, not the director of the orphanage, that is, August Hermann Francke, or the theological faculty.⁵⁶ In its defence the theological faculty could point to the fact that Justus Joachim Breithaupt, one of its professors, had criticized Thomasius' writings on heresy in 1697.⁵⁷ Breithaupt had argued that there could be criteria of true and false in questions of doctrine, contrary to Thomasius' opinions. While the divine mysteries themselves, Breithaupt wrote, might be incomprehensible, they had to be distinguished from the meaning of words used to describe them in Scripture, which could be understood. The words used in Scripture to describe

the divine mysteries conveyed an imperfect knowledge of them, but nevertheless a 'positive and truthful knowledge ... insofar as the Holy Ghost intends to produce it in us, according to humans' capacity to understand them.'⁵⁸

Evidently, the Halle theological faculty did not approve of Thomasius' religious views and was indignant at Mayer's attempt to associate Thomasius with them. In 1700 Francke and Breithaupt had together written a letter to Thomasius, in which they criticized him for encroaching on theological questions in his lectures on jurisprudence and of interpreting Scripture in public, which only trained theologians were permitted to do. Moreover, it was claimed that he ridiculed the statements of theologians and led his students into errors, so that they imitated him by not appearing in church, not going to confession and scorning the truths of salvificatory faith.⁵⁹

Emerging in this context, the church and heresy histories written by the Halle theologians attempted to mediate between the 'dead letter' orthodoxy of traditionalist Lutherans and the 'enthusiasm' of authors such as Thomasius, as we can see from the work of Joachim Lange (1670-1744), professor of theology in Halle. In a response to an anti-'Pietist' periodical, the *Unschuldige Nachrichten*, Lange drew a distinction between orthodoxy, which he wanted to retain, and 'pseudo-orthodoxy', which he attributed to his traditionalist opponents such as the theologian Samuel Schelwig or Johann Benedikt Carpzov.⁶⁰ Pseudo-orthodoxy stood for the over-emphasis on doctrine and the neglect of purity of life. But while Lange was sympathetic to the insistence on holiness of life, he was also careful to distance himself from the implication that doctrine was therefore secondary or even superfluous.⁶¹ In a piece on Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*, for example, Lange praised Arnold in very carefully qualified terms, saying that while Arnold's intentions were good, he had perhaps sometimes taken a too favourable view of some of the heresies in the early church.⁶²

Like Pufendorf Lange believed that some of the so-called heresies in the past were only declared to be heretical, because they had opposed papalism. Papalism had gradually emerged from the time of the first Christian emperors onwards. The reasons for this emergence were the negligence of the emperors as well as the increasing ambition of the bishops, which

expressed itself in a luxurious life-style and an increasingly hierarchical structure of ecclesiastical orders. Orthodox doctrine was also corrupted by the addition of articles based on human opinion rather than revelation. These new articles were usually decreed and pronounced as binding at church councils.⁶³ Lange did not, however, believe that doctrine itself was a sign of corruption. He maintains that orthodox doctrine is an essential part of Christian faith.⁶⁴ This is clear especially from Lange's account of some of the heresies in the early church, such as the Arians, Photinians and Nestorians, which he condemns explicitly as doctrinal aberrations.⁶⁵

Lange therefore did not believe, as Thomasius did, that heresy itself did not exist. But like Thomasius he did believe that the accusation of heresy was used as a pretext for persecution and, in any case, considered violence and force inappropriate means to convince others of their errors.⁶⁶ Further, religious error was not sufficient for heresy, which required, according to the traditional formula, that the heretic also refused obstinately and maliciously to accept the truth when it was presented to him or her. Lange implies that corrupt clergymen persecuted even those who had adopted false opinions in good faith.⁶⁷

Conclusion

The critique of corrupt clergymen and priestcraft may seem a typically enlightened preoccupation. However, in the case of Thomasius' approach to the history of heresy and the church, this critique was based on theological principles, which are closer to the 'enthusiastic', spiritualist religious beliefs on the radical fringe of Protestantism, than to the 'reasonable faith' usually associated with enlightened philosophers.⁶⁸ The distinguishing issue was the necessity of doctrine for faith. Whereas Thomasius was content to leave aside doctrine altogether as a part of faith, and regarded creeds as complicit in the persecution of heretics, Pufendorf and Lange insisted that doctrine was essential to faith. Both Pufendorf and Lange accepted that the church had been corrupted by an ambitious clergy; yet both also believed that it was not doctrine as such, which was this clergy's instrument of control, but the creation of

false doctrine. In the opinion of Thomasius and other 'enthusiastic' historians of heresy, however, the clergy's most important means of control over the laity was doctrine as such and the false belief in its necessity for religious faith, in the contemporary church as much as in the past.⁶⁹

¹ For a discussion of ecclesiastical history in England in this period, cf. J. Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken* (Cambridge, 1992). For a general discussion of ecclesiastical history, cf. the classical study by P. Hazard, *The European Mind, 1680-1715* (London, 1953).

² Christian Thomasius, 'Fides Scriptorum Vitae Constantini Magni', in: *Observationes selectae ad rem literariam spectantes*, vol. 1, Observatio XXII (Halle, 1700); Thomasius, 'Fabulae de Parentibus Constantini Magni', *ibid.*, Observatio XXIII; Thomasius, 'Tabulae de Constantino Magno et Potissimum de Ejus Christianismo', *ibid.*, Observatio XXIV; Thomasius, 'Tundamenta Historica in Expositione Tituli Codicis de Summa Trinitate etc. Supponenda' in: *Observationes selectae*, vol. 2, Observatio VIII (Halle, 1701); Thomasius, 'Ad Legem I. C. de Summa Trinitate', *ibid.*, Observatio XVIII; Thomasius, 'Ad Legem II. C. de Summa Trinitate', *ibid.*, Observatio XIX; Thomasius, 'De Arianismo' in: *Additamentum ad Observationum selectarum ad rem litterariam spectantium tomus decem*, Observatio VII (Halle, 1705).

³ J. Lange, *Historia Ecclesiastica, a Mundo Conditio* (Halle, 1718).

⁴ J. F. Budde, *Isagoge Historico-Theologica ad Theologiam Universam Singulasque ejus Partes* (2 vols, Leipzig, 1727).

⁵ Later included in his *Einleitung zu der Historie der Vornehmsten Staaten in Europa* and also published in an edition by Christian Thomasius as *Politische Betrachtung der Geistlichen Monarchie des Stuhls zu Rom mit Anmerkungen zum Gebrauch des Thomasischen Auditorii* (Halle, 1714).

⁶ H. Schneider, 'Der radikale Pietismus im 17. Jahrhundert', in M. Brecht (ed.), *Der Pietismus vom siebzehnten bis zum frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 400-401.

⁷ On these radical sects cf. B. Hoffmann, *Radikalpietismus um 1700* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996); and Schneider, 'Der radikale Pietismus', pp. 361-439.

⁸ Joachim Whaley, 'A tolerant society? Religious toleration and the Holy Roman Empire, 1648-1806', in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds), *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 175-195.

⁹ Cf. the contribution by Ian Hunter to this volume.

¹⁰ On the opposition between enthusiasm and Enlightenment cf. J. G. A. Pocock, 'Enthusiasm: The Anti-Self of the Enlightenment', in L. Klein and A. J. La Vopa (eds), *Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650-1850* (San Marino, 1998), pp. 7-28; M. Heyd, 'Be Sober and Reasonable'. *The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries* (Leiden, 1995).

¹¹ Cf. note 4.

¹² Samuel Pufendorf, *Politische Betrachtung der Geistlichen Monarchie* (Halle, 1714), pp. 60-61.

¹³ '[I]sta [sc.: disciplina] facile in abusum trahi, & in genus aliquod imperii invalescere potest, non sine insigni summorum imperantium praejudicio' in *De habitu religionis Christianae ad vitam civilem* (Bremen, 1687), §47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ 'Ea causa, postquam universae civitates ipsis cum Principibus sacra Christiana cuncta amplexae, hactenus expiravit, quod non amplius ista morum sanctimonia ad pudorem ethnicis incutiendum faceret, cum hisce exterminatis jam omnes cives ad parem morum puritatem contenderunt' (*ibid.*).

¹⁶ Samuel Pufendorf, *An Introduction to the History of Europe* (London, 1697),

p. 398.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 442.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 442-43.

¹⁹ Samuel Pufendorf, *Ius Feudale Divinum* (Lübeck, 1695), §XLIII. For a modern edition, see Samuel Pufendorf, *The Divine Feudal Law: Or, Covenants with Mankind, Represented*, ed. S. Zurbuchen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).

²⁰ Ibid., §XLVI.

²¹ Cf. on this Detlef Döring, *Pufendorf-Studien* (Berlin, 1992).

²² Cf. M. Kruse, *Speners Kritik am landesherrlichen Kirchenregiment and ihre Vorgeschichte* (Witten, 1972), pp. 159-60 and 172.

²³ 'Als aber der Heydnische Kayser mit seinen Heydnischen Sitten/ Gesetzen und Ordnungen in das Reich Christi kam/ da ward aus der Christenheit ein Babel' (quoted in *ibid.*, p. 159).

²⁴ 'Ich habe aber immer gemeinet, daB es bis dahin gerade elend gegangen' (*ibid.*).

²⁵ 'Es ist der Kirche nie aerger gegangen, als da sie unter Konstantine Luft bekam' (*ibid.*, pp. 159-60).

²⁶ Ibid., p. 172.

²⁷ Recent literature on Thomasius includes Frank Grunert, *Normbegründung und politische Legitimität* (Tübingen, 2000); T. J. Hochstrasser, *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 2000); Ian Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, 2001); Friedrich Vollhardt, *Selbstliebe und Geselligkeit* (Tübingen, 2001). A classical study still is Werner Schneiders, *Naturrecht and Liebesethik* (Hildesheim, 1971). For a general introduction, cf. Peter Schröder, *Christian Thomasius zur Einführung* (Hamburg, 1999). I am currently preparing a book on Thomasius and the religious Enlightenment.

²⁸ J. B. Carpzov, *De Jure decidendi controversias theologicas* (Leipzig, 1695), then. VII, §III.

²⁹ Christian Thomasius, *Observationes selectae ad rem literariam spectantes* (Halle, 1700), tom. I, Obs. XXII. These will be referred to as *Observationes*.

³⁰ Ibid., torn. II, Obs. VIII, §LI-LIII.

³¹ Ibid., torn. I, Obs. XXIV, §XXXVII ff.

³² Christian Thomasius, *Historia contentionis inter imperium et sacerdotium* (Halle, 1722), preface.

³³ Ibid., chapter II, §8; *Observationes*, torn. II, Obs. VIII, §VIII.

³⁴ Cf. for example F. Spanheim, *Summa Historiae Ecclesiasticae* (Leiden, 1689), p. 153.

³⁵ '[V]erbis certis ac determinatis, & ut ita dicam, terminis technicis, sed sufficere quibuscunque verbis exponere mysteria, modo non abducerent a spiritu & fructibus ejus' (*Observationes*, torn. II, Obs. VIII, §VIII).

³⁶ Christian Thomasius, *Dissertatio ad Petri Poirleti Libros de Eruditione* (Frankfurt, 1694), §19; cf. also Thomas Ahnert, 'The Prince and the Church in the Thought of Christian Thomasius', in Ian Hunter and David Saunders (eds), *Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 91-105.

³⁷ Martin Pott, 'Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold', in D. Blaufuß and F. Niewöhner (eds.), *Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714)* (Wiesbaden, 1995), pp.

³⁸ On this, cf. Ian Hunter's contribution to this volume.

³⁹ This is to be found in Thomasius' *Historie der Weiflheit und Thorheit*, vol. 3 (Halle, 1693).

⁴⁰ 'Beste und nuetzlichste Buch nach der Heiligen Schrift' (quoted in Martin Pott, 'Christian Thomasius and Gottfried Arnold', p. 255).

⁴¹ Gottfried Arnold, *Werke in Auswahl*, ed. E. Seeberg (Munich, 1934), p. 44.

⁴² Ibid., p. 48.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 42.

⁴⁴ Schneiders in his *Naturrecht and Liebesethik*, [chapter 5](#), speaks of a 'Pietist crisis' in Thomasius' thought in the 1690s, from which he recovers around 1700.

⁴⁵ Johann Friedrich Mayer, *Eines Schwedischen Theologi Kurtzer Bericht von Pietisten Samt denen Königlichen Schwedischen EDICTEN wider dieselben* (Leipzig, 1706).

⁴⁶ [W] as fuer unbeschreiblich vieles Unheil aus der Redens-Art/ Pietisten/ herkomme'. *Der Theologischen Facultät auf der Universität zu Halle Verantwortung gegen Hn. D. Joh. Fried. Mayers/ Professoris Theologi auf der Universität Greiffswald/ enter dem Namen eines Schwedischen Theologi herausgegebenen so genannten kurtzen Bericht von Pietisten* (Halle, 1707), p. 23.

⁴⁷ '[D]ie allergeulichsten Schwaermer and Verfuehrer' (ibid., p. 22).

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 56, 81-82, 100, 103.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

⁵¹ Cf. for example the statement by the Pietist Paul Anton that '[f]ides viva non est absque bonorum operum studio; sed justificat oram [= coram?] Deo absque nostrorum operum subsidio'. Paul Anton, *Disputatio Hallensis prima de harmonia fidei quae justificat, & fidei, quatenus justificare dicitur* (Halle, 1702), p. 48.

⁵² 'Wie dem auch gedachter Thomasius in seiner Historia Sapientiae & Stultitiae vieler Haupt-Schwaermer Sache wieder die Rechtgläubigen vertheidiget hat'. *Der Theologischen Facultät auf der Universität zu Halle Verantwortung*, p. 82.

⁵³ Johann Friedrich Ludovici had published an *Untersuchung des Indifferentismi Religionum* (Glück-Stadt, 1700) under the pseudonym Eric Fridlibius or 'Eric Peacelove'.

⁵⁴ *Der Theologischen Facultät cuff der Universität zu Halle Verantwortung*, p. 87.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 139.

⁵⁷ J. J. Breithaupt, *Observationes Theologicae de Haeresi juxta S. Scripturae Sensum* (Halle, 1697).

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁹ Carl Hinrichs, *Preujentum und Pietismus* (Göttingen, 1971), pp. 378-379.

⁶⁰ J. Lange, *Auffrichtige Nachricht von der Unrichtigkeit der so genannten Unschuldigen Nachrichten...Erste Ordnung Auff das Jahr 1701* (Leipzig, 1707), p. 7.

⁶¹ Ibid., 'Vorbericht'.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 18-21.

⁶³ Cf. for example J. Lange, *Historia Ecclesiastica a Mundo Conditio* (Halle, 1718), pp. 481-483.

⁶⁴ For Lange's definition of heresy, cf. *ibid.*, p. 386.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 500-506 and 571-580.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 512, 580, 655.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 512.

⁶⁸ D. Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought* (London, 2000).

⁶⁹ A first version of this chapter was presented at the conference on 'Histories of Heresy', organized by the Centre for the History of European Discourses at the University of Queensland in July 2003. I am grateful to Ian Hunter, Chris Laursen and Cary Nederman for inviting me to contribute to it, and for participants' comments.

Chapter 10

What is Impartiality? Arnold on Spinoza, Mosheim on Servetus

John Christian Laursen

Introduction

There have always been many strategies for writing a history of heresy. This paper explores two exemplary but contrasting cases from the beginning and middle of the eighteenth century. The first is Gottfried Arnold's treatment of Spinoza in his *Impartial History of Church and Heretics* (1699),¹ and the second is Johann Lorenz Mosheim's treatment of Servetus in his *Attempt at an Impartial and Thorough History of Heretics* (1748).²

Both of these professed to be impartial (or, perhaps, nonpartisan). We do not know how many of their contemporaries accepted this claim, but nowadays many people believe that there is no such thing as impartiality, no 'view from nowhere'. Hence assertions of impartiality are little more than a rhetorical tactic for claiming the moral high ground and setting the terms of debate from a privileged position. But precisely because claims to impartiality do come from somewhere, it is worth exploring exactly where any particular claim comes from. In a nutshell, the first of our authors, Arnold, uses the 'I'm above it all' strategy, according to which the only impartial position is not to play the game, not to have a church or concern oneself with anyone's heresy. Mosheim, on the other hand, uses the 'I'm in the middle' strategy, positioning himself as privileged referee among contending extremists.

Arnold and Mosheim had many things in common. Both were Protestants, both were writing in German, and both belonged loosely to the Enlightenment. Both were part of what has been described as the project of 'reclaiming theology for the

Enlightenment'.³ This chapter will focus on their differences rather than on their commonalities.

Servetus and Spinoza stand out as early modern heretics because in the first instance they were heretics both to the mainstream and to the fringe or quasi-heretical groups to which they belonged. The heresy of Michael Servetus was anti-Trinitarianism, expressed in his *Christianismi restitutio* of 1552-3, and for that reason he was condemned by Catholic orthodoxy. But he was actually put to death at the instigation of Calvin, a fellow Reformer or Protestant in the fight against Catholicism. What made his case stand out was that the Reformers had always protested the iniquities of Catholic persecution, especially the Inquisition. Putting Servetus to death could be thrown back at the Protestants as a sort of original sin or fall from innocence, a complicity with and moral equivalency to their persecutors. After this experience they could be asked, 'Are you any better than the Catholics?'

Baruch or Benedict Spinoza was born and raised a Jew, and thus an outsider to Christians, but he was also excommunicated from the Jewish community in Amsterdam in 1656, apparently for heresies. He made a living as a lens grinder and his first book introduced Cartesianism, considered a heresy by many, to the Netherlands. His political sympathies were with Johan De Witt, killed by a mob in 1672, so he learned to keep a low profile. His followers in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were vilified as atheists and blasphemers.⁴

1. Arnold, Piety, and Spinoza

Gottfried Arnold's famous *Impartial History* begins (1-11) with dozens of rhetorical questions which, if we boil them all down to one, would read something like this: isn't it true that clerical ambition, partiality, selfishness, and hate has led to the unjust persecution, torture, and cruel deaths of infinite numbers of innocent and pious people accused of heresy? The questions are answered by quotations from a good number of famous authors, featuring the likes of Erasmus, Grotius, Camerarius, Pufendorf, Andreae, and Cunaeus, to the effect that, yes, the foregoing is true (12-26). The cumulative effect of all of this is a strong sense

that no clergyman was ever innocent, and that no heretic was ever guilty.

Arnold wrote from the perspective of what is known as Pietism.⁵ The standard against which all are measured is pure and Biblical faith, where actions speak volumes and words are almost insignificant as a force for the good but all too often used by the bad to convict the truly pious. Almost by definition, any articulated theology will be found wanting when compared to Christian love. Arnold's 'impartiality' is constructed from a personal, mystical position outside of any organized religion. It was so personal that there is no indication that it aimed at a general reformation of society, but rather at withdrawal.⁶

His chief strategy was to show that all of official religion is divided up into sects, and every clergyman writing for a sect is a partisan. In this vision, the only ones who are above it all are Arnold and his Pietist allies, who could imply that they are 'impartial' and nonpartisan precisely because they had no organized sect. This was antinomianism with a vengeance. 'Impartiality' means belonging to no party and supporting no clergy.

'Impartiality' as an anticlerical strategy was anything but gentle. It was 'a plague on all your houses', calling all clergymen evil, bloodthirsty, and godless. As Peter Reill nicely put it, Arnold's 'criticism was so intense that it surpassed anything written by the most thoroughly anticlerical eighteenth-century philosophe'.⁷ All clergymen are engaged in the wrong enterprise, and should be minding their own business. This was ingenious as a strategy, but vulnerable to the criticism of Helmstedt philosophy professor Ernst Salomon Cyprian, who accused Arnold of being partisan precisely because of his theology in the aptly titled 'Judgment of Arnold's Religion, from which Partisanship Must Necessarily Spring'.⁸ After all, even the claim that there should be no clergy and no organized church is still a theological claim. All facts are theory-laden, so, willy-nilly, Arnold had a theology, even if it was mostly an anti-theology. Arnold's was the partisanship of the religiously nonpartisan, the sectarianism of the dogmatic anti-sectarian. It is no surprise that more orthodox Lutheran clergy and theologians did not find it impartial or nonsectarian, but understood its direct attack on their very existence. Naturally, they accused Arnold of, among

other things, the heresy of Spinozism.⁹

Arnold's work was very influential in the development of eighteenth-century Pietism, virtually capturing church history for the Pietists and requiring later writers to situate themselves in relation to him. It has been called a 'Copernican Revolution' in the historiography of heresy.¹⁰ Christian Thomasius borrowed from him on many points, although he later distanced himself from Pietism and Arnold's 'enthusiasm'.¹¹ The structure of Arnold's argument was also very attractive to many later misfits and would-be rebels, no matter what their religious sympathies. Goethe used Arnold's pattern to cast his own *Philosophy of Color* of 18xx as a brave heresy unjustly persecuted by Newtonian orthodoxy.¹²

Arnold's treatment of Spinoza is a good test case partly because Spinoza was so important to so many heresy-mongers of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is clear that Spinoza was not very important to Arnold, since only seven out of the 2,690 quarto pages of the 1729 edition deal with Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, and Spinoza together. Arnold is about to close chapter 16 of the 17th book of the second Part, 'On the atheists and also on the so-called naturalists, deists, and latitudinarians of this century', when he writes, 'I would close this history here, if I did not find it necessary to add on the most necessary points from the three famous writers Hobbes, Herbert, and Spinoza, so that the history of the atheism of this century might not seem incomplete' (1082). Hobbes is accused of atheism by theologians because he criticized the clergy, but he really just wanted to bring unity to religion (1082-3). His friends include Bacon, Galileo, Mersenne, Gassendi, Descartes, Selden, Harvey, Davenant, 'and many others'. Of these, only Descartes appears in Arnold's 'Index of important names and things'¹³ - but the rest are not mentioned elsewhere in Arnold's book, presumably because they are not a significant part of church or heresy history. Philosophy — natural and moral — is its own little world, of little importance to Arnold and other Pietists. 'Impartiality' also means staying out of philosophical battles, presumably because they are insignificant because unrelated to salvation.

Like Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury was accused of atheism by the clergy because they felt threatened by his ideas. He went too

far because he jettisoned Christ from his vision of a unifying minimal religion, and Arnold does not hesitate to call this a 'miserable and perverted' means of achieving unity (1084). But, crucially, even this could be blamed on the clergy. The cause of such atheism or naturalism, Arnold says, is the criminal condition of the clergy, which could drive anyone to doubt the truths of Christian teaching (1084). Arnold would repeat this type of defence by deflection of blame when he dealt with Spinoza.

Arnold's diagnosis of Spinoza was that he was driven by principles that he had absorbed from his Jewish upbringing (1085). He was often accused of atheism, in spite of the fact that even his critics admitted that he never explicitly denied the existence of God (1085). In fact, of course, he had made everything God, by equating God with nature (1086). He trusted too much in reason (1086). And although he said some nice things about Jesus, he did not really experience Jesus's glory (1087). This was perhaps his chief failing, and that of any theologian or philosopher who tried to play the game of mathematical demonstrations in a realm where personal experience is what counts.

Arnold surveys many refutations of Spinoza, concluding that if he did actually become an atheist, it was for the same reason as Herbert. The perverted teaching and praxis of so many clergymen that teach and indeed attempt to live their teaching, but then actually live by unrighteousness, drove him to it (1088). The implication of Arnold's 'impartiality' is that the bad behavior of the orthodox justifies any heretic whatsoever.

Arnold scholars have rightly noted that Arnold's work is a Nietzschean 'Umwertung aller Wertungen', in which the orthodox are the true heretics and some of the heretics are the truly orthodox.¹⁴ This is conspiracy theory according to which certain kinds of players cannot do anything right. It is stronger than the 'impartiality' of the Marxist, according to whom some members of the bourgeoisie can break away from their class and lead the working class: in Arnold's judgment no clergyman for an organized church can do anything right. It is stronger than the 'impartiality' of the post-colonialist, according to which at least the theorists of anti-colonialism are doing something good, even if they are European or American. No sect theologian can

do anything good for Arnold. His is an 'impartiality' of victimhood in which the persecuted can blame everything on the orthodox.¹⁵

Although Arnold's 'impartiality' is radically antinomian and anarchistic in church affairs, it is quite compatible with authority in politics, on the ground that politics does not matter. This is one reason why the Pietists were appreciated by many German princes. And thus Spinoza can be seen by Arnold as relatively harmless, more than anything another opportunity to attack the clergy, rather than a political danger because of his call for *libertas philosophandi*.

Finally, Arnold's history could have the perverse and unintended effect of contributing to secularization by withdrawal of the truly pious from the field of institutionalized religion.¹⁶ Without churches as a counterbalance, impious statecraft rules the political sphere. This is a Montesquieuan point of which Mosheim was well aware.

It is worth noting that Arnold was not hypocritical when he implied that all theologians and clergymen should leave their institutions and churches and concentrate on personal salvation. At the time he wrote the book, he had resigned from a comfortable university appointment in order to evade its compromises.¹⁷ Arnold ends volume 1 with calls for unity of spirit with Christ, and so forth, which each should do on his or her own, and which he was trying to do on his own. It might also be noted that some years later he returned to the ministry.¹⁸

2. Mosheim, the Theologico-Scholarly Enterprise, and Servetus

Mosheim defined his version of impartiality in response to Arnold's. The prefaces to the two volumes of his *Impartial History* set forth his vision of impartial scholarship. In the first volume, he pointed out that Arnold's purposes were not the purest: Arnold merely wanted to blacken the names of those who had accused others of heresy.¹⁹ 'Through him the heretics become the orthodox and the orthodox become the heretics' (i.V13). According to Arnold, the accusers never had good motives and never even correctly understood the opinions of the heretics

(i.V17). Since Arnold wrote there have been two parties, Mosheim says, those who praise all heretics and those who blame them (i.V20). Everyone expresses their loves and hates, their interested and irresponsible party line. No one tries to split the difference, draw a middle way. That is exactly what Mosheim will set out to do.

In his first youth, Mosheim writes in the preface to the second volume, he hit upon the idea of writing a history of books that had been burned by order of the authorities. He wanted to 'become known for something new, special, and agreeable', and thought that 'the road to honor went right through the vast lands of the history of scholarship, scholars, and books'.²⁰ It seemed to him that such a work promised to be 'as useful as pleasant'.²¹ These are very un-Arnoldian categories: nothing is mentioned of piety and salvation.

Mosheim's opening remarks already raise questions. Useful for what? Why would a history of persecution be agreeable and pleasant? The answers, I think, emerge from what I am going to piece together as 'the theologico-scholarly enterprise'.²² Mosheim was well aware of his work as a craft, a way of life, an attitude toward history that is associated with the life of the university theologian and historian, summed up as one branch of the *Gelehrtenstand* or scholarly class. He was neither a metaphysician nor a Pufendorfian civil scholar, but rather claiming scholarly territory for the theologians and historians.²³ The preface to volume one also contains much discussion of what a true historian should be doing, couched in terms of avoiding extremes.

Mosheim was conscientiously self-conscious of his own position, continually putting himself in the role of the 'other'. Up front in the second volume, he admits that a Lutheran (like himself) writing on Calvin is like a Swiss (meaning a Calvinist) writing on Luther, implying that he knows he will have to be very sensitive in order to allay suspicions of partisanship (ii.V9). As an exemplary story, Mosheim tells of the reception of his first work on Servetus, a dissertation by one of his students published in 1727. He points out that he gave the student access to his collection of Servetiana, and edited the student's work. Then Mosheim admits that his student's book was flawed:

It lacked a pure and well2drawn sketch of the main person, his deeds ... It lacked a description of the new beliefs that he had thought up to his own misfortune and which he maintained until his dying breath ... The worst thing was that the first virtue of a historian, that noble impartiality, so worthy of honor, was violated in some places. The young man who held the pen allowed himself too lightly to assume that the sad end of the Spaniard was more the product of revenge and personal enmity than of eagerness to serve his belief, and charged his persecutor, Calvin, with intentions and plots that sometimes could not be proved at all, or at least not sufficiently. (ii.V7)

Martin Mulsow has pointed out that this is a bit disingenuous: Mosheim wrote privately to a friend that not only the content but also the form of the dissertation was his, not the student's.²⁴ But he does take some blame: 'I should have doubled my attention to those places in the text where I could have suspected lapses against fairness and love...', Mosheim writes, but 'I did not... perhaps because I, too, was a captive of suspicion, perhaps because I was more saddened than I should have been' (ii.V8).

Then Mosheim reports that a review of the book by Armand de La Chapelle in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* (1728) assumed that Mosheim was the real power behind his student's dissertation, and that it was done by a Lutheran to pique orthodox Calvinists. La Chapelle proceeded to pick the book apart, with much vituperation. So Mosheim wrote to him, explaining that he had no such purpose in mind, but had written as an impartial scholar. La Chapelle responded by accepting Mosheim's explanation and removing the vituperation from a continuation of the review. This raises the question: why would La Chapelle accept the explanation, and not treat it as insincere? The answer must have to do with scholarly courtesy and conventions. On the one hand, it was disarming and flattering that Mosheim wrote to him rather than ignoring him or polemicizing against him. On the other hand, Mosheim invoked an ethic of scholarly conduct that he sought to live by.

The ethic I have in mind was summarized by famous authors such as Pierre Bayle as the conventions of scholarly historical writing. These conventions appealed to a sense of solidarity and pride in those who could see themselves as different from and better than the usual polemicists. Rather than rising above the fray, as Arnold purported to do, this particular set of

conventions claimed to referee all of the various extremisms from the middle. David Hume's essay 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' of 1741 is a classic example. Hume situates himself in the reasonable middle between the superstitious and fanatical Catholics and the enthusiastic and fanatical Protestant sects. It is worth pointing out that claiming to be the mediator is a rhetorical pose with strategic benefits like any other. Bayle claimed a mediating and reasonable position even as he unfairly excoriated the millenarians; and Hume posed as middle-of-the-road even as he really pushed a deist or latitudinarian, even Confucian, religious politics.

Thus, we should be suspicious when Mosheim places his own work, as Mulsow puts it, in the 'category of impartial history of heretics' which is 'in the middle between fanaticism and superstition' (1997, 92). In Mosheim's hands, oriental and Asian religions are based on superstition, and neoplatonism and rationalism are fanaticism. Neoplatonism ruined Christianity by turning it into philosophy.²⁵ The point is that his positioning allows Mosheim to criticize anyone who does not agree with him as out on one of the extremes, and to build up the merits of holding the middle.²⁶

Mosheim introduces his summary of the La Chapelle incident with an exemplary analysis of the man's character. He is brilliant, ruthless, indefatigable. The upshot is that he is a great force for good, and for evil (ii.V10). He is also Calvin's best defender ever! (ii.V12). But he goes too far when he claims that Servetus was a forerunner of Spinoza and a pantheist. 'What was he less?', Mosheim asks (ii.V15). But the exemplary point is that even La Chapelle finally chooses a middle way, defending Calvin only up to a point, and also admitting his weaknesses. This turns out to be something close to Mosheim's ideal. Later, Mosheim will say that a true history requires this sort of analysis of both the strengths and weaknesses of the person in question (ii.V17-18).

Part of this scholarly enterprise is historicism, the turning of everything into a part of a historical development, which both relativizes and isolates any heretic. Mosheim's 1733 translation of Cudworth injected a sense of historicism into Cudworth's text. Sarah Hutton calls this a 'secular' approach with more in common with the twentieth century than the seventeenth, but

Mosheim had made a point of fighting Thomasius's secularizing tendencies.²⁷ Mulsow points to Mosheim's roots in the historical school of philology.²⁸

What was Calvin? A murderer or a singularly useful and serviceable man? 'I do not assume responsibility for judging these opinions', Mosheim says (ii.VI 7). I will only bring history to light, he says, which others can use to judge (ii.VI 7). 'When I picked up my pen, I tied myself as tightly as one can who is firmly determined to give standing obedience to rightness, impartiality, and truth' (ii.V 17).

One way in which Mosheim's 'impartiality' can reduce the tendency to blame is to rely on determinism. 'I take away from Calvin the dress of a great teacher, an industrious defender of the truth against superstition, the founder of a certain party among the Christians. I take away from Servetus the cover of a heretic, a talented physician and scientist, a learned man. Both must, in my opinion, be presented in the state of nature and purely as men born with certain inclinations and thus with the impossibility of eradicating them' (ii.VI 7-l 8). Mosheim also points out that reader reception is an important part of impartiality:

As long as all readers of a history are not impartial, so long instead there will be people who will refuse the fame of impartiality to the most cautious and most honest historian. There are some recent scholars to whom it seems impossible to write a true impartial history. They are right in a certain sense. One cannot presume that a very impartial history can be written while it cannot be believed that all readers will be wholly impartial. (ii.VI8)

This must mean something like the futility of trying to sell an impartial history of the American party system at a Democratic or Republican National Convention. But Mosheim holds up an image of the ideal reader as someone who can suspend partisanship and judgment until all the relevant facts can be weighed.

Is Mosheim really unbiased in matters of religion? Of course not. Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann reports on suspicions of Mosheim's unorthodoxy, pointing out that Mosheim never qualifies Servetus's anti-trinitarianism as wrong.²⁹ But Mosheim does not need to. You can defend a religion and a scholarly ethos without saying you are doing so. As E. P. Meijering

explains, he sets up all the details and background assumptions so that Lutheran orthodoxy is implied and taken for granted.³⁰ Mosheim's religion was anti-philosophical and basically a biblical textbased faith (like Arnold's in some respects but with completely different institutional implications).³¹ Mosheim did not need to rely on any contentious philosophy, and could excoriate Platonism. Thus, he could hold quite consistently that the heretics were not as bad as the orthodox said they were, but they were still bad. As Schneider puts it, a philosopher of history may be an eclectic, but a church historian can only be impartial.³² That is, if he is to remain orthodox he cannot pick and choose theological positions, but must reject some of them. But he can position his own orthodoxy as the common-sensical middle of the road.

Mosheim's attitude toward religion is quintessentially a conservative intellectual's attitude. Mulsow writes that he should be understood as part of a conservative enlightenment.³³ I would endorse that and add that Mosheim's ideology of theologico-historical scholarship is naturally conservative of the conditions under which scholarship is possible. Mosheim could quite consistently call for greater freedom of teaching,³⁴ even though he had no intention of undermining Lutheran orthodoxy or the state.

Mulsow has also suggested two other keys to the interpretation of Mosheim, both of which are recognized elements of the ideology of many intellectuals. One is treatment of the disputes between Calvin and Servetus as a play.³⁵ 'All the world's a stage.' This distances the author and reader from the action as if they were spectators. It is presumably part of movement toward Adam Smith's impartial spectator. The other is a vocabulary of emotions, in which the writer is supposed to maintain calm and stable emotions and avoid hot-headedness and passion.³⁶ Impartiality means: 'I try to distance myself from hate, love, sympathy, respect, contempt, and all of the emotions that can ruin a work like this' (ii.V17). This contrasts with Arnold, who also professed to be against passions in scholarship (26), but whose entire book is a passionate critique of all clergymen and all organized religion. Part of Mosheim's analysis of Servetus was that his major flaw was excessive zeal for his own opinions. Although he saw himself as pursuing truth, in

fact this was an emotional extremism.³⁷ Mosheim is expressing a Stoic, Senecan preference for avoidance of emotions.³⁸ This would seem to be part of what Albert Hirschmann describes as political arguments for capitalism before its triumph: a movement in the period from passions to interests.³⁹ It is a necessary complement to what Stephen Holmes describes as the institutional constraints on passionate behavior in politics:⁴⁰ here we have a kind of conceptual constraint. If people start to think like Mosheim, they will always want to identify with a middle way of self-constrained passions.

Michael Servetus emerges from the theologico-scholarly enterprise as indeed a heretic, but not worthy of death. If we judge him as Mosheim's ideal historian would, we will conclude that his theology is in error, and that is primarily a product of his own too-passionate attachment to his own ideas. We will not emphasize the point that the error is an error because it is a departure from Lutheran orthodoxy, but that will be the bottom line. We will use a vocabulary that places Servetus and his opponents on ends of a spectrum where we will hold the middle. Our enterprise of scholarly inquiry will be justified in part because of its irenic tone, and the harmlessness and quiet pleasures of the scholarly life will be clear.

Conclusion

To sum it all up, Gottfried Arnold wrote a passionate history of persecution and heresy in which even a clear heretic like Spinoza is excused because of the despicable behavior of the orthodox. The only good stance on heresy and persecution is above it all, denouncing all organized churches and clergies. Mosheim, on the other hand, places himself in a peaceable middle, denouncing extremes both for their ideas and for their passions and violence. Neither approach is impartial from our point of view: rather, they are both using the term to try to occupy the moral high ground. And both were quite successful in appealing to readers, although each to different readers with sympathies like themselves. This may be symptomatic of much of the heresy literature: each branch was received favorably by people who wanted to hear that sort of message. How much

actual persuasion and conversion may have occurred across party lines is yet unknown.

¹ Gottfried Arnolds *Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments his auf Jahr Christi 1688* (Frankfurt, 1729) [orig. 1699-1700], photoreproduced in Gottfried Arnold, *Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis auf Jahr Christi 1688* (Hildesheim, 1967).

² Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, *Anderweitiger Versuch einer vollständigen und unpartheyischen Ketzergeschichte* (Helmstedt, 1748); photoreproduced in Johann Lorenz Mosheim, *Versuch einer unparteiischen und gründlichen Ketzergeschichte. Zweiter Band*, ed. Martin Mulsow (Hildesheim, 1999). For an introduction to Mosheim in English, see John Stroup, 'Protestant Church Historians in the German Enlightenment' in H. Bödeker et al. (eds), *Aufklärung und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1986), pp. 169-192; John Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity in the Clerical Estate* (Leiden, 1984). Stroup's book does not mention Mosheim's work on heresies and Servetus, nor is the work in the bibliography.

³ David Sorkin, 'Reclaiming Theology for the Enlightenment: The Case of Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten', *Central European History* 36 (2004): 503-530. See also, for another claim to a middle way, David Sorkin, 'William Warburton: The Middle Way of "Heroic Moderation"', *Dutch Review of Church History* 82 (2002): 262-300.

⁴ See Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment* (Oxford, 2001); Steven Nadler, *Spinoza's Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind* (Oxford, 2002); J. C. Laursen, 'Spinoza in Denmark and the Fall of Struensee', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61 (2000): 189-202; Paolo Cristofolini (ed.), *The Spinozistic Heresy* (Amsterdam, 1995).

⁵ See Martin Brecht, et al. (eds), *Geschichte des Pietismus* (3 vols, Göttingen, 1993, 1995, 2000); in English, Richard Gawthrop, *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia* (Cambridge, 1993), and J. Van Horn Melton, 'Pietism, Politics, and the Public Sphere in Germany' in James Bradley and Dale Van Kley (eds), *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe* (Notre Dame, 2001), pp. 294-333.

⁶ Cf. Ian Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 271.

⁷ Peter Hans Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley, 1975), p. 26.

⁸ Cited in Ulrich J. Schneider, 'Zum Sectenproblem der Kirchengeschichte' in Martin Mulsow et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim (1693-1755)* (Wiesbaden, 1997), p. 150.

⁹ See Martin Pott, 'Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold', in Dietrich Blaufuss and Friedrich Niewohner (eds), *Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714)* (Wiesbaden, 1995), p. 255, on Thomasius's defense of Arnold against this charge. See also Manfred Lauermann and Maria-Brigitta Schröder, 'Textgrundlagen der deutschen Spinoza-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert', in Eva Schürmann, Norbert Waszek, and Frank Weinreich (eds), *Spinoza im Deutschland des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 47-8, 51, 57, 59, 65 for some indications of Arnold's influence in spreading knowledge of Spinoza.

¹⁰ Walter Nigg, *Das Buch der Ketzer* (Zurich, 1949), p. 408.

¹¹ Pott, 'Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold'. See also Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments*, pp. 270-271. Thomas Ahnert discusses accusations of enthusiasm against Thomasius, but does not mention Thomasius's use of the same accusation

against others, in his 'The Prince and the Church in the Thought of Thomasius', in Ian Hunter and David Saunders (eds), *Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought* (New York, 2002), pp. 94ff.

¹² Ernst Berneburg, 'Einige Gesichtspunkte und Fragen der Wirkung der *Unparteiischen Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*', in Blaufuss and Niewohner (eds), *Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714)*, p. 31.

¹³ 'Cartesius' is vindicated of charges of heresy at pp. 995-997.

¹⁴ It is worth noting that although he defended them from orthodox persecution, Arnold did not approve of all heretics. See, e.g., Nigg, *Das Buell der Ketzer*, p. 404, on his low opinion of Simon Magus.

¹⁵ Parallel to the post-colonial claim that every evil that will ever befall Africa can be blamed on colonialism.

¹⁶ See Sandra Pott, et al. (eds), *Säkularisierung in den Wissenschaften seit der Frühen Neuzeit* (3 vols, Berlin, 2002). I am not sure where Arnold's contribution to secularization would fit in Pott and Schemert's typology of additive, transformative, evolutionary, and revolutionary secularization (pp. 4-5 in vols 1 and 2). Is withdrawal or abandonment of the field another type?

¹⁷ This was certainly a 'care of the self' of which Ian Hunter writes in *Rival Enlightenments*, but it is not one of the forms about which he writes.

¹⁸ I would warn against any tendency to dismiss Arnold's Pietism as wholly backward and dated. For example, Pietism of his strain was still going strong in early nineteenth century Germany. See Ulrike Gleixner, 'Pietism, Millenarianism, and the Family Future', in J. C. Laursen and R. Popkin (eds), *Continental Millenarianism: Protestants, Catholics, Heretics* (Dordrecht, 2001), pp. 107-121; and derivative strains are still around in early twenty-first century Southern California.

¹⁹ *Johann Lorenz Mosheims Versuch einer unpartheiischen und gründlichen Ketzergeschichte* (Helmstedt, 1746), photoreproduced in Martin Mulsow (ed.), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim, Versuch einer unpartheiischen und gründlichen Ketzergeschichte. Erster Band* (Hildesheim, 1998). Since the Vorrede is numbered separately from the text, I cite it hereafter with 'i' for volume one and the letter V before the page number, as in (i.V13).

²⁰ '...die Begierde durch etwas neues, sonderbares und angenehmes sich bekant zu machen unterhielte... Die Bahn der Ehren ging dazumal mitten durch das wietläufige Land der Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit, der Gelehrten und der Bücher' (Mosheim, *Anderweitiger Versuch*, Vorrede, p. 5). Since the Vorrede is numbered separately from the text, I cite it hereafter with 'ii' for volume two and the letter V before the page number, as in (ii.V5).

²¹ 'so viel Nutzen, als Vergnügen zu versprechen schiene' (ii.V5).

²² Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity*, esp. pp. 50-81, refers in general to Mosheim's defense of the clergy. I would like to concentrate on one kind of clergyman: the scholar-theologian.

²³ Thus, I am adding exploration of another rival scholarly community to Ian Hunter's treatment of civil and metaphysical philosophy in *Rival Enlightenments*, the scholars of the 'theological enlightenment'. I have shown how another of these, later in the century, was concerned to capture wide swaths of the academic world for the theological faculty, in my 'Skepticism and the History of

Moral Philosophy: The Case of Carl Friedrich Stäudlin', in J. van der Zande and R. Popkin (eds), *The Skeptical Tradition Around 1800: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society* (Dordrecht, 1998), pp. 365-378.

²⁴ Martin Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung der Servet und der Ophiten? Der junge Mosheim und die häretische Tradition', in Mulsow, et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim*, p. 54.

²⁵ Mulsow reports that Brucker credited Mosheim with inventing this idea, which was then picked up by Gibbon (Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', p. 81). But Hobbes and Thomasius had already made this point.

²⁶ Thomasius also positioned himself at the middle of two sets of extremes: between superstition and atheism, and between superstition and enthusiasm. See Pott, 'Christian Thomasius and Gottfried Arnold', pp. 26223.

²⁷ S. Hutton, 'Classicism and Baroque', in Mulsow, et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim* pp. 226-27; Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity*. Like Arnold's, Mosheim's work may have had unintended secularizing tendencies, perhaps because of its pretensions to a cool, scholarly middle-of-the-road demeanour, together with its exposure of excessive orthodox heresy-mongering. But again it is unclear to me where he would fall in the typology of S. Pott, et al. (see note 16 above).

²⁸ Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', p. 70.

²⁹ W. Schmidt-Biggemann, 'Platonismus, Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte: Mosheims dogmatisch-historisch Kategorien', in Mulsow, et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim*, pp. 193-210.

³⁰ E. P. Meijering, 'Mosheim und die Orthodoxie', in Mulsow, et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim*, pp. 261-76; see also Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity*, pp. 50-81.

³¹ Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity*, p. 59, says he drew largely on Melancthon and Georg Calixtus.

³² Schneider, 'Zuni Sectenproblem', p. 156.

³³ Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', pp. 85ff. See also Martin Mulsow, *Moderne aus dem Untergrund: Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland 1680-1720* (Hamburg, 2002), esp. pp. 337-41.

³⁴ Meijering, 'Mosheim und die Orthodoxie', p. 274.

³⁵ Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', pp. 58-9.

³⁶ Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', pp. 89ff.

³⁷ Mulsow, 'Eine Rettung?', p. 90. Sarah Hutton notes that this was Mosheim's critique of Cudworth as well. In notes to his translation of Cudworth he complains of 'the too strong affection with which he regarded the opinions he had imbibed' ('Classicism and Baroque', p. 218).

³⁸ See Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* (Princeton, 1994).

³⁹ Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, 1977).

⁴⁰ Stephen Holmes, *Passions and Constraint* (Chicago, 1995).

Chapter 11

Thomasius on the Toleration of Heresy

Ian Hunter

Introduction

In the late seventeenth century, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) — public intellectual, professor of law at the University of Halle, and jurisconsult to the state of Brandenburg-Prussia — wrote several tracts against the concept of heresy and in favour of the toleration of those accused of holding alien or erroneous religious views. In this regard as in others, Thomasius is usually seen as a representative of the early *Aufklärung*, whose limited defence of toleration would eventually lead to and be eclipsed by the unfettered freedom of reason and conscience characteristic of the high Kantian *Aufklärung*.¹ To view Thomasius's arguments for the toleration of heresy in this way — as early versions of a philosophically grounded conception of free reason and subjective right — is, I shall argue, seriously misleading.² Thomasius's arguments were in fact grounded in a complex discourse on the place of religion in a civil polity, in relation to which conceptions of reason and individual freedom were only dependent variables. Given the fundamentally political-juridical character of this discourse, and considering its focus on the achievement of stable civil government, we might name its context the 'civil enlightenment'.³ This was a seventeenth-century movement distinct from and in some ways inimical to the late eighteenth-century rationalist *Aufklärung*, with which it would nonetheless intersect.

Thomasius views heresy as a fundamentally historical and political phenomenon: as a device through which philosophically corrupted Christian sects sought each other's civil repression, thereby misusing rights and powers properly

belonging to the prince or civil state alone. He refuses to enter the theological and philosophical discussion of heretical doctrines because, like Hume and Gibbon in Britain, and Samuel Pufendorf and Gottfried Arnold in the German context, he viewed theology and philosophy almost wholly from the perspective of their (largely deleterious) impact on the history of civil society and the civil polity. Thomasius's arguments against the prosecution of heresy and for the toleration of heretics are thus not grounded in metaphysical defences of reason in the Spinozist manner, nor in a rationalist theology of the kind underpinning Locke's toleration arguments — these defences being ones that claim to ground toleration in philosophical truth, sometimes viewing heresy itself as the suppressed vehicle of this truth. But neither is Thomasius a historian working in the genre of 'narratives of civil government', in the manner of Hume, Ferguson and Smith, even if a certain version of this genre does inform his writing. Instead, Thomasius's discourses on heresy are framed in the idiom of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*, which might be translated as the political jurisprudence of church law, or public law (Imperial/us *publicum*) pertaining to church governance.⁴ This frame is quite capacious — allowing inputs from a Hobbesian politics, a pietist or spiritualist lay theology, and an Arnoldian history of the church — yet functions as the means of harnessing this array to the political-jurisprudential view of heresy characteristic of the civil enlightenment. To understand Thomasius's discourses on heresy, then, we need to embed them in the language of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* and in the religious and political circumstances from which this language arose and to which it was addressed.

1. *Staatskirchenrecht* and the Historicisation of Heresy

By the end of the seventeenth century it had become a commonplace (although not a universally accepted one) to historicise and relativise the concept of heresy, for example, with a remark such as Locke's: 'For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical'.⁵ In Germany, such bubbles of discourse

had begun their journey to the philosophical surface more than a century earlier, arising from the desperate agitation of Imperial statesmen and jurists attempting to contain religious schism and its consequence, religious civil war. Two religious peace treaties — the Treaty of Augsburg of 1555 and the Treaty of Westphalia (*Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense*) of 1648 — are landmarks in a protracted and multiplex process that would issue in a profound rearrangement of the relations between civil and religious authority within the German states. This rearrangement was by no means smooth or unilinear. In fact, the Augsburg Religious Peace had ambivalent consequences for the relation between politics and religion. For while the famous formula of *cuius regio eius religio* recognised religious pluralism at the level of Imperial courts and parliaments, it simultaneously authorised princes and prince-bishops to enforce their religion of choice within their own territories and cities, giving rise to archipelagoes of mutually hostile confessional states.⁶ By requiring princes to accept the territorial legitimacy of the three main religions, the Treaty of Westphalia signalled the end of this state of affairs, but not all at once or on the basis of an all-embracing principle. Rather, Westphalia attempted to stabilise a particular distribution of religions within and between states, in a complex set of political-juridical arrangements which continued to permit state churches, so long as minority religions were granted rights of private worship. Nonetheless, such a development, which entailed acceptance of the permanence of heresy and the institution of state-controlled religious toleration, could not take place without a profound transformation of theological, juridical, and political discourse.

In a series of indispensable studies, Martin Heckel has identified the key elements of this transformation. First, in the political and juridical institutions of the Empire there was a shift in the operational discourses for dealing with religious conflict. This was a shift from theology, whose claims to transcendent truth rendered it incapable of negotiating conflict under conditions of religious schism, to Roman law jurisprudence, rendered capable in this regard by its 'pagan' foundations and its basic orientation to civil peace.⁷ Next, there was the gradual establishment of parity of treatment of the rival confessions in the Imperial parliaments and the Imperial Chamber Court

(*Reichskammergericht*). This entailed a fundamental relativisation of confessional claims to theological truth and the emergence of purely political-jurisprudential treatment of religion, as a social institution under civil governance.⁸ The product and instrument of this juridification of religion was Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*. Emerging as a profane civil rival to canon law, Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* presided over a secularisation of the 'visible church' as a civil association under political rule which, nonetheless, went hand-in-hand with a spiritualisation of religion, understood as the 'invisible church' of the scattered faithful.⁹ Finally we can mention the dropping of all claims to theological or metaphysical truth in the great treaties that brought an end to the protracted and bloody periods of religious war. Westphalia thus witnessed the emergence of desacralised forms of law and politics in which transcendent theological truth was sidelined in favour of a purely this-worldly governance aiming no higher than social peace.¹⁰

If, as is undoubtedly the case, these changes brought about a certain form secularisation then, as Heckel shows, it was of a particular and ambivalent kind.¹¹ On the one hand, the political-juridical relativisation of the confessions and restriction of politics to the end of civil peace had a far-reaching secularising effect on both the religious and political domains in early modern Protestant Germany. It allowed religions, heretical ones included, to be viewed in an historical and relativistic manner — that is, in terms of their impact on civil governance without regard to their theological or philosophical truth. Further, it allowed politics to be desacralised, making it possible to relinquish the mission of defending the purity of the true church, understood as the 'kingdom of God on earth', in favour of a political conception of society, understood as a congeries of fractious associations and individuals in need of civil rule to attain a limited social peace. On the other hand, because it was not the symptom of some epochal advance in universal philosophical reason, and was instead the product of highly particular cultural and political circumstances — the work of Protestant jurists seeking religious pacification within the public-law framework of the Empire — this secularisation of religion and politics was neither universalising in the intellectual domain nor totalising in the social one.

In these circumstances, the juridical secularisation of the visible or public church proved to be quite compatible with a typically Protestant anti-ritualist spiritualisation of religion. As a result, the secularising conception of the church as a civil association under political rule was shadowed by a spiritualistic conception of religion, understood in terms of individuals in a purely inward relation to God (the invisible church).¹² Similarly, the historical and relativising conception of orthodoxy and heresy — as temporal phenomena arising from the political claims of rival sects — was accompanied by an a-historical transcendent conception of true faith, as God's unmediated untheorised spiritual presence to the individual believer. The two sides of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* could never be doctrinally or philosophically reconciled and were instead held together by continuous argument and negotiation, and by the unstable metaphors of public and private, external and internal religion. Yet both sides were hostile to so-called 'Papist' religion, understood to be a public church — Protestant or Catholic — exercising civil power by claiming custody of the 'keys to the kingdom' and a monopoly on transcendent true faith.¹³ From the political-juridical perspective Papalism was seen as a clericalist infringement of the prince's civil sovereignty; from the standpoint of Protestant spiritualism it was regarded as a corruption of inner faith through the clerical imposition of a sophistic philosophical religion.¹⁴

The treatment of heresy by representatives of the late seventeenth-century civil enlightenment was deeply informed by the ambivalent culture and language of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*. In Arnold's extraordinary compendium of heresy and church history we find the discipline of history being extolled as the key to adopting an impartial non-theological view of heresies as temporal phenomena arising from the battle of sects.¹⁵ Yet, at the same time, Arnold also extolls a spiritualistic conception of religion, as non-doctrinal faith, which allows him to adopt a sceptical historical view of all theosophical doctrine while implicitly affirming the possibility of a true pietistic (Protestant) religion. As we shall now see, a similar ambivalence informs Thomasius's discourses on heresy, even if these point towards a certain way of overcoming this ambivalence.

2. Thomasius's Discourses on Heresy

Thomasius published two discourses on heresy during 1697. The first, a disputation delivered under his direction by Johannes Christoph Rube in July, was titled *An haeresis sit crimen*, translated into German as *Ob Ketzerei ein strafbares Verbrechen sei? (Is Heresy a Punishable Crime?)* in 1705.¹⁶ In November, responding to a series of attacks on this disputation, and seeking a more discursive presentation of the arguments than that afforded by its dialogue form, Thomasius published *De jure principis circa haereticos*, which was also translated into German in 1705, under the title *Vom Recht evangelischer Fürsten gegen die Ketzer (The Right of Protestant Princes regarding Heretics)*.¹⁷ There is a substantial overlap between these two discourses and, taken together, they provide a snapshot of the treatment of heresy in Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* by a leading figure of the civil enlightenment. At the same time, we shall also take note of a significant shift of emphasis between them, towards a more purely political conception of heresy, which is already reflected in the title of the later work.

The first half of the dialogue *Is Heresy a Punishable Crime?* (sections 1-V11) deals with the question of what heresy is and how it can be described. Here, Thomasius's proxy, 'Christian', mounts an argument that the conception of heresy held by his dialogue partner 'Orthodox' is so faulty and obscure that it fails to describe anything. Thomasius's historical approach is clear from the outset. In refusing to allow the authority of the church fathers to define heresy, he comments that Augustine had already allowed pagan Platonic philosophy to corrupt pure Christianity, by using a hybrid theosophy to attack his rivals, the Donatists and Pelagians, thereby displaying the link between heretic-mongering (*Ketzermacherei*) and religious sectarianism (216-22). Thomasius will thus base his judgments only on 'divine revelation and sound reason' and, having cleared the decks, elicits a definition of heresy from Orthodox which he sources to several prominent Lutheran theologians and jurists, including Benedict Carpzov: 'Heresy is an obstinate error in the foundations of faith by a person who is or was a member of the church' (226). This Augustinian construction, which formed part of medieval canon law, had been incorporated in the Saxon

constitution during the sixteenth century and was repeated by Carpzov in his influential *Practica nova itnperialis saxonica rerum criminalium* of 1635: 'I call heresy a *pertinacem in articulis fidei errorem*'.¹⁸ During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it formed the basis of many Saxon heresy prosecutions, several of which resulted in execution by burning or decapitation.

Thomasius's *tour* (le force demolition of this definition reads like a synopsis of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*. In the first place, he has Christian argue, church membership cannot provide the standard for determining heresy because the visible church contains both good and bad Christians. Moreover, the truly faithful cannot be assembled into a public visible institution, being scattered across nations and religions in an invisible church (227-8). The ultimate effect of separating the church as a civil institution from faith as the inner relation to God was thus to deprive the community of the faithful of concrete historical form, hence to detach it from the civil community.¹⁹ Next, in attacking the notion of the 'foundation of faith', Thomasius begins with a historical relativising tactic, arguing that what has counted as foundational has changed over time and between rival Christian sects (228-32). But this is only a curtain-raiser to a far more aggressive strategy in which Thomasius rejects the whole idea that faith has intellectual foundations about which one might be in error, treating this idea as symptomatic of the corruption of Christianity by Greek philosophy. The true foundations of faith are simple and non-intellectual, consisting only in love of Christ and one's neighbour and contempt for oneself, such that even the uneducated can see that the doctrinal disputes of theologians over heresy are about useless subtleties (234). Thomasius continues that the philosophical penetration of Christianity has produced a 'brain faith' (*Hirn glaube*), characterised by the delusion that faith arises from the understanding and knowledge, rather than from the heart and the will (236-45). Finally, this shows why it is meaningless to characterise heresy in terms of error, because the divine can never be an object of knowledge for human reason, which means that there can be no earthly validation of doctrines claiming knowledge of heavenly things (248-54). With this argument Thomasius in effect declares the illegitimacy of all claims to cognitive theological truth in the articles and

confessions of statutory religions.

Having shown that heresy cannot be understood as the intellectual error of a member of the true church, in the second part of the disputation Thomasius argues that, even if it were a speculative error, heresy could not be classed as a crime. As products of the understanding rather than the will, such intellectual errors have no impact on civil life and are immune to the civil coercion that constitutes criminal law. At this point, Orthodox, whose arguments thus far have been perfunctory, is permitted to apply a little counter-pressure on Thomasius's namesake, Christian. Given that Christian has argued that error arises from the desires and passions of the will, and given that these are indeed the proper object of civil coercion, Orthodox asks why religious error should not be subject to such coercion (267). Christian's initial answer to this counter-argument is to rehearse the distinction between morality and law that Thomasius had elaborated in his writings on natural law and ethics. Christian thus responds that not all viciousness of will is punishable as a crime. The human will is indeed given to such vices as lust, ambition and greed, but only immorality that breaks out in conduct disturbing civil peace will count as a crime and be subject to legal sanction: 'So no-one will be punished on account of his thoughts; and the vices which are common to the whole human race and are incapable of being eradicated — such as envy, ambition, greed and lust — cannot be punished, as long as they do not break out in external deeds and hence do the state no great harm' (270). The punishments for heresy demanded by Lutheran theologians — removal from civil office, fines, deportation are therefore unacceptable, because they apply civil sanctions to a moral matter; and the same goes for ex-communication when it provides a trigger for such sanctions (273-80).

Orthodox has a final argument, however, and it is one that reveals a significant ambivalence in Thomasius's discourse. What about the case where a heretical religion does cause uproar and civil disturbance? Is it not true that on these grounds princes have indeed passed laws for the suppression of those attempting to spread 'alien' or dissenting religions? (280). This of course was more than just a theoretical objection, as Orthodox is in effect referring to the entire period between

Augsburg (1555) and Westphalia (1648) when, under the Imperial *jus reformandi*, ruling houses attempted to impose a ruling religion. Thomasius's initial response to this challenging problem is to claim that it is morally impossible to compel the silence of those who sincerely believe in a certain truth; for there is a natural desire to speak what is in the heart and to share this with others who might benefit from it (283). Here, by envisaging heretics and dissenters as publicly testifying to an inner truth, Thomasius's spiritualist theology is in potential tension with his political jurisprudence; for he is entertaining a position which, were it to be pushed further, would ground toleration of heresy in a subjective moral right, in something like the Lockean manner.

It is highly significant therefore that Thomasius does not take this further step.²⁰ Instead, in countering Orthodox's argument that erroneous doctrines should be suppressed because they cause civil disturbance, Thomasius moves in a different direction: 'This common objection assumes that care for the salvation of his subjects is a matter for the prince; yet it has already been shown elsewhere that he acts in a quite different way. A prince is responsible for the external calm and peace in the country, but no damage is done to this even if a false doctrine is spread about' (286). Thomasius thus swings back to the political-juridical viewpoint, according to which heresy and dissent are to be tolerated not because individuals have a right to express their inner truth, but because the truth or falsity of such expression is a matter of indifference to a political and legal regime oriented solely to maintaining civil peace.²¹ Thomasius then confirms that his conception of toleration is not grounded in a subjective right to free expression; for he comments that he is not advocating that dissenters should be allowed to spread their doctrines in an offensive and insulting manner; nor even that they should be permitted to practise their religion in public and to hold disputations; only that they should be free to do so in their houses and in everyday discussions with friends (287).²² In other words, where the substitution of civil peace for truth forms the historical basis of toleration — because this allows the persecution of heretics itself to be suppressed — then it also limits such toleration, to the boundaries of a private moral

sphere maintained by a state indifferent to moral truth.²³ Privacy here is not the precinct of a subjective truth entailing a right to public expression, but a precinct within which one will be left unmolested, policed by a state which constitutes the public domain solely in terms of civil tranquility.

If the tension between Thomasius's spiritualist theology and statist jurisprudence plays a significant role in the first of his two discourses on heresy, then the balance has tipped in favour of the latter by the time of his second — *On the Right of Protestant Princes regarding Heretics* — perhaps in order to strengthen his defence of toleration against his critics.²⁴ In this discourse Thomasius advances a wholly historical and political view of the church and heresy. Heresy, he argues, cannot be understood as an error in faith by members of a true church because, since Constantine's time, Christianity has been divided into rival sects, and heresy is simply a charge wielded by the *Pfaffen* (power hungry clergy) in order to achieve the political suppression of their rivals. Thomasius draws the relativistic conclusion in a similar way to Locke: 'In the juristic sense [*Juristischen Verstande*] all religions will thus be held orthodox. In the clerical sense [*Pfaffen Verstande*], though, each [religion] will be orthodox to itself, which the clergy of the other party will yet call heretical' (331).

The degree to which this view entails the subordination of the history of theology and philosophy to a history of civil government is shown in his account of the manner in which Greek philosophy penetrated Christianity via the church fathers. This, Thomasius argues, contaminated the pure sources of Christianity with intellectualist doctrine, allowing the clergy to appropriate the role of learned expositors, and to establish the philosophical subtleties through which they could dominate the laity and persecute their rivals as heretics:

Some would find it paradoxical if I said that from the time of Constantine the Great to the Reformation, all of the controversial questions, which were supposed to belong to the Christian religion, and from which heresies arose, were in fact purely and simply philosophical — metaphysical and logical for the most part; and, therefore, that so many millions of men have been murdered and banished not for God's sake, but for the sake of Aristotle's or Plato's metaphysics. Nonetheless, this paradox is only too true. Those who do not believe it need only read the *Panarium* of Epiphanius, and the history of the Councils.²⁵ Only in them can one tally all of the conflicts over the

On this basis, Thomasius makes an explicit case for the necessity of moving from a theological to a juridical conception of heresy. Heresy, he argues, can only be understood via the political and juridical conception of a ruling religion, such that: 'heresy is a deviation from the ruling religion' (329). The ruling religion, however, is not necessarily the religion of the ruler or of the majority confession; rather, it is the religion of those who seek to impose it coercively on others as a faith whose formulas are claimed to hold the key to salvation. It is this thoroughly historical and juridical conception of the (public) church and heresy that allows Thomasius to adopt his relativistic and pluralistic conception of toleration. In other words, for Thomasius, toleration of heresy is grounded not in freedom of conscience or reason, but in the establishment of a political-juridical order capable of enforcing mutual forbearance between public religious parties. Thomasius thus regards freedom of conscience not as a subjective right against the state but as an exercise of religious liberty made possible by the state.²⁷

Conclusion

The cultural and political valency of Thomasius's treatment of heresy and toleration will vary depending on whom we compare him with, and the perspectives embedded in such comparisons. Compared with Locke, Thomasius's position can seem conservative, because Locke's conception of a truth-based church and a rights-based state leads him to treat toleration as an inalienable political right grounded in the inner pursuit of truth. For Thomasius, however, the religious freedom of dissenters is circumscribed by the same condition that restricts the freedom of their orthodox tormentors: the fact that sovereignty is grounded in the preservation of social peace. Somewhat unexpectedly, though, the fact that Thomasius does not found the state in the moral agreement of its subjects allows him to develop a broader conception of toleration than Locke. For, by grounding the state in such a moral contract, Locke found himself denying toleration to Catholics and atheists, on

the argument that they would not or could not abide by such an agreement. Thomasius, on the other hand, found that he could extend toleration to Catholics and atheists precisely because his statist conception of sovereignty did not require subjects to reach this kind of moral agreement.'²⁸

Compared with Gibbon, however, Thomasius's historical-juridical relativisation of orthodoxy and heresy might appear radical, for even the sceptical Gibbon could continue to regard Socinianism as an error, with an eye to the pacifying and civilising role of the established Anglican religion.²⁹ Yet once we recall that Brandenburg-Prussia dealt with the problem of religious conflict by legislating for state toleration of a plurality of public confessions, then Thomasius's position is no less part of a ruling religious-political settlement than Gibbon's, even if the terms of the settlement were quite different.³⁰ This is why, despite his own spiritualist theology, Thomasius's arguments for toleration of heresy differ markedly from Locke's, and even more so from the later metaphysical arguments for the freedom of public reason mounted by such intellectuals as Priestley and Kant. For Thomasius, heresy should be tolerated not because the human intellect must have the right to seek truth in community, but because toleration is the best way of neutralising communities seeking to persecute others on the basis of a truth they have found.³¹

Thomasius's defence of heretics and dissenters is thus not based on a philosophy in which a truth discovered in the free privacy of individual reason might form the basis of a free public sphere of self-governing citizens. Instead, Thomasius closes his second discourse on heresy by echoing his mentor Pufendorf's fundamental separation between the kingdom of truth and the civil kingdom.³² The former is occupied by the personae of teacher and learner bound together by relations of love and emulation to the exclusion of all civil coercion; while the latter contains the personae of sovereign and subject bound together by the coercively enforced exchange of obedience for protection to the exclusion of all concern with truth (345-50). For Thomasius, it is not the unfettered pursuit of truth by a unified rational community that protects dissenting minorities. On the contrary, it is the fact that those exercising civil authority must never presume to do so as teachers of the truth,

and those teaching the truth must never be in a position of civil authority.

¹ For general views of Thomasius as a representative of the *Frühanaufklärung*, understood as a dialectical stepping stone to the high Kantian *Aufklärung*, see Werner Schneiders, 'Der Philosophiebegriff des philosophischen Zeitalters. Wandlungen im Selbstverständnis der Philosophie von Leibniz bis Kant,' in *Wissenschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Göttingen, 1985), pp. 58-92; and Wilhelm Schmidt² Biggemann, *Theodizee und Tatsachen: das philosophische Profil der deutschen Aufklärung* (Frankfurt a. M., 1988). For views of Thomasius's jurisprudence as an anticipation of modern liberal individualism, see Mario A. Cattaneo, 'Staatsräsonlehre und Naturrecht im strafrechtlichen Denken des Samuel Pufendorf und des Christian Thomasius,' in Roman Schnur (ed.), *Staatsräson: Studien zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs* (Berlin, 1975), pp. 427-40; and Klaus Luig, 'Von Samuel Pufendorf zu Christian Thomasius,' in Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald Hartung (eds), *Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung. Werk und Einfluss eines deutschen Bürgers der Gelehrtenrepublik each 300 Jahren (1694-1994)* (Berlin, 1996), pp. 137-46.

² For other discussions sceptical of the view of Thomasius as an early defender of subjective-right liberalism, see Hinrich Rüping, 'Thomasius und Carpzov,' in Frank Grunert and Friedrich Vollhardt (eds), *Aufklärung als praktische Philosophie* (Tübingen, 1998), 187-96; Horst Dreitzel, 'Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus. Thomasius und die Destruktion des frühneuzeitlichen Konfessionsstaates,' in Friedrich Vollhardt (ed.), *Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext der Frühaufklärung* (Tübingen, 1997), pp. 17-50; and Frank Grunert, *Normbegründung und politische Legitimität. Zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der deutschen Frühaufklärung* (Tübingen, 2000), esp. pp. 261-78.

³ This approach to Thomasius broadly parallels John Pocock's illuminating discussion of Gibbon's views on heresy, which Pocock embeds in arguments over the political and theological management of religious enthusiasm that flowed from the Anglican settlement. See J. G. A. Pocock, 'Gibbon and the History of Heresy,' in John Christian Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 205-20.

⁴ For other treatments of Thomasius in the context of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*, see Stephan Buchholz, *Ilistoria Contentionis inter Imperium et Sacerdotium: Kirchengeschichte in der Sicht von Christian Thomasius und Gottfried Arnold*, in Vollhardt (ed.), *Christian Thomasius*, pp. 165-78; and Klaus Schlaich, 'Der rationale Territorialismus. Die Kirche unter dem staatsrechtlichen Absolutismus um die Wende vom 17. zum 18. Jahrhundert,' in Martin Heckel and Werner Heun (eds), *Klaus Schlaich. Gesammelte Aufsätze: Kirche und Staat von der Reformation bis zum Grundgesetz* (Tübingen, 1997), pp. 204-66.

⁵ John Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration,' in *Locke on Politics, Religion, and Education*, ed. Maurice Cranston (New York, 1965), p. 115.

⁶ Martin Heckel, 'Zur Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts von der Reformation bis zur Schwelle der Weimarer Verfassung,' in Klaus Schlaich (ed.), *Martin Heckel Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte* (4 vols, Tübingen, 1989), vol. 1, pp. 366-401, at 375281; Horst Dreitzel, 'Toleranz und Gewissensfreiheit im konfessionellen Zeitalter. Zur Diskussion im Reich zwischen Augsburger Religionsfrieden und Aufklärung,' in Dieter Breuer (ed.), *Religion und Religiosität im Zeitalter des Barock* (Wiesbaden, 1995), pp. 115-28; and Heinz

Schilling, 'Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich: Religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620,' *Historische Zeitschrift* 246 (1988): 1-45.

7 Martin Heckel, 'Religionsbann und landesherrliches Kirchenregiment,' in Hans-Christoph Rublack (ed.), *Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 1992), pp. 130-62.

8 Martin Heckel, 'Die religionsrechtliche Parität,' in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I, pp. 227-323.

9 Heckel, 'Zur Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts'.

10 Martin Heckel, 'Zur Historiographie des Westfälischen Friedens,' in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. I, pp. 484-500.

11 Martin Heckel, 'Das Säkularisierungsproblem in der Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts,' in Gerhard Dilcher and Ilse Staff (eds), *Christentum und modernes Recht. Beiträge zum Problem der Säkularisation* (Frankfurt a.M., 1984), pp. 35-95.

12 See Heckel, 'Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts'.

13 Beyond its prime eponymous target, Protestant writers like Arnold and Thomasius levelled the charge of Papalism at any church held to be making such a claim, particularly the Lutheran church, whose leading theologians Thomasius called 'our Papists'.

14 In this paper I argue that the political-juristic perspective came to predominate in Thomasius's writings on *Staatskirchenrecht*. For an important counter-argument, in favour of the predominance of Thomasius's spiritualist lay theology, see Thomas Ahnert, 'The Prince and the Church in the Thought of Christian Thomasius,' in Ian Hunter and David Saunders (eds), *Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 91-105; and, more generally, Thomas Ahnert, 'Christian Thomasius' Theory of Natural Law in its Religious and Natural Philosophical Context' (Ph.D, Cambridge University, 1999).

15 Gottfried Arnold, *Gottfried Arnolds Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, von AmfÜng des Neuen Testaments bis auff das Jahr Christi 1688* (Frankfurt a.M., 1699). See, for example, § 26 of the Foreword, where Arnold argues that the discipline of history neutralises the passions, allowing the historian to adopt an impartial view of all religious doctrines; yet also comments that in this way the historian joins the invisible church of true believers scattered across all nations and religions.

16 Christian Thomasius, 'Ob Ketzerei ein strafbares Verbrechen sei?' (*An haeresis sit crimen*), in *Auserlesene deutsche Schriften, Erster Teil*, (Hildesheim, 1994, orig. 1697), pp. 210-307.

17 Christian Thomasius, *Wont Recht Evangelischer Fürsten gegen die Ketzer*, (*De jure principis circa haereticos*), in *Auserlesene deutsche Schriften Erster Teil*, pp. 308-76.

18 Cited in Winfried Trusen, 'Rechtliche Grundlagen des Häresiebegriffs und des Ketzerverfahrens,' in Silvana Seidel Menchi (ed.), *Ketzerverfolgung im 16. and frühen 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 1-20, at 12.

19 Cf., Heckel, 'Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts', pp. 368, 389. Thomasius's sharp separation of the visible and invisible church marks a key point of difference from Locke. Locke continues to regard the (visible) church as

a society bound together by its members' belief in a true mode of worship. To avoid the looming problem of heresy, Locke observes that there is a plurality of such churches and that no-one can judge which form of worship is the one truly pleasing to God. Nonetheless, Locke retains the *concept* of a true visible church as (in Thomasian terms) the manifestation of religious community in the form of a public association; and this allows him to expand liberty of conscience into the natural civil right of dissenting Christians to public worship, on the religious grounds of their true inner faith. (See Locke, 'Letter Concerning Toleration', pp. 110-11, 120-21, 127-8, 140). Thomasius's insistence that no public church can be regarded as an assembly of the truly faithful produces a much deeper incision between the civil and religious, in effect denying that any form of public worship could be true, and thereby precluding a defence of toleration in terms of the civil rights of true believers. For a comparative discussion of Locke in relation to German and Dutch constructions of toleration, see Horst Dreitzel, 'Gewissensfreiheit und soziale Ordnung. Religionstoleranz als Problem der politischen Theorie am Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts,' *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 36 (1995): 3-34.

²⁰ Here I differ from Stephan Buchholz, who argues that Thomasius did not back away from his spiritualist conception of heresy (as repressed true faith) until the publication of his *Historia contentionis inter imperium et sacerdotium* in 1722. See Buchholz, 'Historia Contentionis', pp. 174-77.

²¹ This *contra* the interpretations of Cattaneo, 'Staatsräsonlehre und Naturrecht', and Luig, 'Von Samuel Pufendorf zu Christian Thomasius' and in agreement with Rüping, 'Carpzov and Thomasius', and Dreitzel, 'Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus'.

²² In this regard, Thomasius fails to fully conform to Dreitzel's argument that the early enlightenment conception of toleration was grounded in the claim that 'in striving for revealed holiness, each [individual] has an inviolable right to freedom of conscience and religion'. See Dreitzel, 'Toleranz und Gewissensfreiheit', p. 128. Clearly, to the extent that the right to freedom of conscience and religion involves freedom of public worship, then Thomasius did not regard this right as inviolable. Here Trusen is closer to the mark: 'Thomasius's doctrine ... is not a conception that could lead humanity out of its self-incurred immaturity. The German *Aufklärung*, represented by state-theorists and jurists, in no way promoted human and civil rights, but brought a strengthening of political or princely absolutism'. See Trusen, 'Rechtliche Grundlagen', p. 20. That both perspectives should be present in Thomasius's work is typical of the ambivalence of German *Staatskirchenrecht*.

²³ Cf., John Christian Laursen, 'Baylean Liberalism: Tolerance Requires Nontolerance,' in John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (eds), *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment* (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 197-215.

²⁴ The dissertation of July 1697 (*An Haeresis sit crimen?*) immediately provoked outraged responses from the Rostock theologian J. Fecht and from two members of the theology faculty at Thomasius's own university of Halle: the professor of theology Justus Joachim Breithaupt and his junior colleague Gustav Philipp Möil. For publication details, see Rolf Leiberwirth, *Christian Thomasius. Sein wissenschaftliches Lebenswerk* (Böhlau, 1955), p. 60.

²⁵ Epiphanius's *Panarium* — *Contra octoginta haereses opus, Panarium, sive*

Arcula, aut Capsula Medica appellatum, continens libros tres, & tomos sive sections ex toto septem — was a vast catalogue of heresies from the early church. It was translated from Greek into Latin in 1543, by Lutherans seeking to battle heresy inside Protestantism.

²⁶ For a modern study lending support to Thomasius's claims, see Michael H. Shank, 'Unless you believe, you shall not understand': *Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna* (Princeton N.J., 1988).

²⁷ For a different view, in which Thomasius's defence of toleration is seen as derived from an anthropologically grounded freedom of conscience, see Simone Zurbuchen, 'Ciewissensfreiheit und Toleranz: Zur Pufendorf-Rezeption bei Christian Thomasius,' in Palladini and Hartung (eds), *Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung*, pp. 169-80.

²⁸ See in particular Christian Thomasius, *Vollständige Et-täutening der Kirchenrechts-Gelahrtheit* (Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1740): bk. 2, pp. 349-50.

²⁹ See Pocock, 'Gibbon and the History of Heresy'. Cf., also Dreitzel, 'Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus', which locates Thomasius firmly in the context of Prussian 'reform absolutism'.

³⁰ The Brandenburg-Prussian solution was in keeping with both the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia and the political calculations of a Calvinist dynasty ruling over powerful Lutheran estates and significant Catholic and Calvinist minorities. See Bodo Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg* (Philadelphia, 1994). For the congruence between Thomasius's secularisation of law and Brandenburg *Religionspolitik*, see Ilinrich 'Thomasius und seine Schüler im brandenburgischen Staat,' in Hans Thieme (ed.), *Humanismus und Naturrecht in Berlin-Brandenburg-Preussen* (Berlin, 1979), pp. 76-89; and for a different view of this congruence, see Dreitzel 'Christliche Autklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus'.

³¹ Compare this with Dreitzel's comment on the ambivalence of Prussian reform absolutism more generally, which both drastically restricted doctrinal articles and stressed practical piety in order to foster toleration, while simultaneously rejecting freedom of communication as an essential element of freedom of conscience. See Dreitzel 'Christliche Autklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus', pp. 40-41.

³² See Samuel Pufendorf, *Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society*, ed. Simone Zurbuchen (Indianapolis, 2002).

Chapter 12

Exporting Heresiology: Translations and Revisions of Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des heresies*

Gisela Schluter

Introduction

In a chapter significantly entitled 'The Enlightened Orthodoxy of the Abbé Pluquet', Patrick Coleman analyses the abbé François-André-Adrien Pluquet's *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des égaremens de l'esprit humain par rapport à la religion chrétienne: ou Dictionnaire des hérésies, des erreurs et des schismes*, which first appeared in 1762/64.¹ Introducing the chapter, John Christian Laursen draws attention to the Italian and Spanish translations of this work, already available in the eighteenth century, and identifies a desirable area for research: 'Intriguingly, Pluquet's book was translated into Italian in 1771 and into Spanish in 1792. There must have been an ideological purpose and a perceived market in those countries for these volumes. The text could play a rather different role than it did in France. It would be interesting to know exactly what roles it was expected to play and actually played, and whether the translations were faithful to the original or tailored for local purposes.'²

In this chapter, I would like to take up this research challenge and focus on three translations or revisions of Pluquet's *Dictionary of Heresies* which appeared at different times in Italy, Germany, and France. Each envisaged a particular end; each had a different target audience; and each played a variety of roles within a specific context. Pluquet's work was in circulation in the era of Catholic Enlightenment in Italy; in Spain in the last years of the eighteenth century; during the period of the nineteenth century German religious 'Popular

Encyclopaedia'; and in the time of politicised Catholic theology in France between the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. The 1792 Spanish translation cannot for the moment be included.³

Translating writings of a certain political and, generally speaking, ideological relevance has always had a great variety of implications, as David Saunders has recently underlined in a detailed study of Barbeyrac's translations of Pufendorf's writings.⁴ Translations of this kind may merely try to mediate the original text; they may adjust it to different historical and/or local contexts,⁵ moderately or radically; and they may reconfigure the original text in order to make it serve particular political or ideological ends. The 'strategic art' of this kind of political adjustment may concern the 'paratexte'⁶ by modifying titles, adding dedications or/and introductions, glosses, footnotes or illustrations — or it may concern the text itself (the translator interfering by reordering the original text, excising parts of it or even mutilating it) and its specific political, theological, and religious terminology. Translations and adaptations of one source may be interdependent on each other, and this evidently complicates historical reconstruction. In our case, the aspect of potential interdependance can be left aside, for there are no explicit intertextual references. Yet the fact that it circulated in three such ideologically charged contexts as those just mentioned meant that Pluquet's original text would bear the marks of its several translations and receptions.

1.

Let us begin with the Italian translation, which appeared in several editions shortly after the publication of the original French version, and which should be considered in the context of the Italian and more particularly the Venetian Enlightenment.⁷ This translation is the work of the Teatiner priest Tommaso Antonio Contin (1723-1796),⁸ who has been described by Gregorio Piaia as 'a well-known exponent of Venetian reform, supporter of jurisdictionalism of the Sarpian school, and adversary of the Jesuits'.⁹ Contin's Italian translation was produced on the basis of the first edition of Pluquet's dictionary, which appeared in Paris between the years 1762 and

1764. In 1767 the work was released in Venice in five volumes with the title: *Dizionario dell'eresie, degli errori, e de' scismi: o sia Memorie per servire all 'Istoria degli Sviamenti dello Spirito umano rapporto alla Religione cristiana. Opera Tradotta dal Francese, ed accresciuta di Nuovi Articoli, Note ed Illustrazioni da Tom: Antonio Contin C.R. Primario Professore di Diritto Canonico nella Regia University di Parma*. As Contin explains in the redrafted second edition of his translation, one of the two publishers of the first edition, V. Radici, delayed publication of the first edition to such an extent and was responsible for so many printing errors that Contin and the other publisher, Giovanni Francesco Garbo, produced the second edition themselves. This second edition was released in Venice in six volumes in 1771-1772 with *Edizione seconda. Corretta, ed aumentata di un Sesto Tomo intorno 'le Frodi degli Eretici' dello stesso Traduttore* added to the title. My comments are based on this second Venetian edition, which was to provide the basis for the later Cervone version published in Naples in 1777.

Only in the fifth volume of the Venetian second edition published in 1772 do we find the translation of Pluquet's seminal *Discours préliminaire*, which has often been compared to Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*. Although Contin describes the *Discours préliminaire (Trattato)* in the first volume of his translation as, 'tin pezzo di Filosofia eccellente e singolare' Can excellent and unique piece of philosophy') (I: p. XIII), he then, in several later insertions, permits himself to include some criticism of Pluquet's text (e.g. V: p. 29). A further two translations by Contin can be found in the sixth volume of this second edition. These are, however, connected with Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies* only in that they both take heresy for their topic.¹⁰

Franco Venturi discovered that the men named at the end of the first volume, credited with granting permission to print the Venetian edition, were in fact among the leading representatives of Venetian anti-curialism.¹¹ Although Contin was a moderate supporter of the Enlightenment and a loyal Catholic, his translation and reworking of the *Dictionnaire des hérésies* indeed bear his clear ideological signature. The translation is marked by the influence of Contin's religious and political convictions, which were bound to the all important *giurisdizionalismo*.

arguments for the separation of church and state — of the Italian *Settecento* (eighteenth century) and which arose from the tradition of Paolo Sarpi. In his presentation of Pluquet's *Dictionnaire*, Coleman focuses on the author's Gallicanism, or commitment to a French national Catholicism (p. 228). It is in the strong jurisdictionalism and in his criticism of Counter-Reformation Italian Catholicism that the political and national characteristics of Contin's translation can be identified.¹²

In the revised second edition of his translation, Contin explains in an open letter to the publisher Garbo that the enormous demand for the first edition of the *Dizionario dell'eresie* made it necessary to produce a second, extended and revised edition (I, *Lettera del Traduttore allo Stampatore*, unpaginated). In several prefaces and comments on the volumes of this second edition, Contin addresses the criticisms of his translation that had been made after publication of the first edition. These criticisms related, on the one hand, to a purported falsification of the French original in the translation and, on the other hand, to his interference in and comments on Pluquet's text. Criticisms were also made of the translation enterprise as a whole. At this point, it should be noted that in my analysis of the second edition I have not discovered any falsification of the French text in the Italian translation. It should also be noted that Contin clearly marks any of his own commentaries on, or additions and corrections to, the French text, and, furthermore, distances himself from any aspects of Pluquet's *Dictionnaire* which might have proven incendiary in the Italian context; for example, Pluquet's 'perpetual hints at toleration' (I: XVII). There are but few items about individual heresies which Contin has added and marked with an asterisk.

Both striking and revealing is the inclusion of a longer item on the subject of Jansenism in the third volume of the *Dizionario* (*Giansenisti*, 111: pp. 15-43) in which Contin also addresses the issue of the expulsion of the Jesuits from France.¹³ Pluquet did not include Jansenism in his *Dictionnaire des hérésies*: he himself was known to be a Jansenist.¹⁴ Such a circumstance was bound to have provoked great interest from the Italian side since Jansenism played an important role in the Italian Enlightenment.¹⁵ Contin explains in an introductory section of his article on Jansenism that:

É tanto strepitoso il nome di Giansenisti da un Secolo in qua, the mi credo in debito di doverne dare la Storia, avendola ommessa l'Autor di questo Dizionario, o perch& in Francia non giudicava opportuno di dar pascolo al Fanatismo, esponendola; o perchè nel Giansenismo non abbia saputo trovare un'Eresia. (III: p. 15). [The term 'Jansenist' has become so controversial over the past century that I believe it to be my duty to chronicle the story of this group. I do this because the author of this dictionary neglected to do so, either because he felt that it was inappropriate at that time in France, to fan the flames of fanaticism through a historical portrayal such as this; or because he believed that Jansenism did not constitute a heresy].

Contin then explains that the Jansenism problem had been definitively defused ever since the 'fanatics' had been deprived of their powers. By 'fanatics' he means the Jesuits who, he insisted, had brought about the 'chimerical' problem of Jansenism. It should be noted here that the absence of Jansenism in Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies* constituted a significant gap. In the case of the three translations or revisions which constitute the subject of this chapter, this gap is filled by the translator's own items on Jansenism. Of particular significance is the debate on Jansenism with reference to the last revised edition to be discussed here, the 1847 French version, produced as part of the *Encyclopédie théologique* edited by the Abbé Migne.

To sum up the Italian version, let us recall that Contin's translation includes a focus on the jurisdictionalist aspects and thereby firmly places Pluquet's work in the particular context of the Italian Enlightenment. Contin addresses the issue of Jansenism and its Jesuit opponents and, in so doing, fills a significant lacuna in Pluquet's work, which may have been an indication of caution on the part of Pluquet, or possibly of his personal inclinations on the issue of Jansenism. In this and also in other contexts Contin polemicalises pointedly against the Jesuits, who were then under pressure in all corners in Europe. In an extensive *Dissertazione preliminare* in the first volume of his translation, Contin dealt in detail with the sources of the histories of heresies. He further furnished Pluquet's *Dictionnaire* with a systematic and critical compendium of sources both of heresiology and histories of heresy. In this manner, Contin enriched his edition of Pluquet's *Dictionnaire* with the critical *erudizione* which was still prevalent in Italian *illuminismo*, in particular among the Catholic *illuminismo* of the Muratori

tradition.

H.

A three-volume German translation of Pluquet's dictionary appeared between 1828-1829 in the Etlinger book and art dealer's shop in Würzburg under the title, *Ketzer-Lexicon, oder: geschichtliche Darstellung der Irrlehren, Spaltungen und sonderbaren Meinungen im Christenthume, von Anbeginne desselben bis auf unsere Zeiten, in alphabetischer Ordnung. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt, vielfach verbessert rind sehr vermehrt*. The translator was a Catholic priest by the name of Peter Fritz (1772-1854) who lived in the diocese of Würzburg in the province of Franconia. Only scant details about his personal background are available, however.¹⁶ His translation and revision takes Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies* from the context of the French capital and relocates it in the southern German province, and from the period of Enlightenment takes it into the era of the *Vormerirz* and the Restoration. The situation of the German Catholic Church in Southern Germany was greatly affected by the signing of a concordat between State and Church for the kingdom of Bavaria in the year 1817, and by the accession to the throne of Ludwig I of Bavaria in 1825. Peter Fritz's undertaking to translate Pluquet should be considered within the historical and geographical framework of Bavarian political Catholicism under Ludwig I.

In his preface, the translator emphasises that the purpose of his translation is to strengthen the Catholic Church and defend her against her enemies who had begun to campaign against her 'mit erneuerter Wuth'(I: p.V) ('with renewed fury'). The *Ketzer-Lexicon* was, according to Father Fritz, addressed at 'angehende Theologen, junge Geistliche' ('prospective theologians and young clergy'), as well as at the 'den Weltmann, bei dem Religion noch einen Werth hat'(I: p. V) ('man of the world to whom religion still remains of value'). The motivation for the translation was the fact that 'im katholischen Deutschland and in deutscher Zunge, noch kein Werk dieser Art vorhanden ist' (I: p. VII) On Catholic Germany and in the German tongue, no comparable work is as yet available'). The purpose of this German translation of Pluquet's dictionary was to place a Catholic work

alongside other German works about the history of heresies, which were largely written by Protestants, or rather by Protestant dissidents. The learnedness of this Catholic work was greatly stressed by Fritz.

A significant justification for the translation was the difficulty of gaining access while living in a German province to all the many and varied texts and other sources which were required in order to gain a picture of the turbulent history of heresy:

The history of heresy does indeed constitute one of the most significant chapters in works dealing with church history. It is, however, a most laborious and time-consuming task, a task which involves consulting several volumes or works to come to understand a heresy or a schism from its commencement, through its development, and up until its demise. But few can afford or are so fortuitously located geographically as to be able to procure for themselves costly and lengthy works, or to gain admission to extensive libraries. But these volumes offer inexpensively all the information one might need. (I: p. VI)

The German translation was not aimed at the educated audience of the capital cities, as were the dictionaries of Pluquet and Contin, but rather at the priests and laymen of a southern German province, and with this in mind it was adapted to their practical need for a more compact and affordable source of information. It should not be forgotten that Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century was enjoying a heyday of compilations and a popularising of knowledge accompanied by the appearance of large encyclopaedias from Brockhaus, Meyer, and Herder. In addition, the German encyclopaedias of this time, the so-called 'conversation lexicons' or 'encyclopaedias of general knowledge for educated laymen', often had a denominational bias.

In contrast to its Italian counterpart, the German translation follows the structure of the French original. It begins with the translation of the *Discours préliminaire* in the first volume and continues with the alphabetical compendium of heresies in the two subsequent volumes. As declared in his introduction, the translator presents some of Pluquet's articles in revised versions, further items being written by the translator himself in order to fill in the gaps arising from the specifically German and contemporary context. The alterations and annotations are all

marked as such. The annotations mostly concern religious and church issues and not the political or indeed general ideological topics addressed in the later French revised edition, which will be discussed in the following section. Admittedly, several of the passages which were annotated by the translator Fritz have features which are markedly anti-Enlightenment, and do indeed polemicise against French and German 'philosophism'. In particular, against the background of restoration Bavarian Catholicism, Fritz criticises the willingness of German Catholicism to reach compromises with the Enlightenment.¹⁷ It is, above all, in the article on 'indifferentists'¹⁸ which Fritz himself wrote and added to Pluquet's dictionary that he criticises, from a somewhat abstract ideological perspective, the religious and ecclesiastic developments in the wake of the Enlightenment.

Indifferentist is the term given to those who consider it of no consequence which religious system one believes. They can be divided up into the coarse and the fine. The former maintain that it matters nothing which religion one adheres to, whether to natural religion or to some revealed religion. The latter are of the opinion that natural religion is not sufficient, but that among the revealed religions each could lead an individual to salvation. From the plethora of sects within Christianity, each purporting to be the true one, there finally arose an attitude of indifference known as 'indifferentism', the last spawn of false belief. (11/2: p. 285)

Prominent Protestants of the early Enlightenment, such as John Locke, Jean Leclerc, Jean Claude, and Pierre Jurieu are accused of having strengthened this fateful trend towards indifferentism, and of having encouraged the movements of deism and rationalism. 'It goes without saying that the deists, rationalists, etc., lead as the vanguard in the ranks of the indifferentists' (11/2: p. 287).

To sum up the German version, it must be considered within the context of the contemporary 'conversation lexicons' or encyclopaedias of general knowledge, which were, to some extent, denominationally biased. The translation was adapted to the needs of an audience which was certainly bound to the church, but did not consist exclusively of clergy. Its intended purpose was to overcome the educational backwardness in the German province and to consolidate Catholic orthodoxy. The interventions of the translator in the text contain a determined

criticism of the Enlightenment and of religious indifferentism. In this context, the translator recurs now and again to recent German philosophy. A good example of this can be seen in his remarks on 'Kantian views on the issue of the Trinity' (in the item on 'Antitrinitarians', II/1: pp. 104-106). These remarks ultimately adjudge Kant to have contravened the rules of exegesis by applying his philosophical system as a foundation for biblical exegesis (p. 106). In this manner the pious Catholic reader is also made aware of the explosive theological implications in contemporary German philosophy.

After the release of a revised French edition of Pluquet's dictionary in two volumes in 1818 in Besancon, to which a piece on Jansenism, among others, had been added,¹⁹ there was a further release of Pluquet's dictionary around 20 years later, shortly before the outbreak of the February Revolution in 1848. This edition was, in fact, to become volumes 11 and 12 of the highly-prestigious *Encyclopédic théologique*, edited by the Abbé Jacques-Paul Migne (1800-1875): *Dictionnaire des hérésies, des erreurs et des schismes, ou Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des égarements de l'esprit humain par rapport à la religion chrétienne [...] par Pluquet*.²⁰ The title page makes clear that the work had been increased by more than 400 items, which were specially marked; that it had been extensively updated; and that the *Discours préliminaire* had also been revised and enlarged. The Abbé Justin-Joseph Claris is named as responsible for the translation and revision. There are, however, no biographical details available about the translator. The work is dedicated to Pope Pius IX.

The *Encyclopédie théologique* edited by Migne appeared between 1844 and 1866 in a total of 171 volumes. Individual volumes were generally composed of older encyclopaedias and lexicons which had been updated and expanded respectively. It stood to reason that the editor of the time would have had recourse to Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies*. The 1847 edition²¹ is furnished with a densely inscribed copperplate engraving on the first page, which carries the following title: 'Arbre apostologique otit l'on voit la succession non interrompue de

l'Eglise catholique depuis les Ap'titres de Jésus-Christ jusqu'd nous, ainsi que les principaux hérétiques et Schismatiques qui ont été retranchés de sa communion dans les différents siècles' ['Apostolic tree from which one can trace back the unbroken tradition of the Catholic Church from the apostles until our present day, as well as the principle Heretics and Schismatics, who have over the course of various centuries been excluded from communion with them']. This *Arbre apostologique*, which bears some remote resemblance to D'Alembert's *Arbre généalogique et encyclopédique* in his *Discours préliminaire* to the famous *Encyclopédie*, is concentrated on the figure of Jesus Christ, who is depicted sitting at the foot of an immense vine tree: 'I am the vine; you are the branches' (John 15: 5). At the periphery of the tree there are fruitless and dried out branches and vines which are labelled 'Hérétiques et Schismatiques' ['Heretics and Schismatics'], including names and a detailed list. The branches and vines bearing fruit represent, on the one hand, the 'Docteurs et Saints' ['Church Fathers and Saints'] in corresponding detail, as well as the 'Peuples convertis' ['Converted Peoples']. The trunk, with Jesus at its foot, depicts the 'Tapes et Conciles principaux' ['Popes and Principle Councils'], again listed by name.

A project such as the *Encyclopédie théologique* naturally also necessitated the inclusion of a compendium of the heresies which had appeared over the course of church history, and therefore the editor Claris, as he himself writes in an *Avertissement* at the beginning of the book (I: 10), took it upon himself to compile such a list. In doing so, he looked to Pluquet's dictionary for orientation: 'ouvrage généralement estimé, que nous reproduisons *textuellement* [translator's emphasis].' In addition to this introductory remark, a detailed biographical sketch of the Abbé Pluquet is added (I: pp. 10-24), followed by an introduction by the editor, and then by Pluquet's *Discours préliminaire*. In this edition, Pluquet's comments on the history of the church and of heresy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were revised and altered, and chapters on the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, which also included detailed treatments of Jansenism, were added. After Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies* at the end of volume two, there is a comprehensive *Dictionnaire des Jansénistes*. It can

therefore be concluded that a significant reason for producing this new edition of Pluquet's history of heresies was to ensure the historiographical documentation and description of the Jansenist movement. There is, as is only natural to expect, no mention of Pluquet's Jansenist affinities in the *Notice biographique*.

As declared on the title page, a remarkable number of new articles were included. These additions were partly a result of the historical scholarliness of those working in collaboration with Migne, the most important French publisher of theological literature of the nineteenth century.²² Further additions related to the politically and philosophically controversial issues of the period: *Communisme*, *Constitutionnels*, *Criticisme*, *Hégélianisme*, *Progrès*,²³ *Saint-Simonisme*, *Sociétés secrètes* (this article dealt predominantly with the freemasons and the *carbonari*), *Socialistes*, *Spinosisme*, just to mention a few of the notable examples. The fact that in these additions, not only entire philosophical schools, but also political leanings and groups, were classified as heresies from the Catholic standpoint can arguably be judged as a response to the contemporary French reform Catholicism, so deeply influenced by liberalism and socialism.²⁴

Although it has not been possible to enter into great detail in the analysis of the last revised edition of Pluquet's dictionary, we can bear in mind, at this point, at least the following aspects of the Migne edition. There was an incentive to also include the history of Jansenism in Pluquet's history of heresies. There was an examination of the constitutionalist, liberal, and socialist tendencies within the highly politicised French Catholicism of the first half of the nineteenth century. There was both a blurring of the semantic boundaries and a political functionalisation of the term *heresy*, tendencies which were also actively promoted from the Catholic side. With these trends, the term *heresy* naturally began to lose its theological conciseness. (English translation by Sheila Regan)

¹ Patrick Coleman, 'The Enlightened Orthodoxy of the Abbé Pluquet', in J. C. Laursen, (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration* (New York, 2002), pp. 223-38.

² John Christian Laursen, 'Enlightened Orthodoxy: Introduction', in Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe*, pp. 221-22.

³ This translation is cited in Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispanoamericano*, t. XIII: Pluques [recte: Pluquet], Abate, *Diccionario historico de las herejias, errores y cismas o Memorias historicas acerca de los errores del entendimiento humano respecto de la religion cristiana* (2 vols, Madrid, 1792), 4°. I am grateful to Titus Heydenreich of the Hispanic Department at the University of Erlangen for this reference. The Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid has been unable to provide information about this work. I am grateful to John Christian Laursen and to Peter Dolgenos (Sutro Library, San Francisco) for helping me to find the first volume of this rare work in the Sutro Library: *Diccionario historico de las herejias, errores y cismas, o Memorias Historicas acerca de los errores del entendimiento humano, respecto de la Religion Christiana [...]*, obra escrita en frances por el S.or Abate Pluquet, y traducido al castellano. Con licencia. (Madrid, 1792). (Call Number BT 1313 P 58 S 61796). Unfortunately, the Sutro Library owns only the first volume which neither indicates the translator's name nor does it contain any introduction by the translator or the editor. The first volume consists of the long *Discurso preliminar* written by Pluquet, with a striking printing error (Siglo Primero: Cap. Nacimiento del Christianismo, sus progresos entre los Indios [recte: Judios], y obstáculos que encuentra).

⁴ David Saunders, 'The natural jurisprudence of Jean Barbeyrac: Translation as an art of political adjustment', *Eighteenth Century Studies*, 36/4 (2003): 473-490.

⁵ Ibid., p. 473: 'Because words have histories, translating is not an ahistorical enterprise. Whether transferring a writing of yesterday across time for readers of today, or translocating a writing across space from its place and language of origin to a different place and language of reception, translation involves adjustment. When it confronts religious conflicts and political disputes, adjustment via translation can be a strategic art, a weapon for serious struggle'.

⁶ See Gérard Genette, *Seuils* (Paris, 1982).

⁷ For further information about the Italian Enlightenment, see Dino Carpanetto and Giuseppe Ricuperati, *Italy in the Age of Reason, 1685-1789*, translation C. Higgitt (London, 1986), as well as Nicholas Davidson, 'Toleration in Enlightenment Italy', in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds), *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 230-249.

⁸ Further details about Tommaso Antonio Contin can be found in P. Preto, 'Contin, Tommaso Antonio', in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 28 (Rome, 1983), pp. 509-512, as well as in Franco Venturi, *Settecento riformatore H: La chiesa e la repubblica dentro i loro limiti, 1758-1774* (Turin, 1976), *passim*; see especially, pp. 129-131 on Contin's translation of Pluquet's *Dictionnaire des hérésies*.

⁹ Gregorio Piaia, 'I. Francois-André-Adrien Pluquet (1716-1790), *Examen du Fatalisme*', in *Il secondo Illuminismo e l'eta kantiana*, ed. Giovanni Santinelli et al., (Padua, 1988), vol. I, pp. 226-241; here, p. 227.

¹⁰ This volume consists of a translation of *De Fraudibus Haereticorum, ad Orthodoxos*, an anonymous tract which appeared in 1677, and a translation of

Commonitorium adversus omnes haereses, a tract by Vincent de Lerins [Vincenzio Lirinese] (fifth Century). The sixth volume was also published separately in 1772 by Garbo in Venice under Contin's name with the title *Caratteri dell'Eresia proposti a' veri Ortodossi*.

¹¹ Venturi, *Settecento riformatore* II, p. 129, n.l (Sebastian Zustinian, Andrea Tron, Sebastian Foscari).

¹² 'Il tono [del *Dizionario dell'eresie*] era ortodosso, ma continua pure, nelle aggiunte di Contin, una dura polemica contro il cattolicesimo della controriforma.' 'The tone of the *Dizionario dell'eresie* was orthodox, and yet Contin's annotations pursue an avid polemic against Counter-Reformation Catholicism.' Ibid., p. 129. Contin's *giurisdizionalismo* can, for example, be clearly seen at an early stage in his 'Translator's Preface' to the first volume, 'Avvertimento del Traduttore', in which Contin, in an act of polemical irritation, counters the allegation that in the first edition of his translation he had, in a comment on Pluquet's text, deemed that the 'autorità del Papa nelle disposizioni beneficiarie ed altre cose civili o miste', ('the authority of the Pope in questions of livings and other secular and combined affairs') was irrelevant to the 'essenza della Religione', ('essence of religion') (I, *Avvertimento del Traduttore*, unpaginated).

¹³ Cf. John McManners, *Church and Society in Eighteenth-Century France: The Religion of the People and the Politics of Religion* (2 vols, Oxford, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 423-455, 509-561.

¹⁴ [Pluquet] era considerato un giansenista, anche se nei suoi scritti si riscontrano poche tracce delle dottrine giansenistiche', ('Pluquet was considered a Jansenist, although in his writings there is scant evidence of the Jansenist ideas.'). Piaia, Francois-André-Adrien Pluquet', p. 226. Pluquet's dictionary was received with great acclaim by the Jesuit journal *Mémoires de Trévoux*, as pointed out by Patrick Coleman. The Jesuit reviewer indicated that he was pleased that Pluquet had completely omitted all mention of Jansenism (Coleman, p. 226).

¹⁵ For further information, see the older but still pertinent study by Arturo Carlo Jemolo, *Il giansenismo in Italia prima della rivoluzione* (Bari, 1928).

¹⁶ See H. Kellner, 'Fritz, Peter F.', in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Berlin, 1968), vol. 8, p. 115.

¹⁷ For more on southern German Restoration Catholicism of this period, see Ludwig Holzfurtner, 'Katholische Restauration in Romantik und Vormärz: Ludwig I.', in Walter Brandmüller (ed.), *Handbuch der bayerischen Kirchengeschichte: Vom Reichsdeputationshauptschluss bis zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*, ed. (St. Ottilien, 1991), vol. 3, pp. 131-165. For more information on contemporary German Catholicism, see also Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866* (Munich, 1983), pp. 403-23: 'Der Katholizismus'.

¹⁸ Félicité de Lamennais's widely read *Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion* appeared in 1817-1823. The first volume of this work was translated into German in 1820.

¹⁹ Further items dealing with controversial topics were added: 'Tonstitutionnels', 'Quesnélisme', 'Richer'. In 1819, Pluquet's nephew declared an official protest against these inclusions, cf. 'Pluquet, Francois-André-Adrien', in Michaud, *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne*, nouv. éd. (Paris, undated), vol. 3, pp. 540-543, at p. 542.

²⁰ This edition appeared in 1847/1853, again in two volumes. The latest edition is available as a reprint: *Dictionnaire des hérésies des erreurs et des schismes*, published by M. l'Abbé J. P. Migne (2 vols, Amsterdam, 1969).

²¹ This illustration is missing in the reprint of the 1847/1853 edition.

²² See, among others, A-G. Hamman, *Jacques-Paul Migne. Le retour aux Pères de l'Eglise* (Paris, 1975).

²³ 'La doctrine du progrès indéfini est aujourd'hui une sorte de religion, qui n'est pas très-orthodoxe: c'est pourquoi nous en parlons ici.' (vol. I. p. 1135) 'The doctrine of indefinite progress is today almost a type of religion, a religion which is not entirely orthodox: that is why we speak of it here'.

²⁴ For historical-theological context see, Louis Foucher, *La philosophie catholique en France au XIXe siècle: Avant la renaissance thomiste et dans son rapport avec elle, 1800-1880* (Paris, 1955).

Chapter 13

Radical Heretics, Martyrs, or Witnesses of Truth? The Albigenses in Ecclesiastical History and Literature (1550-1850)

Sandra Pott

Introduction

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century the so-called Albigenses were seen as the most significant and threatening medieval heretics.¹ As early as the thirteenth century, the first crusades by the Catholic Church on western European territory were directed against them. The Inquisition was created as a response to the threat of this heresy (part 1). My purpose in this chapter is not to examine the historical heresy but to reexplore the reception of the Albigenses in early modern histories of heresy.² Reception in this case means conflict, a conflict not only between Catholicism and Protestantism but within Protestantism itself. Although Protestant scholars borrowed and copied not only from Catholic sources but also from each other, their interpretations were just as biased.

When histories of heresy adopted the patterns of church history it was the merit of Johann Lorenz Mosheim, the so-called 'father of the new church history', to introduce a certain impartiality into the debate. Late in the nineteenth century this sort of impartiality helped to create a more historical historiography of the Albigenses (part II). Literature participated considerably in this movement. In his long poem, *The Albigenses [Die Albigenser]* (1842), Nicolaus Lenau not only rediscovered one of the most important documents on the history of the crusades but reinterpreted the heresy as well as its contradictory interpretations on an anthropological level (part III). Both contributions should be seen as highlights in the ongoing

discussion of the Albigenses.

1.

Before turning to the early modern discussions of the Albigenses, a short introduction to the Occitan heresy may be helpful. Due to a lack of sources, scholarship has always been speculative.³ Today we are faced with two different tendencies: The dominant pattern is still the classic narrative of Catharism. According to Arno Borst and others, the Albigenses shared the Cathars' beliefs and religious cults which makes it possible to deduce several characteristics of Cathar thought. These centrally included dualism, the division of communities into a group of 'Consolated' or 'good men' and of 'Tredentes', the negation of hell, and reduction of religion to morals.⁴

The second perspective — not yet widely acknowledged, but historically convincing — states the contrary that there was no organized Church, no coherent belief with relations to the Bogomils, to Catharism or other sects believing in dualism. Following Mark Gregory Pegg, we only know about the crusades against the 'good men' and 'women' and against Raimund VI, count of Toulouse.⁵ When in 1209 a servant of Raimund murdered the pontifical legate Peter of Castelnau, Pope Innocent III called for the first crusade against the Albigenses. Between 1209 and 1218 Simon of Montfort's army conquered Occitania. Simon was killed in 1218 and Raimund VI reconquered his country. Increasingly, the battles were motivated by political interests. In 1226 King Louis VIII of France started the last crusade, supported by the Holy See. The political result was an agreement between Raimund VII and Louis VIII, the contract of Meaux, signed in 1229. Through marriage politics, Occitania would fall into the French king's hands. The religious result turned out to be disastrous: Raimund VII was forced to fight the Albigenses. He had to empower tribunals of Inquisition which the Dominicans were charged with from 1231. The first official trial took place in Toulouse in 1233.⁶ In consequence, the 'good men' and 'women' fled into the Pyrenees and Occitania lost its identity. The Albigenses became one of the most negative examples of heresy in Catholic church history.

Protestant historiography was different, but not completely different. Several hundred years after the end of the crusades it rediscovered the twelfth- and thirteenth-century heresies as positive examples of the only true religion. The reason for this originated in the Reformations themselves. Protestants had to solve two problems. How could they legitimate another new Christian church after more than fifteen hundred years of Christianity — against Catholicism on the one hand *and* against the heretic churches on the other? As far as Catholicism was concerned, Protestant scholars had to revalue the medieval heresies. As far as the heresies themselves were concerned, they had to devalue the heretical churches in order to demonstrate the superiority of Lutheranism or Calvinism. In consequence, the heresies were seen as forerunners, not as spiritual contemporaries, of Protestantism. The heretics did not teach 'the' true doctrine but testified to the truth and should be remembered as 'witnesses of truth', a topos still alive in Protestant historiography into the twentieth century.⁷ Looking at the Albigenses, even this construction of witnesses was problematic in later reception, as there was no direct contact with Protestantism. However, what about a certain religious heritage that might have survived in the oral tradition as well as in the new Catholic doctrines which were invented to destroy the sects? Or, last but not least, what about certain structural analogies between the 'reformations'?

Both revaluation and devaluation of the Albigenses were resolved in the same ways. I shall present six interpretations of the heresy. This is of course only a selection, but a representative one. It will give insight into a process that is characteristic of the histories of heresy written in Switzerland and Germany:⁸

1. In the light of the Reformation, the Albigenses are Christians, even if they are radical heretics. Influenced by various sects in sixteenth-century Strasbourg, the spiritualist Sebastian Franck (ca. 1500-1542 or 43) in his *Historical Bible* (1531) presented the Albigenses as radical Christians.⁹ According to him, the Albigenses fundamentally pursued the right aims but, due to a narrow interpretation of the Bible, they could only realize its literal sense. That was the first step towards a positive recognition of the heretical movement.

2. Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-1575), a relatively orthodox Lutheran theologian, added another consideration. Apart from the Straßburg theologian Ludovicus Rabus (1524-1592),¹⁰ a Lutheran as well, Flacius is the most important representative of the witnesses-topos. Against the Catholic *Catalogue of Heretics* written by the grand inquisitor of Cologne, Bernhard of Luxemburg (1522), Flacius's *Catalogue of Witnesses of Truth* (1556) not only serves as an edition of medieval texts on heresy but also lays down the fundamental lines of interpretation for the topos. Against the suggested historical dominance of Catholicism, Flacius describes an overwhelming continuity in the 'ecclesia Dei'¹¹ of Protestant witnesses from antique times until Luther.¹² Flacius focuses on Johannes Tauler (11361), John Wyclif (t 1384), Jan Hus (11384), and Johannes of Staupitz (11524), whom Luther read and held in some esteem. Thanks to Flacius the Waldensians became the most prominent example of medieval heretical Protestants.¹³ But he does not consider the Albigenses as heretics, explaining his decision in the *Centuries of Magdeburg* (1574).¹⁴ In this document of Lutheran historiography he accuses the clergy of having falsified Albigensian belief and history. For that reason they only seemed to have had strange ideas, an argument 'ex negativo' which leads to a second positive recognition of the Occitan heresy.

3. But someone had already gone further. Earlier than Flacius, Jean Crespin (ca. 1520-1572), Calvinist lawyer and printer, wrote a *Book of Martyrs* (1554), an important Reformed document and a successful book with several reeditions.¹⁵ It might have inspired Rabus and Flacius to a certain extent. As the book's title announces, Crespin adapted Catholic martyrology. Protestantism astonishingly developed its own martyrology, although it fought against hagiography and personal cult. Until Otto Michaelis's *Book of Protestant Martyrs* (1917) such Protestant martyrologies went hand in hand with the witnesses-topos.¹⁶ But martyrology tended more towards moral reflection. Its aim was not so much a theological one: martyrs should serve as shining pedagogic examples.¹⁷ Suffering physically, their blood flowed to persuade simple people. But according to Crespin blood was less important than moral or religious purpose.¹⁸ A real martyr had to defend Christ's word

and fight against hatred.

As we have seen, in early modern histories of heresy two different narratives developed. There was a tale of the only true belief, way of living, protest, and struggle against a decadent clergy written by those who defended the 'witnesses of truth', on the one hand, and a tale of woe on the other, a tale of suffering, blood, a devotional book of Protestant martyrology. Crespin was the first to tell such a story. But although the purpose and style of his *Book of Martyrs* differ from the witnesses-tale, he mentions the same examples. He provides a Protestant history of martyrs since the apostles' times. His emphasis is on Hus, and the Albigenses and Waldensians are rarely mentioned. But Crespin refers to them as if he was reporting one phenomenon.¹⁹ According to him, Albigenses and Waldensians were the first martyrs, before Wycliff and Hus.²⁰ In Crespin's footsteps Protestant and especially Calvinist — historiography mingled Waldensians and Albigenses.

4. So did the radical Pietist Gottfried Arnold in his highly influential *Impartial History of the Church and its Heretics* (1699/1700). In spite of its title the text is well-known for its partiality. It evoked harsh critiques from orthodox elements of the Lutheran clergy. Arnold went too far in describing his 'witnesses' — that was the opinion of his adversaries. He was said to have changed honourable clergyman into infidels and vice versa.²¹ This is an astonishing critique, given the long Protestant tradition of the witnesses-topos. I shall explore whether the critique is nevertheless justified.

Arnold is a master of black and white depiction. As far as the Catholic church, scholastic erudition, and political authority are concerned, he applies the pattern of 'deformatio'. According to his opinion, the thirteenth century was marked by simony, usury, indulgence, idolatry, crusades; in short, by the tyranny of Innocent 111.²² Where 'deformatio' reigns 'reformatio' is necessary. In Arnold's view the largest group of witnesses were the Waldensians, a group to which he also attributes the names 'Manicheans, Arians, Cathars'.²³ The Albigenses belong in this general tendency of heresy, which is constituted not so much by a certain belief but by pure morals,²⁴ by an ideal life, and by the fact that people were victims of a violent church and of political authority. Heresies occur when sins and errors grow, and that

was the case at the end of the twelfth century. Innocent, the 'maker of heretics', proceeded to incredible atrocities. He called crusades and institutionalized the Inquisition — these tribunals run by 'frantic dogs'.²⁵ The result was to be foreseen. The 'good Waldensians' suffered the most and took refuge in the forest until they again emerged, as Wycliffites and Hussites.²⁶

According to Arnold, on the one hand stood the ignorant who persecuted, on the other the morally superior victims who risked their life for truth. This was a very simple model for writing a history of heresies. Lutheran orthodoxy was not completely wrong in attacking Arnold. Its polemics might have been one reason that the famous Berlin theologian Isaac of Beausobre in his *History of Manicheism* (1734) followed Arnold only cautiously. He may have been inspired by the Dominican Jean Benoit.²⁷ In his *History of the Albigenses and Waldensians* (1691) Benoit fought the Albigenses, calling them a 'Manichean monstrosity'.²⁸ Beausobre changed Benoit's argumentation to the opposite effect. The Albigenses become good Manicheans. But against Arnold and Beausobre another Protestant theologian pleaded for a more sophisticated point of view.

5. Johann Lorenz Mosheim's church history (1741) differed from Arnold in several respects. First, Mosheim intended to deal with the real, historical Albigenses and not with a supra-historical phenomenon. Second, he called the Albigenses heretics as well as 'enemies of the church' and defined them by deviation. Heretics were those who either refused the church's authority or who taught doctrines that contradicted Catholic dogmas.²⁹ Third, Mosheim rejected black and white church history. According to him, both sides, the Albigenses and the clergy, were guided by errors, although the clergy was driven by scandalous luxury and committed more crimes than the 'sect'. Mosheim focused on the historical interaction. He regarded Innocent III as developing the church's hierarchy and introducing new dogmas, thereby giving the heretics reasons for deviation from the church.³⁰ But by their increasing number, the Albigenses threatened Rome. A war took place, with terrifying cruelties on both sides.³¹ Unlike Arnold, Mosheim was sceptical of the continuation of this heresy, doubting that there were any remains of Cathar belief after the war in southern France.³² In Mosheim's church history, the Albigenses lost the moral

character Crespin, Arnold, and Beausobre had attributed to them. Mosheim never speaks of 'witnesses of truth'. He was one of the first to write a nearly impartial and historical religious historiography of all Christian tendencies and groups.³³

6. But in Arnold's and especially in Beausobre's more or less Calvinist footsteps the sixth interpretation of the 'good men' developed. Several theologians and historians speculated about a dualistic or Manichean 'stream of consciousness' that went straight through religious history. Johann Conrad Füssli (1704-1775), a Reformed Swiss parson, was one of them. In his *New and Impartial History of Churches and Heresies* (1770/2) Füssli provides a history of heresies of Switzerland. Criticising Catholic and Protestant sources, he decisively distinguishes the Albigenses and Waldensians.³⁴ His reason is the dualistic myth of creation supported by the Albigenses or 'new Manicheans'.³⁵ Although Füssli is sceptical towards the Albigenses he shows a certain sympathy for their fate. Nevertheless, both Mosheim's historical and Füssli's dualistic interpretation of the Albigenses come to the same conclusion: Raimund and his people can no longer claim religious or moral authority.³⁶

In his popular *Book of Marlyrs* (1852) the Protestant parson Theodor Fliedner (1800-1864) followed in Füssli's footsteps in being sceptical of the Albigenses. According to Fliedner, the Albigenses were one of the few sects who really preached false doctrines.³⁷ The history of heresies was wrong to mingle them with the Waldensians, even if this was done to legitimate Protestant belief. As in Füssli's *New and Impartial History*, Fliedner's reason is the dualism. The Albigenses, he writes, believed in a good and a bad God as well as in the resurrection of the body, and they rejected the Trinity, Christology, and the Old Testament.³⁸ It was not by mere accident that the Albigenses were fought by the crusaders. Rome won 'externally', writes Fliedner: The Albigenses possessed only 'human arms'. They were not really inspired, and the Roman Catholic church was right to extinguish this 'impure fire'.³⁹

History repeats itself. Late in Protestant historiography the Albigenses were seen as negative examples. Although with Fliedner the history of the interpretations of the Albigenses seemed to have reached its final period of devaluation, the history of this heresy does not end here. The 'witnesses of truth'

topos as well as Protestant martyrology continued as a sort of *longue durée* phenomenon.

HI.

False heresy or enormous contest? Dangerous error or real human truth? In the nineteenth century the Albigenses became a dazzling phenomenon that attracted English, French, and German writers.⁴⁰ When the history of heresies was rewritten in heroic poetry it exchanged religious for secular and anthropological interest. Charles Robert Maturin's (1780-1824) *Albigenses* (1824),⁴¹ Frédéric Bonhomme's (1851) *The Albigensian Woman* (1898), a verse-drama,⁴² and *The Albigensian Woman* (1933)⁴³ by the Austrian author Ludwig Huna (1872-1945) present the Albigenses in very positive ways. They are the 'witnesses of truth', the living martyrs. I shall deal with a more complex text that is well-informed by nineteenth-century religious historiography,⁴⁴ Nicolaus Lenau's *The Albigenses* (1842). Lenau (1802-1850) was the *enfant terrible* of late Romanticism as well as a poet of the 'Pre-March' (*Vormärz*), German's pre-revolutionary movement before 1848. *The Albigenses* deals with cruelty and revolution.⁴⁵ Referring to the crusades in Occitania, its 30 poems focus on reflections, personal motivations, dogma, struggle, battle, last refuges, victims, and fighters, all subjects in line with the political atmosphere and occurrences of the 'Pre-March' (e.g. the persecution of demagogues, the protest and dismissal of the 'Göttinger Sieben'). The order of the poems is in part chronological but mainly thematic. *The Albigenses* begins with the murder of Peter of Castelnau in January 1208, mentions the murder of Simon of Montfort in 1218, and ends with the death of the person who caused the crusades, Innocent III, on 16th July 1216.⁴⁶ In Lenau's text history is abridged and reversed in favour of personal destiny and general reflection.

The poem's form follows its content: Lenau announces that he uses free verse but most of the strophes have ten or eleven syllables with rhymes at the end. It is not by mere accident that the form is reminiscent of the old *canzon*, the tradition of the troubadours. Lenau knew about a very long poem written by the

troubadour Guilelm de Tudela (an Occitan contemporary and a pro-crusader), but continued by an anonymous anti-crusader. In 1837 M. C. Fauriel translated the text from Occitan into French: *History in verse on the crusade against the Albigensian heretics* (1837)⁴⁷ — it tells the story of the crusades in verse. This poem suddenly became one of the most important sources on the history of the Albigenses.

Like Lenau's text, the *History* begins with the murder of Peter of Castelnau and ends with the death of Simon of Montfort, and late in the 130th and 131st couplets the Albigenses become the heroes.⁴⁸ Another similarity between *The Albigenses* and the *History* lies in the characterization and dramatization of the crusades. The troubadour describes exactly the same figures as Lenau does: Fulco, bishop of Toulouse, plays a difficult and duplicitous role,⁴⁹ Simon of Montfort seems to be a noble man,⁵⁰ Roger of Béziers is presented very favourably.⁵¹ Taking this into account, Lenau's *Albigenses* should be seen as a re-interpretation of the *canzon* written by de Tudela and the anonymous author.⁵² Lenau's re-interpretation humanizes the text, stressing the ambivalence of the historical occurrences.

I. The ambivalence of personal motivations

Although Lenau shows a certain sympathy for the Cathars' goals, firstly, he evokes doubt concerning the human feelings of the Albigenses. In 'Song to the night' (*Nachtgesang*) for example, Lenau depicts an anonymous Albigensian fighter who feels lonely, desires a woman, but disciplines himself in the name of ascetic belief. He sings the war of the Albigenses instead of behaving in a human manner.⁵³

Secondly, Lenau demonstrates the complex feelings and ideas of the Catholics.⁵⁴ Innocent III seems to be motivated by true belief. He seeks to preserve the unity of Christianity,⁵⁵ hopes to secure the church's paintings and bells against the iconoclasts,⁵⁶ and fears a self-made paganism.⁵⁷ Another example is Fulco, bishop of Toulouse and former troubadour (ca. 1180-1195, died in 1231). Lenau's *Fulco-poem* begins with the question why the troubadour associated with the murdering church. The answer turns out to be purely human. It was disappointed love.⁵⁸ Here, Lenau closely reproduces another

source, Friedrich Diez's *Life and Works of the Troubadours* (1829),⁵⁹ in verse.

Thirdly, Lenau invents a layer of common experience. Two troubadours consider their role in a world that is destroyed by war and conflict. Happiness and love are gone. When Bertrand de Born, famous political troubadour of Occitania, describes the crusade as a knightly enterprise,⁶⁰ Lenau's troubadours oppose his ideal. In this war about heaven and hell, the honour of the knight belongs to past times. Troubadours become useless.⁶¹ According to Lenau's desperate troubadours, neither Bertrand nor Fulco are right; the troubadours kill each other, not knowing where to turn. Their peaceful equivalents occur later. 'Knight and Monk' (*Ritter and Minch*) tells the story of a knight who lost his horse and a monk who lost his belief in the Catholic church. The monk cries; in the destroyed landscape both men — originally fighting for different parties — make friends with each other.

2. The ambivalence of belief.

In the matter of belief, the most important poem is 'The cave' (*Die Höhle*) where Dominicus meets a group of Albigenses, watches their religious practices, and wishes to die as a martyr. He does not succeed: the Albigenses stay peaceful. The poem on the one hand shows that the two religions are nourished by black and white depictions. On the other hand it also explains what is meant by Albigensian belief. Like Mosheim, Lenau defines the heresy by its deviation from Catholicism, stressing that it comprises different forms of heresy and that it does not necessarily support dualism.⁶² Obviously, Lenau knows about the difficulties of Protestant historiography. He illustrates the vagueness of Albigensian belief in a ritual scene: an old man, the Bible in his hands and surrounded by his religious 'sons', introduces a disciple. A troubadour crowns the feast with a song against the Catholic enemy.

The troubadour reduces Catholicism to persecution and inquisition by comparing it to the Indian Goddess Amadurga (or Kali), Shiwa's wife.⁶³ In this case, Lenau's source is the first part of Peter Feddersen Stühr's *General History of the Religious Forms of the Pagan Peoples* (1836/1838):⁶⁴ Amadurga means fury. She

is armed with a sword and trident, has snakes around her body, and flies on a horse from hell for only one purpose: killing people.⁶⁵ Lenau's troubadour uses the analogy to blame Catholicism, but his song also reveals the making of hate and the demonization of Catholicism furthered by the Albigenses.

Although Lenau shows a certain sympathy for the Albigenian side, he points out a general human feeling and criticizes such black and white depictions as well as religious battles. It is 'A pain that belief drives such fruits.'⁶⁶ The 'Final Song' (*Schlußgesang*) completes this interpretation. It reintroduces the idea of a huge heretic tendency in religious history, but in a fatalistic way. 'Hussites follow the Albigenses / and revenged bloodily what those suffered; / After Huss and Ziska come Luther, Hutten, / The thirty years, the warriors of the Cevennes, / The fighter of the Bastille and so forth.'⁶⁷

According to Lenau, Albigenses and Catholics are closely interwoven. Life itself is a battlefield determined by struggle. In consequence, not only the Albigenses but even the Catholics become witnesses. Everybody testifies to his own ability to kill, the destructiveness of the human character, the ugly to express it in an aesthetical term common among the adversaries of *Theodicée* in the nineteenth century.⁶⁸ Lenau's poem writes 'world history'⁶⁹ in a negative way. On the one hand Lenau's text could be seen as a literary version of history demonstrated by its sources. Like the theologian Ferdinand Christian Baur and his famous disciple David Friedrich Strauss, Lenau wanted to find historical truth in religious history. On the other hand, by humanizing his subject Lenau participates in the large movement of neo-humanism that dominated thought and education in the nineteenth century. However, Lenau's result is of no use for the liberal politics of his age.⁷⁰ Protest does not produce free and open-minded human-beings. By his historical and anthropological explorations Lenau finally reverses early modern histories of heresy which were either in favour of the Catholics or the Albigenses. Witnesses and testimonies remain — witnesses and testimonies of the sad and fatalistic 'truth' that no truth can be found in religious history.

Conclusion

The Albigenses' case raises many questions. How should such a story of fall and rise be explained? Why were there such enormous interpretive differences, even in Protestant historiography? I shall provide several answers. Firstly, there is the problem of histories of heresy in general, as they relate to historical occurrences that only survive in highly polemical and tendentious texts. Secondly, the lack of sources and the fact that these sources are rarely consulted leads to speculation concerning religious doctrine. Thirdly, there is the inertia of the established pattern of description in the histories of heresy and in church history. When a concept of a heresy has become widely and authoritatively acknowledged it becomes increasingly difficult to oppose. Taking this into account, it is obvious why Lenau's *Albigenses* — despite its ahistorical point of view — seems relatively close to historical truth. Literature motivated by secular and anthropological interest not only escapes the disciplinary proceedings of contemporary theology, but it can also break with its 'truisms' and narratives.

¹ For that reason some histories of heresies do not mention the Albigenses; see e.g. *Die Zeugen der Wahrheit. Lebensbilder zum evangelischen Kalender auf alle Tage des Jahres*. Vol. 3: *Das Leben der Zeugen von der Mine des zwölften his in die zweite Hälfte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts*, ed. Ferdinand Piper (Leipzig, 1874). For discussion and proofreading I wish to thank Thomas Ahnert, Anja Hill-Zenk, and Mark Gregory Pegg.

² On aspects of this reception, see also the contributions by Luisa Simonutti, John G. A. Pocock, Patrick Coleman, Clorinda Donato, and Kathleen Hardesty Doig, in John Christian Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe. For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration* (New York, 2002).

³ Besides the files of the Inquisition, the disputations of their adversaries, and a history (Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, *Historia Albigenensis*), see Jean de Lugio, *Liber duo principiis*, a depiction of the so-called 'baptism of spirit' — known as the *Rituel de Florence* — a *Rituel de Lyon*, and a history by an unknown troubadour I will mention later.

⁴ See Jean Duvernoy, *La religion des Cathares. Le Catharisme* (Toulouse, 1986, 1st ed. 1979); Daniela Albiger — *Die wahre Kirche? Eine Untersuchung zum Kirchenverständnis der 'ecclesia Dei'* (Gerbrunn, 1986); Daniela Müller, 'Katharer,' in Gerhard Müller (ed), *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (Berlin, 1989), vol. 18, pp. 21-30; Arno Borst, *Die Katharer* (Freiburg, 1991). The narrative in question continues to exist in Beverly Mayne Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy, and Crusade in Occitania, 1145-1229: Preaching in the Lord's Vineyard* (Woodbridge, 2001); Constant J. Mews, Review of Kienzle, *The Medieval Review*, ID: 02.03.17.

⁵ Mark Gregory Pegg, *The Corruption of Angels. The Great Inquisition of 1245-1246* (Princeton, 2001), pp. 17-19; Pegg, *The Albigensian Crusade* (in press).

⁶ See Jörg Oberste, *Der Kreuz gegen die Albiger. Ketzerei und Machtpolitik im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt, 2003), pp. 186ff.

⁷ One of the best descriptions of the topos (with additional editions of principal heretical texts) is still Gustav Adolf Benrath (ed), *Wegbereiter der Reformation* (Wuppertal, 1988, 1st edn 1967).

⁸ More is to be found in Borst, *Die Katharer*.

⁹ Sebastian Franck, *Chronica, Zeitbuch und Geschichtsbibel: von Anbeginn bis in das gegenwärtige Jahr 1531* (Straßburg, 1531), 3. Chronica, I. 101 verso.

¹⁰ See Ludovicus Rabus, *Historien der Heyligen, Aufierwölten Gottes Zeugen. Bekenner und Martyrer [...] beschriben* (Straßburg, 1552-58), vol. 8, 1557-58. Unlike Flacius, Rabus stresses the moral implications of Christianity. Although the history of martyrs and witnesses was falsified by Catholicism, honest people always followed their 'own belief' (l. Theil, iij recto). Rabus wants to encourage his contemporaries to do the same (iiij recto / verso).

¹¹ His adversaries did react as soon as possible. William Eisengrein (1544-1570), a lawyer from Ingolstadt, again wrote a Catholic 'catalogus'; see Guillemo Eysengrein, *Catalogus Testium Veritatis [...]* (Dillingae, 1565).

¹² For that reason the witness-topos became a common feature of Protestant church histories; see e.g. Christian Wilhelm Franz Walch, *Geschichte der evangelischlutherischen Religion als ein Beweis daß sie die wahre sey* (Jena, 1753), pp. 13ff.

¹³ [Matthias Flacius Illyricus,] *Catalogus Testium Veritatis [...]*. ([Strasbourg], 1608), liber decimvsquintvs, pp. 1503-1529.

¹⁴ See also Sabine Müller, 'Das Ketzerverständnis bei Sebastian Franck und Matthias Flacius Illyricus am Beispiel der Katharer' (M.A. im Fach Neuere und Mittlere Geschichte der Justus-Liebig-Universität, Gießen 1997).

(www.bib.uni-giessen.de/ghm/2000/uni/m000001.htm, 30-6-2003), pp. 154ff.

¹⁵ Jean-François Gilmont, *Jean Crespin. Un éditeur relégué du XVI^e siècle* (Genève, 1981), p. 165. On Crespin's influence see also Amy C. Graves, 'Martyrs manqués: Simon Goulart, continuateur du martyrologe de Jean Crespin,' *Revue des Sciences humaines* 269/1 (2003): 53-68.

¹⁶ Otto Michaelis, evangelical parson in Metz, explicitly referred to Crespin. See Otto Michaelis, *Protestantisches Märtyrerbuch. Bilder und Urkunden der evangelischen Märtyrergeschichte aus vier Jahrhunderten* (Stuttgart, 1927,^{1st} edn 1917), p. 7.

¹⁷ [Jean Crespin,] *Märtyrerbuch. Denckwürdige Reden und Thaten vieler Märtyrer 1...* (Basel, 1597), p. 13.

¹⁸ Crespin, *Märtyrerbuch*, p. 3.

¹⁹ In his history on Catharism Arno Borst only refers to later examples (Jean Chassanion 1595, Philippe de Mornay 1611, Jean Paul Perrin 1618) that, in the Calvinist tradition, mingle Waldensians and Albigenses; see Borst, *Die Katharer*, p. 35.

²⁰ Crespin, *Märtyrerbuch*, pp. 92ff.

²¹ See W. A. Bienert, 'Ketzer oder Wahrheitszeuge. Zum Ketzerbegriff Gottfried Arnolds,' *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 88 (1977): 230-246; Andreas Urs Sommer, 'Geschichte und Praxis bei Gottfried Arnold,' *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 54/3 (2002): 210-243, especially 210-215, 225.

²² Gottfried Arnold, *Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie von Anfang des Neuen Testaments bis auff das Jahr Christi 1688* (Frankfurt, 1699), vol. I, p. 375.

²³ Arnold, *Unpartheyische*, p. 382.

²⁴ Arnold, *Unpartheyische*, p. 383.

²⁵ Arnold, *Unpartheyische*, p. 383.

²⁶ Arnold, *Unpartheyische*, p. 383.

²⁷ See Sandra Pott, 'Critica perennis. Zur Gattungsspezifik gelehrter Kommunikation im Umfeld der "Bibliothèque Germanique" (1720/21741),' in Helmut Zedelmaier and Martin Mulsow (eds), *Die Praktiken der Gelehrsamkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Tübingen, 2001), pp. 249-73, esp. 259-71. In a letter, Beausobre asked the German scholar Johann Christoph Wolf to send him two books on the Albigenses written by the Dominican Jean Benoît (*Histoire des Albigeois et des Vaudois ou Barbets. 2 Vol.*, Paris: Le Febvre, 1691; *Suite de l'Histoire des Albigeois*, Toulouse, 1693). But it remained unclear if Beausobre actually received them.

²⁸ Benoît tried to prove the singularity of the Albigenses, *Histoire*, vol. I, pp. 3-8. His aim is to legitimate the crusades as well as to delegitimize Catharism: *Histoire*, vol. I, p. 4.

²⁹ Johann Lorenz Mosheim, *Histoire ecclésiastique ancienne et moderne, depuis la naissance de Jesus-Christ jusqu'au commencement du XVIII^e siècle* Traduite de l'original latine avec des notes & des tables chronologiques, par Archibald Maclaine [...] (Maestricht, 1776), vol. 3, pp. 165-67, 274. In his history of heresies, Mosheim keeps this definition. See Johann Lorenz Mosheim, *Versuch einer*

unpartheiischen and gründlichen Ketzergeschichte (Helmstedt, 1746, reprint Waltrop, 1995), p. 3.

³⁰ Mosheim, *Histoire*, pp. 171ff., 175.

³¹ Mosheim, *Histoire*, pp. 200ff., 276, 282ff.

³² Mosheim, *Histoire*, p. 286.

³³ On the development of Mosheim's interest in heresies and its results, see Martin Mulsow, 'Eine "Rettung" des Servet und der Ophiten? Der junge Mosheim und die häretische Tradition,' in Martin Mulsow et al. (eds), *Johann Lorenz Mosheim (1693-1755). Theologie im Spannungsfeld von Philosophie, Philologie und Geschichte* (Wiesbaden, 1997), pp. 45-92.

³⁴ Johann Conrad Füssli, *Neue und unpartheyische Kirchen2 und Ketzerhistorie der mittlern Zeit. Erster Theil* (Frankfurt, 1770), p. 5.

³⁵ Füssli, *Ketzerhistorie*, pp. 34, 413-44. His sources are Benoit and the vehement anti-heretic history of Rudolf Glaber, *Historiarum libri quinque / The five books of the histories*, ed. and trans. John France (Oxford, 1993).

³⁶ Füssli, *Ketzerhistorie*, pp. 389, 394, 396.

³⁷ Theodor Fliedner (ed.), *Buch der Märtyrer, und andrer Glaubenszeugen der evangelischen Kirche, von den Aposteln his auf unsre Zeit, in drei Bdn. Zur Stärkung des Glaubens und der Liebe unsrer evangelischen Christenheit*, Vol. 1: *Von der apostolischen Zeit zur Reformation* (Kaiserswerth, 1852), pp. 688ff.

³⁸ Fliedner, *Buch der Märtyrer*, p. 689.

³⁹ Fliedner, *Bach der Märtyrer*, p. 693.

⁴⁰ See also Jochen Desel, *Hugenotten in der Literatur. Eine Bibliographie. Hugenotten, Waldenser, Wallonen und ihr Urmfeld in Erzählung, Biographie, Hagiographie, Drama, Geschichtsschreibung und Gedicht* (Bad Karlshafen, 1996).

⁴¹ Charles Robert Maturin, *The Albigenses. A Romance* (New York, 1992, orig. 1824).

⁴² Frédéric Bonhomme, *L'Albigeoise. Drame en Vers en cinq actes et six tableaux* (Cahors, 1898).

⁴³ Ludwig Huna, *Die Albigenserin. Roman* (Berlin, 1933).

⁴⁴ Ferdinand Christian Baur, important theologian and historiographer of the 19th century, wrote a book on the Manichean religious system, but he mentions the Cathars only once, in a distanced way, quoting a certain monk who considers their origin; see Baur, *Das Manichäische Religionssystem nach den Quellen neu untersucht und entwickelt* (1831, reprint, Gottingen, 1928), p. 289.

⁴⁵ On *The Albigenses* in the context of Lenau's work, see Peter Skrine, 'Die Albigenser,' in Alexander Stillmark and Fred Wagner (eds), *Lenau zwischen Ost und West. Londoner Symposium* (Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 103-120, especially 103ff.; Helmut Brandt, 'Lenaus "Albigenser" im Blickwinkel gewandelter Zeiten,' *Lenau-Forum* 21 (1995): 57-75, especially 62f.

⁴⁶ The death is interpreted as a murder although there is no historical evidence that Innocent died by force. See Nicolaus Lenau, 'Die Albigenser. Freie Dichtungen,' in Walter Dietze and Eduard Castle (eds), *Nicolaus Lenau, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe in zwei Bänden. Vol. 1: Gedichte und Versepen* (Frankfurt/M., 1971), p. 887.

⁴⁷ [de Tudela/Anon.,] *Histoire de la croisade contre les hérétiques albigeois écrite en vers provençaux par un poète contemporain*, trans. and ed. M.C. Fauriel (Paris,

1837). The remarks on Lenau's sources are to be found in the valuable commentary by Eduard Castle and Walter Dietze; Lenau, *Werke*, 1103f.

⁴⁸ Fauriel, 'Introduction', pp. XXVIII, XLVIIIff.

⁴⁹ De Tudela/Anon., *Histoire*, couplet CXLV.

⁵⁰ De Tudela/Anon., *Histoire*, couplet XXXV.

⁵¹ De Tudela/Anon., *Histoire*, couplet XV.

⁵² It is surprising that Lenau-scholarship has not recognized this close relation between the texts.

⁵³ Lenau, *Werke*, pp. 775-780.

⁵⁴ Skrine and Brandt already stress the differentiated way of Lenau to deal with the Catholics; Skrine, 'Die Albigenser', pp. 110-114; Brandt, 'Lenaus "Albigenses"', p. 67.

⁵⁵ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 802.

⁵⁶ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 803.

⁵⁷ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 803.

⁵⁸ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 792.

⁵⁹ Friedrich Diez, *Leben und Werke der Troubadours. Ein Beitrag zur nähern Kenntniss des Mittelalters*, ed. Karl Bartsch (Leipzig, 1882, edn 1829), pp. 194-206.

⁶⁰ Diez, *Leben*, pp. 148-187.

⁶¹ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 842.

⁶² Lenau, *Werke*, p. 812, fn.

⁶³ Lenau, *Werke*, pp. 815ff.

⁶⁴ Peter Feddersen Stuhr, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Religionsformen der heidnischen Völker. Erster Theil: Die Religions-Systeme der heidnischen Völker des Orients* (Berlin, 1836).

⁶⁵ Stuhr, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, pp. 107ff.

⁶⁶ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 833.

⁶⁷ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 889.

⁶⁸ Gerhard R. Kaiser, 'Poesie des Aases. Überlegungen zur Ästhetik des Hässliche in Lenaus "Albigenser"', *Lenau-Forum* 16/1-4 (1990): 52-75. On Lenau's aesthetics see Rüdiger Görner, 'Lenaus poetische Grenzerfahrung,' *Sprachkunst* 33/2 (2002): 195-203.

⁶⁹ Lenau, *Werke*, p. 780. See also Brandt, who describes the text as 'a great poem of Weltanschauung'; Brandt, 'Lenaus "Albigenser"', p. 64.

⁷⁰ In this respect I follow Kaiser's interpretation, whereas Brandt sets *The Albigenses* on the political stage of the 'Pre-March'; Brandt, 'Lenaus "Albigenser"', p. 75.

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